

インド・パキスタンの核実験
内容、目的、動機および国際社会の反応

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序

本稿は、1998年5月にインドおよびパキスタンにより実施された地下核爆発実験に関して、その内容、動機および目的、ならびにその後の両国および国際社会の動きについて事実関係をまとめるとともに、この問題に関する声明および決議などを添付したものである。

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インドおよびパキスタンの核実験

- 内容、目的、動機および国際社会の反応 -

1 はじめに

核不拡散条約(NPT)では、核兵器の保有を、「1967年1月1日前に核兵器その他の核爆発装置を製造しかつ爆発させた(第9条3項)」中国、フランス、ソ連(ロシア)、英国および米国の「核兵器国(nuclear-weapon states)」5カ国だけに認め、その他の国家を「非核兵器国(non-nuclear-weapon states)」として核兵器の保有を禁じた。

しかしながら、国際社会には、NPTに加入せず、核兵器保有の意思を有し、すでに核兵器を保有しているかまたは短時間に製造する能力を持つ国家、すなわち「核敷居国(nuclear threshold states)」があり、現在ではインド、パキスタンおよびイスラエルの3カ国がこれに該当する。これら3カ国は、インドが1974年に実施した「平和目的」の地下核爆発実験を除き、核爆発実験を行ってこなかった。また核敷居国は、核兵器を製造する能力は持つが、核兵器自体は保有していないと主張して、曖昧な態度をとり続けてきた。

この状況は、1998年5月にインドおよびパキスタンが地下核爆発実験を実施し、核兵器の保有を宣言したことにより一変した。以下は、インドおよびパキスタンの核実験の内容、目的および動機と、その後の両国および国際社会の動きに関して、これまでに発表された声明および決議などを参考に、事実関係をまとめたものである。

2 インド核実験と国際社会の反応

インドの地下核爆発実験

1998年5月11日、インドのバジパイ首相は、ラジャスタン州のポカラン実験場において3回の地下核爆発実験を実施したと発表した。この核実験は、包括的核実験禁止条約(CTBT)採択後に、しかも5核兵器国以外の国家により実施されたことに加えて、米国の情報機関も事前に察知できなかったことから、国際社会に大きな衝撃を与えた。インドは、この2日後の5月13日にも2回の地下核爆発実験を実施したと発表した。

核実験の詳細は、インド原子力省および国防研究開発機構の共同声明により発表された。その共同声明によると、11日の実験では、核分裂装置、低出力爆発装置および熱核反応

装置の計3つを同時に爆発させ、爆発規模はそれぞれ12kt(キロトン)、0.2ktおよび43ktであった。また13日の実験では、2つの低出力爆発装置が使用され、その規模は0.2ktおよび0.6ktであった。これら一連の実験により、異なる目的および運搬手段のための異なる威力の核兵器を設計するのに重要なデータが得られたこと、コンピューター・シミュレーションの能力が強化されたこと、ならびに将来の未臨界実験への道を開くものもあったことを明らかにした¹。1974年の核実験の際には、「平和目的」であること、ならびに核兵器を製造する意思はなく、軍事利用には引き続き反対することを強調したが、今回は、核爆発装置の兵器化およびその改良を主眼とした軍事目的の核実験であった。

バジパイ首相は5月27日の声明で、「核およびミサイルの拡散の結果、われわれの安全保障環境が悪化した」こと、「隣国では核兵器が増大し、より高性能化した運搬手段も導入された」ことをあげて、パキスタンおよび中国の脅威が核実験の動機であったと述べるとともに、核兵器国は核軍縮の努力を怠っていると批判した上で、核実験は自国の安全保障を維持するために最低限必要な行為であり、国際法にも違反していないと主張した。またバジパイ首相は、「インドは今や核兵器国である」と宣言し、その核兵器は、他国への侵略あるいは威嚇のために用いられるのではなく、インドが核の威嚇を受けないことを確保する自衛の兵器であり、軍拡競争に参加する意図もないことを強調した。加えて、核実験のモラトリアムを宣言し、さらなる地下核爆発実験を実施しないことを約束した²。

インドが発表した核実験の内容に関しては、実際とは異なっていたとの見方が少なくない。11日の核実験で測定された地震波はマグニチュード4.7であり、爆発規模は、実際には25ないし30ktであったと推測されている。使用された3つの装置のうちの1つは熱核反応装置であったとのインドの主張についても、実際には核分裂強化装置(boosted fissile device)であったと考えられている³。またインド政府は、この実験で放射能漏れはなかつ

¹ “Joint Statement by Department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research and Development Organisation”, New Delhi, 17 May 1998.以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), pp.4-5.

² “Suo Motu Statement by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Parliament”, 27 May 1998.以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), pp.5-6.

³ 以下を参照。David Albright, “The Shots Heard ‘Round the World: India Conducted Three Nuclear Tests on May 11 and Two on May 13”, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol.54, No.4 (July/August 1998), pp.22-23.; Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), “Proliferation-Related Developments: India and Pakistan”, *PPNN Newsbrief*, No.42 (Insert: 2nd Quarter 1998), p.1.; Rebecca Johnson, “International Implications of the India-Pakistan Tests”, *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.28 (July 1998), p.27.

たと発表したが、実験場近くでは被爆による症状とみられる患者が急増しており、放射能漏れがあった疑いが持たれている。

インドの核兵器開発には、兵器級プルトニウムが使われており、今回の核爆発実験で使用された核爆発装置もプルトニウム型のものであった。1993年のS I P R Iの研究では、インドは年間約35kg、1995年末までに425kgの兵器級プルトニウムを生産していると推計された⁴。すべての兵器級プルトニウムを用いれば、約80発の核兵器を製造することが可能な量である。

国際社会の対応

インドの地下核爆発実験に対して、国連事務総長は、インドの核実験は国際社会によって認められた規範に反する行為であるとして遺憾の意を示し⁵、インドおよびすべての国家に対して、核軍縮に向けた進展ができるだけ早く達成されるために、核実験および核不拡散に関する国際社会の規範が守られるよう求めた⁶。国連安全保障理事会(安保理)議長も、インドの二度にわたる核実験を非難し、インドにさらなる核実験を実施しないよう求める声明を発表した⁷。また多くの国が、インドの核実験実施を非難し、核実験の停止などインドに対する要求に関する声明を発表した。主要国は、主要8カ国(G8)首脳会談での共同声明に見られるように、この問題に一致して対処することを約束したが、対インド制裁に関しては、各国の対応に大きな違いが表れた。

(1)対インド制裁

日本は、11日のインドの地下核爆発実験を受けて、インドに対して、核実験の即時停止、ならびにNPTおよびCTBTへの早期加入を求めるとともに、経済制裁を発動する声明を発表した。その制裁は、対インド無償資金協力に関して新規の協力は停止すること(緊急・人道的性格の援助および草の根無償資金協力は除く)、対インド円借款は今後のインドの対応に応じて具体的方針を決定すること、ならびに対インド支援国会合の東京開催

⁴ David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, *World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.158-161. 参照。

⁵ SG/SM/6555 of 11 May 1998.

⁶ SG/SM/6560 of 13 May 1998.

⁷ S/PRST/1998/12 of 14 May 1998.

招致を見合わせるということであった⁸。日本は、インドの13日の地下核爆発実験の後、インドに対する新規円借款を停止し、国際開発金融機関による対インド融資について慎重に対応するという制裁を追加した⁹。

米国は、5核兵器国以外の国家が核実験を実施した場合に自動的に経済制裁が発動される武器輸出管理法(グレン修正法)に基づき、インドに対して、人道目的の援助を除く経済援助の停止、防衛関連装備品の売却などすべての軍事的支援の停止、米国政府による信用供与あるいは他の財政援助などの拒否、国際金融機関による財政あるいは技術援助のための融資延長への反対、米国の銀行によるインド政府との金融関連取引の禁止、ならびに輸出ライセンスを条件とする特定の物品および技術の輸出禁止といった、制裁を課した¹⁰。

日米以外では、オーストラリアによるインドとの二国間防衛関係の中断および人道援助を除く援助の中断¹¹、デンマークによる供与の凍結、スウェーデンによる援助合意の削減、あるいはドイツによる対インド援助協議および貿易協力に関する会議の中止といった制裁が発動された¹²。またカナダおよびニュージーランドなどは、駐インド高等弁務官を召喚した。制裁に加えてカナダは、核爆発実験によってインドは国連安保理常任理事国になる資格を失ったと発言し、核兵器の保有が大国としての地位には結びつかないとの姿勢を明確にした¹³。

国際金融機関では、世界銀行が5月26日に、総額8億6500万ドルの対インド融資に関する決定を延期すると発表した。米国は当初、融資の停止を求め、日本およびカナダはこれを支持したものの、過半数の支持を得ることができず、融資の延期に賛成するEU諸国との間で妥協が図られた形となった¹⁴。

⁸ 村岡官房長官「インドの核実験実施に対する我が国の対応について」外務省ホームページ (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/happyo/danwa/danwa_10/dmu_0513.html)、1998年5月13日。

⁹ 村岡官房長官「インドによる第二回核実験実施を踏まえた我が国の措置について」外務省ホームページ (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/happyo/danwa/danwa_10/dmu_0514.html)、1998年5月14日。

¹⁰ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the Press Secretary: India Sanctions”, the White House Office of the Press Statement, 13 May 1998 (<http://www.state.gov/regions/sa/>).

