JIIA Strategic Comments (2026-4) Enhancing Greenland’s Future Strategic Value in the Arctic -- Independence, Annexation, or Free Association?

Toshio Sano(Former Ambassador of Japan to the Kingdom of Denmark)

JIIA Strategic Comments (2026-4) Enhancing Greenland’s Future Strategic Value in the Arctic -- Independence, Annexation, or Free Association?

Papers in the "JIIA Strategic Commentary Series" are prepared mainly by JIIA research fellows to provide comments and policy-oriented analyses of significant international affairs issues in a readily comprehensible and timely manner.

Introduction

The United States has attempted several times in the past to acquire the Danish territory of Greenland , and President Donald Trump has of late repeatedly expressed his intention to make yet another attempt, justifying this primarily from the perspective of US security despite the friction generated with Denmark and other European countries.
 A look back at modern history alone shows that Greenland as a strategic stronghold has been buffeted by international political disputes arising between major powers. Home to about 57,000 Inuit residents, this island aspires to independence and hence requires economic self-sufficiency. The progressing global warming of recent years offers bright prospects for its future, facilitating as it does the opening of Arctic Sea routes, the extraction of abundant underground resources, and the development of tourism. The challenge lies in securing Greenland as a key strategic point for Western Hemisphere defense amid Russia's militarization of the Arctic and China's growing involvement, while ensuring that Western investment allows Greenland to enjoy economic independence as well.

Greenland’s strategic importance

Greenland has played an extremely important role in Western Hemisphere or US-European defense, particularly since World War II.

Strategy vis-à-vis Germany

Denmark was occupied by Germany during the early stages of World War II, but Greenland was not immediately subjected to military occupation. The Roosevelt administration, which was maintaining US neutrality at this point, believed that any military bases that Germany might establish in Greenland would not only threaten maritime transport by the Allied nations Britain and Canada but also potentially expose New York and Washington to the direct threat of air raids. Accordingly, the US destroyed the meteorological observatory Germany was constructing in Greenland and subsequently placed the island under de facto US protection. Furthermore, Greenland was at the time almost the sole producer of cryolite (an essential material in producing the aluminum required for aircraft manufacturing), and the US government keenly felt the need to secure this strategic resource. The Roosevelt administration therefore applied the Monroe Doctrine to Greenland, citing its location in the Western Hemisphere, to prevent any European country from interfering in the island’s politics. After many twists and turns, the same administration in 1941 signed the Agreement between Denmark and the United States of America for the Defense of Greenland with Henrik de Kaufmann, the Danish minister to the United States who had rebelled against the Copenhagen government.  The US then moved to build military bases in Greenland that greatly boosted the British and Canadian war effort against Germany and played an extremely important role in Allied strategy vis-à-vis Germany once the United States had entered the war. The Agreement was subsequently revised in 1951 as the Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland, and the US military bases became permanent fixtures in the West’s strategy to counter the Soviet Union.

Strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union/Russia

  •  During the half-century Cold War, Thule Air Base (renamed and reorganized as Pituffik Space Base in 2023)  was positioned along the shortest route to the Soviet Union, functioning as a critical launch point for bombers targeting the USSR, an intercept base against missiles and bombers deployed on the Kola Peninsula targeting North America, and a ballistic missile early warning radar base. Indeed, it served as the hub for Cold War operations such as Operation Chrome Dome (which kept over 12 bombers constantly airborne to deter the Soviet Union) and was indispensable to US nuclear strategy. The deployment of nuclear weapons there became public knowledge in 1968 following the crash of a B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs.
  • Since the end of the Cold War, Greenland has proven a crucial outpost against Russia, which has intensified its authoritarian tendencies and accelerated the militarization of the polar regions. Since 2005, Russia has reactivated dozens of Soviet-era military bases along the Arctic Ocean, constructed a new base on Franz Josef Land, and strategically deployed nuclear-armed SSBNs. Its 2022 Maritime Doctrine emphasizes the vital importance of the Arctic Ocean, transforming it from a transit area into a deployment area for military forces. The Arctic power balance currently favors Russia heavily (CSIS), with Russian military bases in the region outnumbering NATO's by about 30% (IISS). Eight of Russia's eleven strategic nuclear submarines are concentrated in the Arctic. Russia possesses 37 icebreakers (seven of which are nuclear-powered), while the US and China each have only two diesel-powered vessels.
  • In response, the US published its "National Strategy for the Arctic Region" in 2022, conducted Arctic naval exercises such as "ICEX 2022" (which included aircraft carriers) and invested heavily in renovating the aging Pituffik Base to counter Russia. The Trump administration also announced the "Iron Dome Initiative" (later renamed "Golden Dome" in May 2025; total cost: approximately ¥27 trillion), declaring Greenland indispensable for commencing the initiative during his term and exhibiting a strong interest in claiming sovereignty over Greenland.
        NATO set a target of 5% of GDP for defense spending at its June 2025 summit. Member nations are pursuing initiatives that include constructing an Arctic spaceport (Canada, Sweden), deploying submarine detection and surveillance aircraft (Canada), developing drones capable of up to 40-hour flights (Denmark), reactivating Cold War-era radar bases (Denmark's Faroe Islands), increasing the number of Arctic surveillance satellites from four to eight (Norway), and conducting joint military exercises.