¹¹ Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Alexander Downer MP, “Australian Response to Indian Nuclear Tests”, *Peace and Disarmament News* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Australia), p.5.

¹² PPNN, *op.cit.*, p.3.

¹³ 「インドの常任理事国入り：核実験で資格失った」『産経新聞』1998年5月27日。

¹⁴ PPNN, *op.cit.*, p.3.; 「世界銀行、対インド融資延期」『毎日新聞』1998年5月27日。

(2) 米国以外の核兵器国の対応

米国以外の核兵器国は、インドの核実験に対して懸念あるいは遺憾の意を表明したものの、英国が駐インド高等弁務官を召喚した以外には制裁は行わなかった。フランスは、経済制裁はインドを核不拡散に関連する諸条約に署名させるための試みとしては適切ではないと主張して、米国などインドに対して制裁を課した国とは一線を画した¹⁵。

インドと緊密な関係にあり、同国にとって最大の兵器供給国であるロシアは、エリツィン大統領が個人的な失望を示したものの、プリマコフ外相は、制裁ではなく両国間の特別な関係および影響力によって対処すると述べて、対インド制裁には加わらないと発言した¹⁶。またロシア駐インド大使は、インドがC T B Tなどに署名し、国際的な核管理体制に参加すれば、ロシアはインドを第6の核兵器国として承認する意向を示したとも伝えられた¹⁷。

パキスタンと緊密な関係にある中国は、インドは南アジアにおける覇権を獲得するために核実験禁止の国際的な努力を傷つけたと述べて、その核実験を強く非難するとともに、中国がインドに脅威を与えているというインドの主張は根拠がないものであり、核兵器開発の口実に過ぎないと主張した¹⁸。

(3) G 8 首脳会議

バーミンガム(英国)で開催されていたG 8 首脳会議でも、インド核実験問題が緊急に取り上げられた。5月15日には声明が発表され、インドによる核実験は、C T B Tの149の署名国により表わされた意思、世界的核不拡散体制を強化する努力、ならびに地域および国際の平和および安全を強化するステップに逆行するものと非難した。またインドおよび南アジア諸国に対して、さらなる核実験および核兵器やミサイルの配備を行わないこと、N P TおよびC T B Tに無条件に加入すること、ならびにカットオフ条約交渉に参加することを求めた¹⁹。インドに対する要求に加えて、現行の核不拡散体制を堅持し、インドを

¹⁵ “French Opposes US Sanctions on India over Tests”, *Reuters*, 13 May 1998. この資料は、ACRONYM Web より。

¹⁶ “Yeltsin Regrets Indian Nuclear Test”, *United Press International*, 12 May 1998. 以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), p.12

¹⁷ 「核保有国に承認も：ロシア駐印大使が意向」『読売新聞』1998年5月24日。

¹⁸ “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on Indian Nuclear Tests”, Press Release, 14 May 1998 (<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/e/b/eba.htm>).

¹⁹ G8 Statement on Indian Nuclear Tests, ‘Regional Statements’, Birmingham, UK, 15 May 1998. 以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), p11.

核兵器国として認めないことに主要国が合意したことは、大きな意義といえる。しかしながら、インドに対する多数国間制裁を発動すべきという米国の要求は、フランス、ロシアおよび英国が受け入れなかったため、声明では言及されなかった²⁰。

3 インド核実験後のパキスタンをめぐる動き

過去3回のインドとの戦争にいずれも敗北したパキスタンは、インドに対抗して核兵器開発を決定し継続してきた。そのパキスタンは、インドによる5月11日および13日の核実験、ならびにその後の核兵器配備の宣言およびパキスタンに対する敵対的な発言²¹に反発し、インドのこれらの行為を非難した。またパキスタン国内からは、自国も核実験を実施すべきとの声が高まった。軍部に近いカーン外相は、11日のインドによる核実験実施後、「自国の安全保障のために必要なすべての措置を行う権利を留保する」と発言して、核実験の実施を示唆した²²。その一方で、アジズ蔵相あるいはパキスタンの経済界からは、経済制裁が実施されればパキスタンの経済状況は一層悪化するとの予測から、核実験の実施に反対する意向が示された²³。

パキスタンは、5月14日の軍縮会議において、インドの核実験を非難するとともに、南アジアの戦略および安全保障の均衡は大きく変化し、そのような新しい戦略環境において、パキスタンに求められている核実験実施の自制、C T B Tへの署名あるいはカット・オフ条約交渉の合意といった要求は受け入れられないと発言した。加えて、インドの核兵器および通常兵器の脅威を抑止する能力を永久に妨げるコミットメントは受け入れないと述べて、核実験の実施を強く示唆した。またこの声明では、パキスタンの核あるいはミサイル分野における活動は、インドの行為に対抗する手段として行われてきたこと、ならびにそれらの活動は自制されたものであったことを強調した²⁴。

²⁰ A. Srivastava, "In the Eye of a Storm: Indo-US Strategic Dialogue", *The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control*, Vol.4, No.2-3 (Spring Summer 1998), p.9.

²¹ たとえば、インドのアドバニ内相は、カシミールにおけるパキスタンの敵対行為には断固とした対応を取ると発言して、核兵器使用の可能性を示唆した。「カシミールで挑発：対パキスタン核使用の可能性示唆」『読売新聞』1998年5月21日。

²² John F. Burns, "India Carried out Nuclear Tests in Defiance of International Treaty", *The New York Times* (web-version), 12 May 1998 (<http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/051298india-nuke.html>).

²³ Stephen Kinzer, "Pakistan Tells U.S. Delegation It Has Not Decided on Nuclear Tests", *The New York Times* (web-version), 16 May 1998 (<http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/051698pakistan-us.html>).

²⁴ "Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan", the Conference on Disarmament, 14 May 1998.

米国の偵察衛星は、パキスタンが核実験の準備を進めていることを探知していたが、パキスタンのシャリフ首相は、核実験を実施するとの最終的な決定は下していないという態度を保っていた。

パキスタンに対する核実験実施の自制を説得するために、日本は登誠一郎内閣外政審議室長を特使として、また米国もタルボット国務副長官を団長とする特使を、それぞれパキスタンに派遣した。日本、米国および英国などの首脳も、シャリフ首相との電話での会談で説得を繰り返した。

パキスタンに対する説得が成功する鍵は、核実験の自制によりパキスタンが何を得られるかにあると見られた。パキスタンは、米国の特使に対して、インドの脅威の深刻さを国際社会が認識すること、米国による軍事支援の制限を解除すること、ならびにカシミールを巡るインドとの紛争において外交的に支持することを求めたと伝えられた²⁵。またパキスタンに核実験の実施を自制させるためには、米国あるいは中国が核に関する何らかの安全保障(security assurances)をパキスタンに提供することが最も有効であるとの意見も少なくなかった。

米国は、パキスタンに対して、核実験実施の自制の見返りとして、50億ドルの信用保証、武器供与、F 16戦闘機の引き渡し、対パキスタン制裁を定めたプレスラー条項の廃止、ならびにパキスタンでの米国の資本投資の促進などを示したと伝えられた²⁶。パキスタンと中国との会談では、パキスタンがインドからの攻撃に対して核に関する安全保障の提供を求めたものの、中国は、パキスタンが核実験を実施しても制裁を発動しないことは約束したが、「他国に核の傘は提供しない」として、パキスタンの要請を断ったと報道された²⁷。

カーン外相は、核兵器国が核の傘を提供すれば核実験を再考することもありえると発言したが²⁸、米国および中国ともパキスタンに核の傘の提供を約束することはなかった。シャリフ首相も、G 8でのインドへの対応、とくにフランス、ロシアおよび英国がインドに

以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), pp.6-10.

²⁵ Stephen Kinzer, "Pakistan Tells U.S. Delegation It Has Not Decided on Nuclear Tests", *The New York Times* (web-version), 16 May 1998 (<http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/051698pakistan-us.html>)..

²⁶ 「核実験実施の回避は難しい」『産経新聞』1998年5月27日。

²⁷ Elisabeth Rosenthal, "China Seems to Deny Pakistan a Nuclear Umbrella", *The New York Times* (web-version), 21 May 1998 (<http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/052198pakistan-china.html>).

²⁸ 「「核実験再考も」：パキスタン外相が明言」『日本経済新聞』1998年5月24日。

対して制裁を課さないことに失望したと発言し²⁹、パキスタンによる核実験の実施がもはや避けられないとの悲観的な見方が強まった。

4 パキスタン核実験と国際社会の反応

パキスタンの地下核爆発実験

シャリフ首相は、5月28日にパルチスタン州のチャガイ丘陵において5回の地下核爆発実験を実施したと発表し、この実験では放射能漏れはなかったこと、ならびにパキスタンは核兵器を保有しており、すでにミサイルに装着していることを明らかにした。また同日、タラル大統領は、非常事態宣言を行った。パキスタンは、5月30日にも1回の地下核爆発実験を実施した。

核実験実施の理由として、シャリフ首相は、インドによる核実験とその後のパキスタンを威嚇する発言が地域の安全保障、平和および安定に脅威を与えたこと、ならびに国際社会のインドに対する対応は南アジアの安全保障環境を変える要因にはならなかったことをあげ、自衛のために核実験以外に選択の余地がなかったと述べた。またシャリフ首相は、パキスタンの核兵器は、他国からの核兵器あるいは通常兵器による侵略を抑止するものであること、パキスタンは効果的な指揮管理システムを有していること、ならびに機微な技術を他の国家には移転しないことを明言した³⁰。パキスタン外務次官は、5月30日の会見で、核実験によりパキスタンが抑止力を持つことが証明され、南アジアにおける戦略的均衡が保たれたと核実験の意義を述べた³¹。

核不拡散体制への参加に関しては、パキスタンは、核実験実施を発表する数時間前に、5月28日の軍縮会議において、インドが核兵器国としての地位を維持し続ける間、パキスタンは核不拡散に関するいかなる文書の交渉あるいは受諾はできないと主張し、CTBTへの署名は考えておらず、カットオフ条約交渉にも加わる意思のないことを示した³²。

²⁹ 「パキスタン首相が声明：インドを強く非難」『朝日新聞』1998年5月24日。

³⁰ “Text of Prime Minister Muhammed Nawaz Sharif at a Press Conference on Pakistan Nuclear Tests”, Islamabad, 28 May 1998. 以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), pp.13-14.

³¹ Remarks by Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed”, 30 May 1998. 以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), pp.4-5.

³² “Statement by Ambassador Munir Karam, Pakistan”, the Conference on Disarmament, 28 May 1998. 以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), p.15.

パキスタンが実施した核実験の詳細は、核開発の責任者であるカーン博士およびパキスタン原子力委員会が明らかにした。それらの説明によると、5月28日の実験のうち、1回が30ないし35ktの規模の爆発で、残り4回が低出力の小型の戦術兵器を使用したものであった。また30日の実験では、15ないし18ktの爆発規模であった。また使用された核爆発装置はすべて、高濃縮ウランを用いたものであった³³。

しかしながら、パキスタンの核実験に関しても、その内容に関する発表と実際とは異なっていたと考えられている。5回の核爆発と発表された28日の実験は、測定された地震波から、実際には1ないしは2回の爆発で、その爆発規模も、マグニチュード4.6と測定されたことから、最大でも15ktであったと推測されている。また30日の実験でも、実際には1ないしは3ktの爆発規模であったとの見方がなされている³⁴。

パキスタンの核兵器開発には高濃縮ウランが用いられている。パキスタンは1986年より兵器級ウランの生産を開始したが、1989年から約1年間、米国の圧力によりその生産を中断していた。その後、1990年に高濃縮ウランの生産を再開し、1991年に再び生産を停止した。S I P R Iの研究では、1991年までに約200kgの高濃縮ウランを生産していたと考えられており、これは10発ほどの核兵器を製造できる量に相当する³⁵。

インドの反応

パキスタンの28日の実験に対して、バジパイ首相は、「パキスタンがわれわれに核抑止の道を進ませた」と述べて、パキスタンによるこれまでの核兵器開発がインドに脅威を与えてきたため、核実験を実施せざるを得なかったと主張した。また、「インドはいかなる挑戦にも受けて立つ用意がある」と述べて、パキスタンに対する報復の可能性を排除しなかった³⁶。インド外務省の声明でも、パキスタンの核実験により、インドの政策およびこれまでの措置が正しいものであったと証明され、国家安全保障のために必要なすべての措

³³ Howard Diamond, "India Conducted Nuclear Tests: Pakistan Follows Suit", *Arms Control Today*, No.28, Vol.4 (May 1998), p.22.

³⁴ 以下を参照。PPNN, *op.cit.*, p.5.; David. Albright, "Pakistan: The Other Shoe Drops", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol.54, No.4 (July/August 1998), pp.24-25; Rebecca Johnson, "International Implications of the India-Pakistan Tests", *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.28 (July 1998), p.27..

³⁵ Albright, Berkhout and Walker, *op.cit.*, pp.162-167.参照。

³⁶ John F. Burns, "Pakistan, Answering India, Carried out Nuclear Tests", *The New York Times* (web-version), 29 May 1998 (<http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/052998pakistan-nuke.html>).

置をとってきたと主張した³⁷。インド外務省は、パキスタンの30日の実験後にも声明を発表し、インドはすでに核実験のモラトリアムを宣言しており、追加の核爆発実験は実施しないことを確認した³⁸。

国際社会の反応

28日のパキスタンの実験直後、国連事務総長は、インドおよびパキスタンの核実験に遺憾の意を表明し、両国に対してC T B Tへの署名、二国間での先制不使用の約束、ならびに核兵器開発計画の凍結を求めた³⁹。その翌日には、パキスタンの核実験を非難する安保理議長声明が発表され、インドおよびパキスタンにさらなる核実験を実施しないこと、ならびに二国間対話を再開することを求めた⁴⁰。また30日の実験の後、国連事務総長は、パキスタンに核実験のモラトリアムを宣言するよう求めた⁴¹。

インドの核実験の時と同様に、多くの国家がパキスタンの核実験を非難するとともに、インドおよびパキスタンに対してさまざまな要求を行ったが、対パキスタン制裁に関しては、各国の対応には大きな相違が見られた。

(1)対パキスタン制裁

日本は、パキスタンの核実験に遺憾の意を表明するとともに、パキスタンに対して核実験および核開発の即時停止を、またインドおよびパキスタンに対して核軍拡競争を開始しないこと、ならびにN P TおよびC T B Tに無条件で加入することを求めた。また日本は、パキスタンに対して、O D A大綱原則に基づき、新規無償資金協力を停止すること(緊急・人道的性格の援助および草の根無償資金協力は除く)、新規円借款を停止すること、国際開発金融機関による対パキスタン融資については慎重に対応することといった経済制裁を発動した⁴²。

³⁷ “Official Press Releases, Ministry of External Affairs”, New Delhi, 28 May 1998. 以下に掲載されている。*Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), p.16.

³⁸ “Official Press Releases, Ministry of External Affairs”, New Delhi, 31 May 1998. 以下に掲載されている。*Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), p.16

³⁹ SG/AM/6575 of 28 May 1998.

⁴⁰ SC/6524 of 29 May 1998.

⁴¹ SG/SM/6577 of 30 May 1998.

⁴² 「パキスタンの核実験実施に対する我が国の措置について」外務省ホームページ、1998年5月29日 (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/happyo/danwa/danwa_10/dmu_0529.html)。

米国も、グレン修正法に基づいて、パキスタンに対して制裁を課した。その内容は、人道目的を除く経済援助の停止、防衛関連装備品の売却などすべての軍事的支援の停止、米国政府による信用供与あるいは他の財政援助などの禁止、国際金融機関による財政あるいは技術援助のための融資延長への反対、米国の銀行によるパキスタン政府との金融関連取引の禁止、ならびに輸出ライセンスを条件とする特定の物品および技術の輸出禁止というものであった⁴³。

この他には、カナダは、人道目的以外の対パキスタン経済援助の停止、軍事関連物資の輸出禁止、国際金融機関に対するパキスタン向け援助の延期要請などの制裁措置を発動した⁴⁴。ドイツは、経済援助に関するパキスタンとの協議を中断した⁴⁵。オーストラリアは、パキスタンとの二国間防衛関係の中断、ならびに人道援助を除く援助の中断を決定した⁴⁶。またカナダおよびオーストラリアなどは、駐パキスタン高等弁務官を召喚した。

(2)米国以外の核兵器国の対応

米国以外の核兵器国は、インドの場合と同様に、非難声明は発表したものの、英国が駐パキスタン高等弁務官を召喚した以外は、経済制裁を発動しなかった。たとえばロシアは、「孤立や経済制裁よりも対話によって、よりよい結果を達成することができる⁴⁷」として、インドおよびパキスタンに経済制裁を課すことに反対した。

パキスタンと緊密な関係にある中国は、パキスタンの核実験に深い遺憾の意を表明するとともに、南アジアにおける核軍備競争に深い懸念を表明した⁴⁸。インドに対する非難声明と比較してパキスタンに配慮した表現になっている。またインドの核実験後にパキスタンに約束したように、核実験に対する対パキスタン制裁には加わらなかった。

⁴³ The Bureau of Economic and Agricultural Affairs, the United States of America, "Fact Sheet: India and Pakistan Sanctions", 18 June 1998.