The context of US-China rivalry

Greenland may be considered the endpoint of the Belt and Road Initiative being pursued with abundant Chinese capital. China has conducted resource surveys in Greenland since the Lehman crisis, and Chinese companies have subsequently showed interest in exploration and development (though enthusiasm appears to have waned due to the challenges of long-term investment in frigid Greenland). In its 2018 Arctic Policy white paper, China presented the concept of a "Silk Road on Ice" and positioned itself as a near-Arctic state, drawing backlash from the United States. China's aim seemingly goes beyond exploiting Greenland's abundant rare earths , critical minerals and oil/natural gas resources to include stepping up its political involvement with this geographically strategic island. In fact, China Communications Construction Company participated in bidding on two airport expansion projects in Greenland and in 2016 expressed interest in acquiring the closed former US naval base at Kangerlussuaq. However, both proposals were rejected by the Danish government.

Information warfare hub that utilizes space

US military operations in the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap have traditionally fallen under the command of US European Command (EUCOM). This stems from the GIUK Gap's critical importance in defending the North Atlantic against the Soviet Union and later Russia. However, securing land-based facilities in the polar regions is now essential for sun-synchronous orbit satellites critical to obtaining military weather imagery (currently only Clear Space Force Station in Alaska fulfills this role), and Pituffik Space Base is expected to take on this function. Consequently, some argue that this base should be administratively transferred to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) jointly operated by the US and Canada.  The benefits cited include enhancing American, Canadian and Danish security through shared communications infrastructure, improved early warning capabilities, and expanded access for the Danish military to NORAD-related information.

Future visions for Greenland

 Greenland was a Danish colony for over 200 years but gained equal status with other Danish counties in 1953. This shift stemmed from Denmark's desire to clarify Greenland's sovereignty, driven by post-war fears of continued US protectorate status. Greenland subsequently expanded its autonomy, with the 2009 Self-Government Act granting local authority over judicial administration, policing, mineral resources, and many other areas. However, governance over the Supreme Court, foreign affairs, security, and monetary and financial policy remains with Denmark. Greenland was also granted the right to negotiate independence with Denmark. In 2023, the Greenlandic Constitutional Commission drafted a constitution to which the Danish government appears favorably disposed. Greenland's "internal autonomy" can be said to be maturing in terms of international law, paving the way for "external autonomy” (independence).
  On the other hand, Greenland relies on subsidies from Denmark for approximately 56% of its public expenditures (about 25% of its GDP), and Denmark is its primary trading partner. It has a monoculture economy based on fishing and seafood processing. In pursuing independence from the mainland, it has explored new industries, looking to capitalize on the opportunities for resource development and tourism offered by global warming, and solicited foreign investment to fund the necessary ports, airports and other infrastructure. Even so, the involvement of Chinese companies has raised concerns in the US and elsewhere.
What path will Greenland take going forward?
While approximately 56% of residents aspire to independence, the coalition agreement reached by four parties – Demokraatit, Siumut, Atassut, and Inuit Ataqatigiit – after the March 2025 parliamentary elections established a basic policy of not rushing independence but rather taking realistic steps. This outcome disappointed both the United States and China, who had anticipated that an independent Greenland would be easier to manage than one still sheltered by Denmark. What are the conceivable medium- to long-term options for Greenland's future?