⁴⁴ 『毎日新聞』1998年5月29日。

⁴⁵ 『毎日新聞(夕刊)』1998年5月29日。

⁴⁶ Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Alexander Downer MP, "Pakistan Nuclear Tests", *Peace and Disarmament News* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Australia), p.6.

⁴⁷ "Remarks by Valery Nesterushkin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman", 29 May 1998. 以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), p.18.

⁴⁸ "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhu Bangzao issued the following statement on Pakistan's nuclear tests", 28 May 1998 (<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/e/b/eba.htm>)

5 インドおよびパキスタンの核実験の動機

インドは、核実験を実施した理由として、中国およびパキスタンの脅威、ならびに核兵器国による核軍縮の努力不足をあげた。NPT無期限延長の決定およびCTBTの採択により、核兵器国と非核兵器国との間の不均衡は固定化され、とくにインドにとっては、核爆発実験の禁止により、中国に対する通常戦力および核戦力の劣勢を挽回することが困難になる。インドによる今回の核実験は、その核抑止力を示すとともに、核兵器の改良を可能にするデータを得ることで、中国との戦略的均衡を達成することを目的としたものといえる。

しかしながら、その後の分析では、核実験実施には安全保障の強化以外の2つの要素が強く働いたと考えられている。

1つは、国内政治の要素である。バジパイ首相が属するインド人民党(BJP)は、選挙綱領の中で、核実験の実施および核兵器の配備を明記していた。そのBJPを中心とする連立政権に対しては、政権内外から批判の声が上がっていた。核実験の実施は、BJPの公約を実行に移すとともに、政権に対する批判を核実験の支持に変え、BJP政権の権力基盤を強化するという計算が働いたと思われる。

もう1つは、国際的あるいは地域的な地位の獲得という要素である。インドが国際的な地位の象徴と考え、長年にわたってその椅子を求めている国連安保理常任理事国はすべて核兵器国であり、その核兵器国には地域の大国である中国が含まれている。国際的あるいは地域的な地位の獲得には核兵器の存在が不可欠であり、核に関する抑制や非核化によっては得られないと判断したと分析されている⁴⁹。

パキスタンに関しては、声明でも述べられたように、インドの核実験に対抗するとともに、インドに対する抑止力の確保が目的であったといえる。国際社会のインドへの対応は、パキスタンから見ればその安全保障を強化するには不十分であり、核実験を実施しなければインドに対する戦略的均衡を再構築できないとの危機感があった。加えて、パキスタン

⁴⁹ インドの核実験実施の動機に関しては以下を参照。遠藤義雄「インドの核政策転換」『海外事情』第46巻第7・8号(1998年7・8月)、5-9頁。；伊豆山真理「インド人民党政権と核実験」『海外事情』第46巻第7・8号(1998年7・8月)、11-17頁。；Kalpana Sharma, "The Hindu Bomb", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol.54, No.4 (July-August 1998), p.30, 32.; Aaron Karp, "Indian Ambitions and the Limits of American Influence", *Arms Control Today*, Vol.28, No.4 (May 1998), p.15-17.; Jyotika Saksena, "Changing the Status Quo: Why India Went Nuclear", *The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control*, Vol.4, No.2-3 (Spring-Summer 1998), p.11.

国内からの圧力も強く、核実験を回避すればシャリフ政権の存続が危ぶまれるとの見方もあった。このような状況で、シャリフ首相が核実験の実施を自制することは困難であったと分析されている⁵⁰。

6 印パ核実験後の動き

パキスタンに対する核実験自制の説得が失敗に終わった後、焦点は、核不拡散体制をいかに維持するか、インドおよびパキスタンをいかに核不拡散体制に参加させるか、ならびに南アジアにおける軍拡競争および核戦争をいかに防止するかということに移っていった。また、この問題に対して国際社会、とりわけ核兵器国あるいは主要国がいかに一致した対応をとるかも注目された。

軍縮会議(6月2日)⁵¹

(1)47カ国共同声明

軍縮会議加盟国の中の47カ国を代表して、ニュージーランドが、印パ核実験に関する共同声明を発表した。声明では、両国の核実験に強い懸念を表明するとともに、すべての核実験を、核実験禁止の国際的なコンセンサスに反する行為と非難した。また印パの核実験は、軍縮のプロセスおよび核兵器廃絶の目標を損なうものであり、核軍縮にコミットしているという両国の主張に全く合致しないと批判した。この声明では、印パ両国に対する要求として、すべてのさらなる核実験の即時停止、核兵器計画の放棄、CTBTへの無条件署名および批准、NPTへの遅滞なき加入、ならびにカットオフ条約交渉への参加をあげた⁵²。

⁵⁰ パキスタンの核実験実施の動機に関しては以下を参照。Zaffar Abbas, "The Hardest Choice", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol.54, No.4 (July/August 1998), pp.36-37.; PPNN, *op.cit.*, p.6.

⁵¹ 6月2日の軍縮会議における各国の声明に関しては以下を参照。CD/PV.795, 2 June 1998.

⁵² この声明に参加した47カ国は以下の通り。オーストラリア、ニュージーランド、米国、英国、オランダ、フィンランド、オーストリア、カナダ、ウクライナ、ギリシャ、スロバキア、スウェーデン、ハンガリー、ノルウェー、ベラルーシ、ドイツ、ポーランド、スイス、フィリピン、デンマーク、イタリア、ルーマニア、クロアチア、チェコ、カザフスタン、日本、マルタ、ブルガリア、リトアニア、モンゴル、ロシア、韓国、フランス、中国、トルコ、スペイン、チリ、南アフリカ、メキシコ、ブラジル、アルゼンチン、アイルランド、ベネズエラ、ポルトガル、スロベニア、エクアドルおよびベルギー。

(2)印パの声明

インドは、5月27日のバジパイ首相の演説を代読した後、核実験のモラトリアムを宣言したこと、カットオフ条約交渉に参加すること、核兵器、ミサイルおよび他の大量破壊兵器に関連する技術の厳格な輸出管理を行うこと、ならびにパキスタンとの先制不使用協定を提案したことを繰り返し、印パ間のさまざまな問題に関しては、包括的、建設的かつ持続的な二国間対話によって解決する意向を示した。また、近隣諸国における核兵器およびミサイルの増大によりインドの安全保障環境は一層複雑になったとの懸念を表わして、間接的ながらも中国を批判する一方で、パキスタンはその核実験を正当化するためにインドの脅威を主張していると述べた。核不拡散および核軍縮問題に関しては、南アジアに限定されるものではなく世界的な問題であるとして、時間的枠組みを定めた核兵器の全面的廃棄に関する核兵器禁止条約の交渉を開始すべきとのこれまでの主張を繰り返した。

パキスタンの声明では、インドの脅威に対する対抗措置として核実験を実施したことを強調し、国際社会がインドの核実験に対して適切な対応を行わなかったと批判した。またパキスタンは、地域の安全保障を強化する措置の重要性とともに、国際社会は印パ間の通常兵力の不均衡、ならびにジャムおよびカシミールにおける紛争解決の必要性を認識すべきと訴え、この紛争を二国間では解決できなかったことから、国際社会がその解決に向けて取り組むべきと主張した。インドが提案している先制不使用協定については、通常戦力の不均衡からパキスタンとしては受け入れることはできないと述べ、逆にインドに対して軍事力の使用または使用の威嚇を禁止する不可侵協定を提案した。C T B Tへの加入に関しては、インドがさらなる実験を実施するか否かが判断の重要な要素になるとし、またカットオフ条約についても、インドの核の地位、その兵器化の程度、ならびに核分裂性物質ストックの規模および質によって判断すると主張して、C T B Tおよびカットオフ条約交渉への参加をともに約束しなかった。

(3)その他の軍縮会議加盟国の声明

47カ国共同声明に参加しなかった他の軍縮会議加盟国からも、印パ核実験に関する声明が発せられた。とくに非同盟諸国からの声明では、核兵器国の核軍縮に向けた努力不足が強く批判され、軍縮会議において核軍縮に関する特別委員会を設置すべきとの要求がなされた。

南アジア諸国では、バングラディッシュが、インドおよびパキスタンを非難する発言は

行わず、また両国に対する経済制裁はむしろ悪影響を与えると主張して反対した。スリランカは、南アジアにおける安全保障環境に深い懸念を表明し、南アジア地域協力連合(S A A R C)を通じて現実的で意味のある協力のための措置の強化を継続すると述べた。

中東諸国は、インドおよびパキスタンの核実験だけでなく、イスラエルの核問題に関しても国際社会が注意を払うべきと主張した。アルジェリアは、印パの核実験に懸念を表明するとともに、すべての核実験を禁止すること、イスラエルの核能力に対するこれまでの沈黙を破り、同国をN P Tに加入させ、その核施設をI A E A保障措置下に置くことを緊急に実施すべき問題にあげた。エジプトは、すべての核実験を非難する声明に同意することを表明し、ならびに核兵器あるいは核爆発装置の実験は、これを禁止する国際的なコンセンサスに反する行為であると述べた。同時に、C T B TおよびN P Tへの即時かつ無条件の加入は、インドおよびパキスタンだけでなく、イスラエルに対しても求められるべきと主張した。

国連安全保障理事会

(1)常任理事国外相共同コミュニケおよび安保理決議

安保理常任理事国である核兵器国5カ国の外相は、6月4日に共同コミュニケを発表した。このコミュニケでは、インドおよびパキスタンに対して、さらなる核実験を実施しないこと、核兵器の兵器化および配備をしないこと、挑発的な発言や軍事行動を行わないこと、C T B Tに早期かつ無条件に加入すること、カットオフ条約交渉に参加すること、ならびに大量破壊兵器およびその運搬手段に関連する装備、物質および技術を移転しないことを求めた。また5カ国は、国際核不拡散体制を強力かつ効果的に維持すること、ならびに最終的な目標を印パを含めたすべての国によるN P Tへの加入と設定して、核実験を実施したインドおよびパキスタンをN P Tの下での核兵器国とは認めないことで合意に達した。また印パ間の紛争を解決するために、両国による直接対話を通じて相互に受け入れ可能な解決策を模索するよう求めるとともに、常任理事国も両国を支援することを確認した。

このコミュニケでは、常任理事国は、印パの核兵器および弾道ミサイル計画を支援するような装置、物質および技術を印パに移転しないこと、ならびにN P T第6条の下での核軍縮に関するコミットメントを継続することも約束した⁵³。経済制裁に関しては、米国が

⁵³ “Joint Communiqué adopted during the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United

他の核兵器国に同様の措置を取ることは求めず、フランスおよびロシアはともに経済制裁に反対したことから、コミュニケでは言及されなかった。フランスは、経済制裁に反対する理由として、主要な目的はインドおよびパキスタンがC T B Tを署名および批准するよう促進することであり、インドの孤立化あるいはパキスタンの経済的弱体化は、そのための方法ではないと主張した⁵⁴。

6月6日には、日本、スウェーデンおよびコスタリカの共同提案に基づいて、印パ核実験に対する安保理決議が採択された。この決議では、印パ核実験の非難および安保理常任理事国の共同コミュニケへの支持が表明され、共同コミュニケにおける印パへの要求および国際社会のコミットメントが繰り返された⁵⁵。

(2)インドおよびパキスタンの反応

安保理常任理事国による共同コミュニケおよび安保理決議の採択に対して、インドおよびパキスタンは、そろってこれを非難する声明を発表した。

インドは、安保理が全く役に立たない決議を採択したと述べて遺憾の意を表明した。またインドおよびパキスタンに核およびミサイル計画を停止するよう求めた決議を受け入れることはできず、核不拡散は地域的問題ではなく、非差別的で世界的な枠組みで対処されるべきと主張した。さらに、印パ間の問題は二国間の直接対話で解決されるべきとして、国際社会の介入を拒否するとともに、ジャムおよびカシミール地方はインドの不可分の領土であることを強調した⁵⁶。

パキスタンは、安保理がインドの行為が南アジアにおける安全保障環境を悪化させたことを考慮しておらず、その対応は現実的でなく、合法性あるいは道義性にも欠けるものと非難した⁵⁷。

States of America”, Geneva, 4 June 1998. 以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), pp.20-21.

⁵⁴ Craig R. Whitney, “Top U.N. Members Urge India and Pakistan to End Arms Race”, *The New York Times* (web-version), 5 June 1998 (<http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/060598pnuke-un.html>).

⁵⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 of 6 June 1998.

⁵⁶ “Prime Minister’s Statement in Rajya Sabha regarding UN Security Council Resolution”, New Delhi, 8 June 1998. 以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.27 (June 1998), pp.20-21.

⁵⁷ “Statement Issued by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations in Response to the Security Council Resolution 1172”, 6 June 1998. 以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.27 (June 1998), pp.21-25.

G 8 外相会議

6月12日にロンドンで開催された主要8カ国(G 8)外相会議に先立ち、日本は、印パ両国に対する要求に加えて、G 8 共同コミュニケに、全世界に向けたCTBTの批准促進の呼びかけ、核不拡散体制堅持の再確認、ならびに第二次戦略兵器削減条約(START 条約)の早期批准およびSTART 条約の早期交渉開始を盛り込むよう求める方針を示した⁵⁸。

12日のG 8 外相会議で採択された共同コミュニケでは、インドおよびパキスタンに対して、これまでの要求に加えて、カシミール問題を含めた両国の緊張緩和のため、外相級対話を再開し、南アジア地域協力連合(SAARC)における首脳会談実現を要請した。また核兵器国および非核兵器国ともに、NPT第6条の下での核軍縮に関するコミットメントを実現する決意を再確認し、核兵器の廃絶を究極的目標として、核兵器国による組織的で前向きな核兵器削減努力を行うことを約束するとともに、米国およびロシアがSTART 条約の発効およびSTART 条約の早期交渉開始に向けて強い意向を表明した。またすべての国に対して、CTBTの早期署名および批准を求めることもコミュニケに盛り込まれた。さらに、国家がそれぞれ適切と考える行動をとるべきとして、一致した制裁は課さないことを確認したが、印パ両国あるいは核実験を実施するいかなる国家に対しても、世界銀行など国際金融機関による基礎生活分野を除いた融資の検討を延期することで合意した⁵⁹。

G 8 外相会議終了後には、南アフリカ、ブラジル、アルゼンチンおよびウクライナを非公式に昼食会に招き、核問題に関して議論した。これら4カ国は、新たな核不拡散体制の構築を目的としたG 8 のタスクフォースにも参加することとなった。

国連総会における印パのCTBTに関する発言

インドは、一連の核実験が終了した後にモラトリウムを宣言し、さらなる核爆発実験は実施しないことを表明した。パキスタンは、30日の核実験直後はさらなる核実験を実施する権利を留保していたが、6月11日にはモラトリウムを宣言した。しかしながら、CTBTへの署名および批准に関しては、インドは条約への署名に関して交渉する、あるいは

⁵⁸ 「CTBT：米中口にも批准促す」『読売新聞』1998年6月10日。

⁵⁹ Communiqué of the Group of Eight, London, 12 June 1998. 以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.27 (June 1998), pp.30-32.

は条約を部分的に遵守する用意があると主張していた。またインドは、C T B Tが改正されないことは認識しており、高い技術の移転に関する取極の修正ならば可能ではないかとの考えを示した。これは、核供給国グループの取極により、インドへの核関連技術の移転が禁止されていることを念頭に入れた発言と見られている⁶⁰。他方、パキスタンは、インドの態度を見極めた上で決断するとして、インドがC T B Tに加入しなければ自国も加入しないという姿勢を示していた。

9月より開始された国連総会において、インドおよびパキスタンは、C T B Tに関する注目すべき発言を行った。まずパキスタンのシャリフ首相は、9月23日の演説で、自国が強制あるいは圧力から解放されるという状況の下でのみ、C T B Tが発効しない場合に締約国会議が開催されることになっている1999年9月までに、条約に加入する用意があることを表明した。その条件として、多数国間機関によりパキスタンに課されている制限が解除されること、パキスタンに対する不平等な制裁が解除されること、ならびにジャムおよびカシミール紛争の正当な解決のための国際社会の支持が得られることをあげた。またインドが核実験を再開した場合には、C T B T第9条に基づいて条約から脱退する権利があることを付け加えた⁶¹。

パキスタンによる声明の翌日、インドのバジパイ首相は、核実験のモラトリアムを宣言したことによって、C T B Tの基本的な義務をすでに受け入れていると述べた上で、C T B Tの効力発生は1999年9月から遅れてはならないと主張し、条約への署名および批准の用意があることを明らかにした⁶²。

しかしながら、印パ両国内にはC T B T加入への反対が根強く、両国首脳による条約への署名および批准の意思表示が実現するのは容易ではないとの見方もある。パキスタン議会の多くの議員は、自国への「報酬」が明確に示されていない状況でC T B Tへの署名および批准を約束することはできないと主張している。インドに関しては、パキスタンおよび中国に対する信頼できる核抑止力の発展には核実験実施の自由が必要であるとして、C T B Tへの参加そのものに反対する意見も強く、また5核兵器国が世界的な核軍縮に合意す

⁶⁰ “CTBT Update: Editorial Introduction”, *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.29 (August/September 1998), p.10.