  • An independent nation dependent on foreign capital from China and elsewhere
    Australia, the US, the Nordic nations, and China are among the countries that have shown investment interest in Greenland should it choose to continue relying on foreign capital to finance the infrastructure needed for resource and tourism development, but China is a cause for concern. If Greenland gains independence, China could potentially pursue resource development, acquire former US military bases, construct major roads, and renovate or build facilities such as airports and ports that could be used for military purposes, all without interference from the Danish government. A recent public opinion survey in Greenland shows that support for cooperation with China stands at a not insignificant 39%. Nevertheless, some argue that China's influence should not be overestimated going forward, given the difficulty of long-term investment in Greenland and a slowdown in the Chinese economy.
  • Greenland under US control
    In this scenario, Greenland would become part of the United States, enabling the US and NATO to fully benefit from Greenland's strategic value as described above but keeping unfulfilled the Inuit people's long-cherished aspiration for independence. The truth is, however, that approximately 85% of Greenland's residents currently oppose US sovereignty, and many participate in protesting the prospect. It is unlikely this sentiment will change significantly in the future. Would US sovereignty be sustainable under these circumstances? Could it leave lingering problems for the future, with the issue of independence for Greenland becoming a thorn in the side of US domestic politics? Within the US itself, 69% oppose annexation (57% of Republican respondents), while support stands at only 11%. At this year's Davos meeting, the US and NATO leaders came to a consensus on creating a "framework of a future deal” regarding the entire Arctic region, including Greenland, and the US ruled out the use of force. This agreement can be viewed positively from the perspective of ensuring Western and NATO unity.
  •  A free association with the United States or Denmark
     A third possibility would see an independent Greenland form a free association with either the United States or Denmark, an option recognized in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Indeed, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau, all of which were former US Trust Territories, entered into Compact of Free Association (COFA) agreements with the United States after independence. These arrangements combine US economic assistance with the delegation of foreign and security policy to the United States. The Cook Islands has a similar arrangement with New Zealand. While Greenland’s circumstances differ somewhat, following a path similar to these precedents is conceivable. As a matter of fact, the 2023 draft constitution for Greenland considers this "free association model" as one possibility. In this scenario, Greenland as an independent nation would likely become a member of NATO under the diplomatic and security umbrella of either the United States or Denmark. It must be understood, however, that situations could arise such as the recent conclusion by the Cook Islands of a cooperation agreement with China that slightly undermined its relationship with New Zealand.

Conclusion

As stated at the outset, the issues at hand are securing the independence-seeking Greenland as a strategic stronghold for Western Hemisphere defense and advancing resource and tourism development under Western leadership, all the while minimizing Chinese influence. President Trump seeks to resolve both straight away through "annexation," but this approach is creating friction and conflict between the US and Denmark/Europe and fracturing Western unity.
  The most realistic solution to the former issue – and the one that would generate the least friction with Denmark and other European nations – would likely be for the US to recognize the status quo in Greenland while establishing sufficient Space Force assets and other defense-related facilities on Greenland for Western Hemisphere defense. Denmark is likely not unfriendly to the idea of the Trump administration having a free hand in Greenland to implement the Golden Dome concept if it so wishes, as Greenland's defense relied almost entirely on Thule Air Base, i.e., the United States, throughout the Cold War. In that context, Denmark's integration into NORAD would also merit serious consideration.
  Regarding the latter issue, Greenland's choices after achieving independence could become a concern if China continues to show interest not only in accessing resources but also in becoming politically involved there. Should Greenland lean toward China and its rare earths come under the control of Chinese companies, Japan and the West would face a problem in terms of economic security. Therefore, the West must now present viable alternatives to China by, say, boosting Western private investment to meet Greenland's robust resource development needs, developing tourism infrastructure, providing technical cooperation, and even considering the formation of a Western lending consortium focused on Greenland (Greenland's GDP per capita is approximately $58,000, making it ineligible for ODA).  The United States in particular should encourage private investment aligned with Greenland's interests and strongly support Greenland's development, employment, and investment plans.

 (This article reflects the author's personal views and does not represent the views of any organization)


  1. President Andrew Johnson had plans in the 1860s to acquire Greenland following the purchase of Alaska. President Harry Truman also reportedly put together a $100 million acquisition plan in 1946. Note that today’s US Virgin Islands were acquired from Denmark in 1917.
  2. Lidegaard, B. (2003). Defiant Diplomacy: Henrik Kauffmann, Denmark, and the United States in World War II and the Cold War, 1939–1958 (Studies in Modern European History, Vol. 54). Peter Lang.
  3. Pituffik Space Base is currently the only US military base in Greenland and the only Space Force base overseas.
  4. Greenland's rare earth reserves are said to be among the world's largest. The New York Times estimates their value at $12.5–77.0 billion, while The Economist and The Times report figures in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
  5. Rand Corporation, "Should Greenland and Denmark become a part of NORAD?" (https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/09/should-greenland-and-denmark-become-part-of-norad.html) (last accessed on January 28, 2026)
  6. Last November, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry dispatched a delegation to Greenland whose participants included government officials and representatives from trading companies and other businesses. While details remain unclear, reports indicate the delegation inspected mining operations in the Arctic environment and the status of rare earth exploration and development, while also investigating business opportunities for Japanese companies in the Arctic region.