⁶¹ “Speech by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan, in the United Nations General Assembly”, 23 September 1998. 以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.30 (September 1998), pp.15-16.

⁶² “Speech by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India, in the United Nations General Assembly”, 24 September 1998. 以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.30 (September 1998), pp.14-15.

るまではC T B Tに署名すべきではないとの主張もある⁶³。

インドおよびパキスタン両首相によるC T B T加入の声明を受けて、1998年12月に、米国は、両国に対する制裁を1999年10月21日までの間、部分的に解除することを決定した。これにより、米国の輸出入銀行、海外民間投資公社および貿易開発局による両国への信用保証の再開、両国に対する国際軍事教育訓練プログラムの再開、ならびに米国民間銀行の両国政府に対する融資の凍結解除が行われる。さらに、パキスタンに対しては、パキスタンがI M Fと交渉している援助計画を支持して、他の国際金融機関による融資あるいは財政的・技術的支援を拡大することが加えられた⁶⁴。しかしながら、両国に対する軍需品の売却禁止および汎用品の輸出制限、ならびに世界銀行による対インド開発計画融資への反対は継続される⁶⁵。日本も、二国間経済協力の部分的再開やI M Fなど国際金融機関を通じた対パキスタン融資への支持を検討している。しかしながら、対インド制裁については当面継続するとの姿勢を示している。

印パ二国会談

インドおよびパキスタンの核実験後はじめての首脳会談は、コロンボで開催されたS A A R C首脳会議を利用して、7月29日に行われた。また9月23日の国連総会の際にも、両国首相は二回目の会談を行った。9月の首脳会談では、関係改善の具体的な措置として、二国間ホットラインを設置すること、ならびに経済関係を強化することに合意した。

1997年9月以来中断していたインドおよびパキスタンの外務次官級協議は、10月15日より4日間の日程で再開され、核問題およびカシミール問題に関する集中的な議論が行われた。両国の提案は以下の通りであったが、来年2月にも外務次官級会談を行うこと以外は合意は得られないまま会談は終了した。

核問題に関しては、インドが、二国間の核兵器先制不使用、125マイル(約500km)以上

⁶³ 以下を参照。Celia, W. Dugger, "For Pakistan and India, Atom Pact is a Hard Sell", *The New York Times* (web-version), 30 September 1998 (<http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/093098india-pakistan-nuke.html>); Pamela Constable, "To Sign or Not to Sign?: India, Pakistan Must Answer at Home on Joining Nuclear Pact", *The Washington Post*, 14 October 1998, p.17.

⁶⁴ Presidential Determination No.99-7, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 1 December 1998 (<http://library.whitehouse.gov/ThisWeek.cgi?type=p&date=2&briefing=9>).

⁶⁵ Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S. Lifts Sanctions on India, Pakistan: Aim is to Reward, Encourage Nuclear Curbs", *The Washington Post*, 7 November 1998, p.14.この決定より前に、米国は、米産農産物輸出への信用供与、および人道目的の計画に対する世界銀行の融資承認による制裁緩和を行っていた。

のミサイル実験の事前通告、ならびに他方に向けたミサイル発射実験の禁止を提案した。これに対してパキスタンは、核実験に関する一方的モラトリアムの条約化、不可侵条約の締結、ならびに通常戦力の均衡のとれた相互削減を提案した。これら以外では、インドは、人口密集地に兵器の照準を合わせることの禁止、上級将校の相互訪問、ホットラインの改善を提案し、他方パキスタンは、領空侵犯の禁止措置、軍事演習の事前通告、軍事指揮官間の通信リンクの改善、敵対的プロパガンダの抑制を提案した⁶⁶。

7 おわりに

インドおよびパキスタンによる核実験の実施は、南アジアにおける核戦争の可能性を高めるとともに、核不拡散体制を崩壊させかねないと懸念された。その一方で、両国を核兵器国とは認めず、現行の核不拡散体制を堅持することで主要国をはじめとする国際社会が一致していること、印パはC T B Tへの加入を約束するなど核不拡散体制に部分的ながらも参加する意思を表明していること、ならびに印パ二国間対話が再開されたことなど、好ましい動きも見られる。1998年の国連総会には、インドおよびパキスタンの核実験を強く非難し、両国に対してC T B Tへの署名および批准を求める決議案が提出され、第一委員会で採択された⁶⁷。加えて、「核兵器のない世界に向けて」と題されたアイルランドなどの提案による8カ国共同声明⁶⁸が、国連総会決議案⁶⁹として第一委員会に提出されるなど、核兵器国に一層の核軍縮実施を求める主張も活発になっている。

印パ核実験がもたらした、国際社会による核不拡散および核軍縮の強化に向けた動きを持続させ、進展させるためにも、これまでに諸場面で述べられてきた印パ両国に対する要求および国際社会の取り組みが誠実かつ迅速に履行されることが望まれる。

⁶⁶ 以下を参照。Kenneth J. Cooper, "Indian-Pakistani Talks End without Accord", *The Washington Post*, 19 October 1998, p.16.; Celia W. Dugger, "India and Pakistan Agree Only a Future Talks", *The New York Times* (web-version), 19 October 1998 (<http://www.nytimes.com/98/10/19/news/world/>).

⁶⁷ A/C.1/53/L.22 of 23 October 1998.

⁶⁸ Joint Ministerial Declaration, "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda", 9 June 1998.以下に掲載されている。 *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.27 (June 1998), pp.30-32.この共同声明には、ブラジル、エジプト、アイルランド、メキシコ、ニュージーランド、スロベニア、南アフリカおよびスウェーデンが加わった。

⁶⁹ A/C.1/53/L.48/Rev.1 of 5 November 1998.この決議案は、8カ国共同声明に参加していたスロベニアが共同提案国から抜けたことにより、7カ国の主導により提案された。

資料：インドおよびパキスタンの核実験に関する声明および決議

1 インド核実験

インドの声明

(1)核実験に関するインド政府の声明 5月11日)

“Statement of the Government of India on Nuclear Tests”, 11 May 1998.¹

As announced by the Prime Minister this afternoon, today India conducted three underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran range. The tests conducted today were with a fission device, a low yield device and a thermonuclear device. The measured yields are in line with expected values. Measurements have also confirmed that there was no release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. These were contained explosions like the experiment conducted in May 1974.

These tests have established that India has a proven capability for a weaponized nuclear program. They also provide a valuable database, which is useful in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and for different delivery systems. Further, they are expected to carry Indian scientists towards a sound computer simulation capability, which may be supported by sub-critical experiments, if considered necessary.

The government is deeply concerned, as were previous governments, about the nuclear environment in India's neighborhood. These tests provide reassurance to the people of India that their national security interests are paramount and will be promoted and protected. Succeeding generations of Indians would also rest assured that contemporary technologies associated with nuclear option have been passed on to them in this, the 50th year of our independence.

It is necessary to highlight today that India was in the vanguard of nations, which ushered in the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 due to environmental concerns. Indian representatives have worked in various international forums, including the Conference on Disarmament, for universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable arrangements for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. The Government would like to reiterate its support to efforts to realize the goal of a truly comprehensive international arrangement which would prohibit underground nuclear testing of all weapons as well as related experiments described as 'sub-critical' or 'hydronuclear'.

India would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But this cannot obviously be done in a vacuum. It would necessarily be an evolutionary process from concept to commitment and would depend on a number of reciprocal activities.

We would like to reaffirm categorically that we will continue to exercise the most stringent control

¹ *The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control*, Vol.4, No.2-3 (Spring-Summer 1998), pp.17-18.より再録。

on the export of sensitive technologies, equipment and commodities – especially those related to weapons of mass destruction. Our track record has been impeccable in this regard. Therefore we expect recognition of our responsible policy by the international community.

India remains committed to a speedy process of nuclear disarmament leading to total and global elimination of nuclear weapons. Our adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention is evidence of our commitment to any global disarmament regime, which is non-discriminatory and verifiable. We shall also be happy to participate in the negotiations for the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament.

In our neighborhood we have many friends with whom relations of fruitful cooperation for mutual benefit have existed and deepened over a long period. We assure them that it will be our sincere endeavor to intensify and diversify those relations further for the benefit of all our peoples. For India, as for others, the prime need is for peaceful cooperation and economic development.

(2) 政府プレスリリース(5月15日)

Press Release, Government of India, New Delhi, 15 May 1998.²

1. We have noted with regret that the Security Council has adopted a Presidential Statement on 14 May, 1998 [see below] on the underground tests which we have conducted. We are surprised by this, because the Council has never thought it necessary even to take cognizance of the many hundreds of nuclear tests carried out over the last 50 years, including in 1995 and 1996, when the de facto moratorium on testing, which the Council recalls, was already in place.

2. The tests which our scientists carried out are not directed against any country. Tests by themselves...do not jeopardize peace and security. Nuclear weapons do, and the refusal of the nuclear-weapon States to consider the elimination of nuclear weapons in a multilateral and time-bound framework, despite the end of the Cold War, continues to be the biggest single threat to international peace and security.

3. It is because of the continuing threat posed to India by the deployment, overtly and covertly, of nuclear weapons in the lands and seas adjoining us that we have been forced to carry out these tests, so that we can retain a credible option to develop these weapons, should they be needed for the security of India's people, who constitute one-fifth of the world's population.

4. There is a strong national consensus supporting the Government's decision... [I]t is essential to

² ACRONYM Institute, "India & Pakistan Nuclear Tests: Special Feature", ACRONYM Web Site (<http://www.bn.apc.org/acronym/spind>). より再録。

recall that India has been subjected to aggression by one nuclear-weapon State and to the threat of use of nuclear weapons by another. Our security concerns, therefore, go well beyond South Asia.

5. The Statement adopted by the Security Council, therefore, is to be viewed in this light and is completely unacceptable to us. India is a responsible member of the international community, and has consistently supported the United Nations. ... The nuclear-weapon States have completely set their face against the overwhelming wish of the international community, and increasingly significant sections of their own domestic strategic and military opinion, for meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States have adopted every ploy possible to deflect attention from their policies... The Statement issued by the Council is in this unhappy tradition.

6. We would like to take this occasion to express our appreciation to the members of the international community who have shown understanding to India's concerns and actions."

(3)原子力省および防衛研究開発機構共同声明 5月17日)

"Joint Statement by Department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research and Development Organisation", New Delhi, 17 May 1998.³

The current series of testing 5 nuclear devices during 11-13 May, 1998 in the Pokhran Range is the culmination of years of pioneering work done by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO).

DAE has done pioneering R & D work in various aspects of nuclear science and technology. It has developed comprehensive indigenous capabilities in designing and building nuclear power reactors, fuel reprocessing plants and many other fuel-cycle related activities. DAE has also developed and built research reactors and strongly promoted the peaceful uses of atomic energy in industry and agriculture. The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) is one of the largest multi-disciplinary laboratories in the country with the capability to build new technological systems in a wide range of areas. The fissile material used in these 5 tests are completely indigenous, and have been produced by local mastery over the relevant technologies by DAE establishments.

DRDO is one of the largest agencies in the country which is engaged in research and development of advanced weapons and systems for the Armed Forces. DRDO is also at the forefront in a spectrum of advanced defence technologies.

It has a large number of mission-oriented programmes involving design, development and proving of defence systems along with Transfer of Technology to Production Agencies. DRDO's experience

³ *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), pp.5-6.より再録。

and expertise in explosives and explosives-related technologies and in systems engineering and integration constitute an important part in the 5 devices tested in the present campaign.

The design and development of various kinds of nuclear explosives, e.g. fission, boosted fission, thermonuclear and low yield, has been carried out by BARC based on more than 25 years of R & D. BARC has also worked out several new concepts like long shelf life of device components and optimisation of the yield-to-weight ratio. Further, the fabrication of fissile materials to suitable shapes was also performed by BARC. The PNE experiment of May 1974 was an early and successful demonstration of India's capability in nuclear devices.

One of the laboratories of the DRDO had the task of 'weaponising' proven designs. This activity involved design, testing and production of advanced detonators, ruggedised high volt trigger systems, interface engineering, systems engineering and systems integration to military specifications. Three other laboratories have made contributions in aerodynamics, arming, fusing, safety interlocks, flight trials etc. DRDO has, further, conducted a series of trials and achieved the necessary operational clearances. Additionally, DRDO shouldered the burden of field engineering associated with the conduct of the 5 tests along with DAE.

DRDO and DAE have effectively and efficiently coordinated and integrated their respective technological strengths in a national mission to confer the country with a capability to vacate nuclear threats.

The 3 tests conducted on 11 May, 1998 were with a fission device with a yield of about 12 kt, a thermonuclear device with a yield of about 43 kt and a sub-kilo tonne device. All the 3 devices were detonated simultaneously. It may be noted that the yield of the thermonuclear device tested on 11 May was designed to meet stringent criteria like containment of the explosion and least possible damage to building and structures in neighbouring villages. On 13 May, 1998 two more sub kilo-tonne nuclear tests were carried out. These devices were also detonated simultaneously. The yields of the sub-kilo tonne devices were in the range of 0.2 to 0.6 kt.

The tests conducted on 11 May as well as on 13 May were fully contained with no release of radioactivity into the atmosphere.

The measured yields of the devices agree with expected design values. A complex software package developed by DAE has been used in device design and yield estimation.

The tests conducted during 11-13 May, 1998 have provided critical data for the validation of our capability in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and different delivery systems. These tests have significantly enhanced our capability in computer simulation of new designs and taken us to the stage of sub-critical experiments in the future, if considered

necessary.

DAE and DRDO would like to place on record their thanks to the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force for excellent support to the campaign. They would also like to record their gratitude to the current Government, as well as those in the past, for reposing confidence in the ability of DAE and DRDO to meet nuclear threats.

(4) バジパイ首相声明(5月27日)

“Suo Motu Statement by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Parliament”, 27 May 1998. ⁴

I rise to inform the House of momentous developments that have taken place while we were in recess. On 11 May, India successfully carried out three underground nuclear tests. Two more underground tests on 13 May completed the planned series of tests. I would like this House to join me in paying fulsome tribute to our scientists, engineers and defence personnel whose singular achievements have given us a renewed sense of national pride and self-confidence. ...

In 1947, when India emerged as a free country to take its rightful place in the comity of nations, the nuclear age had already dawned. Our leaders then took the crucial decision to opt for self-reliance, and freedom of thought and action. We rejected the Cold War paradigm and chose the more difficult path of non-alignment. Our leaders also realised that a nuclear-weapon-free-world would enhance not only India's security but also the security of all nations. That is why disarmament was and continues to be a major plank in our foreign policy.

During the 50's India took the lead in calling for an end to all nuclear weapon testing. Addressing the Lok Sabha on 2 April, 1954, Pt. Jawaharlal, to whose memory we pay homage today, stated 'nuclear, chemical and biological energy and power should not be used to forge weapons of mass destruction'. He called for negotiations for prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and in the interim, a standstill agreement to halt nuclear testing. This call was not heeded.

In 1965, along with a small group of non-aligned countries, India put forward the idea of an international non-proliferation agreement under which the nuclear-weapon States would agree to give up their arsenals provided other countries refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. This balance of rights and obligations was not accepted. In the 60's our security concerns deepened. The country sought security guarantees but the countries we turned to were unable to extend to us the expected assurances. As a result, we made it clear that we would not be able to sign the NPT.

The Lok Sabha debated the issue on 5 April, 1968. Prime Minister...Indira Gandhi assured the

⁴ *Ibid*, pp.4-5. より再録。

House that 'we shall be guided entirely by our self-enlightenment and the considerations of national security'. This was a turning point and this House strengthened the decision of the then Government by reflecting a national consensus.

Our decision not to sign the NPT was in keeping with our basic objectives. In 1974, we demonstrated our nuclear capability. Successive Governments thereafter have taken all necessary steps in keeping with that resolve and national will, to safeguard India's nuclear option. This was the primary reason behind the 1996 decision for not signing the CTBT, a decision that also enjoyed consensus of this House.

The decades of the 80's and 90's had meanwhile witnessed the gradual deterioration of our security environment as a result of nuclear and missile proliferation. In our neighbourhood, nuclear weapons had increased and more sophisticated delivery systems inducted. In addition, India has also been the victim of externally aided and abetted terrorism, militancy and clandestine war.

At a global level, we see no evidence on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world. Instead, we have seen that the NPT has been extended indefinitely and unconditionally, perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the five countries.

Under such circumstances, the Government was faced with a difficult decision. The touchstone that has guided us in making the correct choice clear was national security. These tests are a continuation of the policies set into motion that put this country on the path of self-reliance and independence of thought and action.

India is now a nuclear-weapon State. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers. It is India's due, the right of one-sixth of human-kind. Our strengthened capability adds to our sense of responsibility. We do not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for mounting threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defence, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion. We do not intend to engage in an arms race.

We had taken a number of initiatives in the past. We regret that these proposals did not receive a positive response from other nuclear-weapon States. In fact, had their response been positive, we need not have gone in for our current testing programme. We have been and will continue to be in the forefront of the calls for opening negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, so that this challenge can be dealt with in the same manner that we have dealt with the scourge of two other weapons of mass destruction-through the Biological Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention.

Traditionally, India has been an outward looking country. Our strong commitment of multilateralism is reflected in our active participation in organisations like the United Nations. This engagement will continue. The policies of economic liberalisation introduced in recent years have increased our regional and global linkages and my Government intends to deepen and strengthen these ties.

Our nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness. We have not violated any international agreement either in 1974 or now, in 1998. The restraint exercised for 24 years, after having demonstrated our capability in 1974, is in itself a unique example. Restraint, however, has to arise from strength. It cannot be based upon indecision or doubt. The series of tests recently undertaken by India have led to the removal of doubts. The action involved was balanced in that it was the minimum necessary to maintain what is an irreducible component of our national security calculus.

Subsequently, Government has already announced that India will now observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions. We have also indicated willingness to move towards a de jure formalisation of this declaration.

The House is no doubt aware of the different reactions that have emanated from the people of India and from different parts of the world. The overwhelming support of our citizens is our source of strength. It tells us not only that this decision was right but also that our country wants a focussed leadership, which attends to their security needs. This, I pledge to do as a sacred duty. We have also been greatly heartened by the outpouring of support from Indians abroad. They have, with one voice, spoken in favour of our action. To the people of India, and to Indians abroad, I convey my profound gratitude. We look to the people of India and Indians abroad for support in the difficult period ahead.

In this, the fiftieth year of our independence, we stand at a defining moment in our history. The rationale for the Government's decision is based on the same policy tenets that have guided us for five decades. These policies have been sustained successfully because of an underlying national consensus. It is vital to maintain the consensus as we approach the next millennium. In my statement today and in the paper placed before the House, I have elaborated on the rationale behind the Government's decision and outlined our approach for the future. The present decision and future action will continue to reflect a commitment to sensibilities and obligations of an ancient civilisation, a sense of responsibility and restraint, but a restraint born of the assurance of action, not of doubts or apprehension. Avoiding triumphalism, let us work together towards our shared objective in ensuring that as we move towards a new millenium, India will take its rightful place in the international community."

パキスタンの声明

軍縮会議におけるパキスタン大使の声明 5月14日)

“Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan, in the Conference on Disarmament”, 14 May 1998.⁵

1. This Spring session of the Conference on Disarmament opens at a defining moment for the post-Cold War world security order. It is also a moment of destiny for the 140 million people of Pakistan.

2. Since its independence, our nation has confronted the endemic hostility of our neighbour, India. We have thrice been subjected to aggression by this country, which dismembered our State in 1971, and is even now engaged in an eight-year brutal war to suppress the right of self-determination of the people of occupied Jammu and Kashmir. This country has deployed almost the whole of its million-and-a-half-man Army, its Air Force and its Navy on our frontiers. This third large[st] conventional force in the world is being further augmented through the acquisition of advanced arms worth billions of dollars.

3. Before assuming office, the present Hindu fundamentalist leadership of this country had declared that it would conduct nuclear tests and 'induct' nuclear weapons. It had also threatened to conduct attacks on Pakistan across the Line of Control in Kashmir. It has carried out the first of these threats. Nuclear weapons proliferation is now a fact of life in South Asia.

4. In evaluating the grave environment created by India's three plus two nuclear weapons tests, and in evolving an equitable and effective response, it is essential to bear in mind the history and context of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. It is essential to be aware of the ambitions of India, and the compulsions of Pakistan. It is essential to recall the inertia and the responsibility of certain major powers for this development which has grave portents for regional and international peace and security.

5. India's ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, though often disguised by chronic deceit and hypocrisy, has been no secret. Prime Minister Nehru, while inaugurating the Indian Atomic Energy Commission in 1948, declared that 'every country would have to develop and use the latest scientific device *for its protection*.'

6. India has proceeded systematically to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. It acquired a research reactor and other nuclear facilities outside safeguards in the 1960s. It refused to sign the NPT in 1968. It insisted on the legitimacy of 'peaceful nuclear explosions'. Then, India meanwhile diverted nuclear fuel from its 'civilian' programme to explode a so-called 'peaceful' nuclear device in

⁵ *Ibid*, pp.6-10.より再録。

May 1974. Since then, the scope of its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and fissile material stocks have expanded exponentially.

7. Nuclear weapons development has been accompanied by the development of nuclear delivery systems, specially ballistic missiles. This was done initially under the cover of a civilian space programme, pursued with the cooperation of several advanced countries. The short-range *Privthi* missile was tested 20 times. Four to five of these missiles are being serially produced every month. The *Privthi*'s declared targets are Pakistan's strategic facilities and assets and almost all our cities. The intermediate-range *Agni* has been tested four times. It is likely to be developed soon for deployment, against China and Pakistan.

8. India has developed its nuclear and missile programmes with the active assistance and cooperation of several industrialised countries. This must be mentioned, not in anger but for the record. Canada supplied India's unsafeguarded CIRRUS research reactor, a heavy water plant, a nuclear fuel complex and two power reactors. The United States provided unsafeguarded heavy water, assistance in the construction of reprocessing facilities and in training dozens of experts in reprocessing. France offered exchange of personnel and special training in plutonium extraction from spent fuel.

9. Similarly, India's missile development is not indigenous. India's missile chief visited various US missile bases and research facilities in 1962 and, on the way back, concluded an agreement with Switzerland for *Project Indigo*, an IRBM programme. In 1963 and 1964, the doyen of the Indian missile programme participated in the development and launch of the US *Scout* missile, which has provided the technological basis for the *Agni* missile. Several Western countries collaborated in the launching 350 rockets in India's space programme and the Space Launch Vehicle (SLV 3), whose first stage provided the motor for the *Agni*. Equipment and technologies - the *Viking* rocket engine, liquid-fuel technology, guidance and navigation systems, high-altitude rocket simulation, electronics - were acquired from these Western countries. The *Privthi* is based on the *Viking* and SA-2 technologies. Finally, despite the MTCR, India obtained at least one cryogenic engine from Russia, with 80% of the design and technical information already in its hands.

10. Pakistan's actions in the nuclear and missile fields were taken, at each stage, in response to the escalatory steps taken by India. Pakistan was able to develop the capability for nuclear enrichment and in missile research and development, not withstanding discriminatory embargoes and restrictions. We have the technological and other capabilities now to develop the various aspects of our programmes to respond to India's past, present or future escalatory steps.

11. However, Pakistan has never resorted to adventurist or irresponsible actions. Our policies have been marked by restraint. After India's 1974 nuclear test, we did not reciprocate. We did not feel the need to do so if India's nuclear weapons development did not go any further. Similarly, Pakistan

exercised unilateral restraint in the production of highly-enriched uranium despite our concerns regarding India's larger plutonium stockpile. Pakistan has held back so far from deploying its missiles. In response to India's 24 missile tests, Pakistan has conducted only one missile flight test so far.

12. Despite the fact that every escalatory step on the nuclear proliferation ladder was initiated by India, it is Pakistan which has been consistently subjected to a series of discriminatory penalties, sanctions and restraints designed to prevent us from acquiring the capability to respond to the Indian escalation.

13. After India's 1974 nuclear explosion, the same country which had provided India an unsafeguarded research reactor, reneged on its contracts to provide Pakistan safeguarded fuel for our Karachi power reactor, halted shipment of a fuel fabrication plant and terminated all civilian and safeguarded nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. In 1976, the US Congress passed the so-called Symington Amendment which penalized acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities *but only after 1976*, thus effectively exempting India but not Pakistan. In 1979, US economic assistance to Pakistan was terminated for contracting to purchase a reprocessing plant from France. Soon, that country was also obliged to renege on its contract to supply this safeguarded reprocessing plant to Pakistan. But it was not halted from providing India a vital shearing machine for its unsafeguarded reprocessing facility. In 1980, the US decided to ship 38 tons of enriched uranium to India. In 1985, France took up the supply of enriched uranium to India. Discrimination against Pakistan was further compounded by the specific legislation aimed against Pakistan, specially the so-called Pressler Amendment which required the US President to annually certify that Pakistan-but not India - did not possess a nuclear device.

14. Such discrimination against Pakistan was all the more unjustified because our preference, at every step of India's push towards proliferation, was to press for political solutions and mutual restraint.

15. The initiatives taken by Pakistan to arrest nuclear proliferation in South Asia are a matter of historical record. Even after India's 1974 nuclear explosion, Pakistan proposed:

1. a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, in 1978;
2. mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of each other's nuclear facilities, in 1979;
3. simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan, in 1979;
4. simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards, in 1979;
5. a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty, in 1987;
6. a South Asia Zero-Missile Zone in 1994.

16. Pakistan also suggested various modalities to advance the goal of non-proliferation in South Asia: bilateral talks, five-nation talks, a multilateral conference. We fully supported initiatives by the US, first for five-nation talks and later for nine-nation consultations regarding non-proliferation and security in South Asia. While India predictably opposed all these initiatives, what was most disappointing for Pakistan is the alacrity with these initiatives were jettisoned by their author in the face of India's obdurate and bellicose rejection. Such supine responses are at least consistent. They are all too evident even today. After all, India's 1974 test was accepted as [a] 'peaceful' nuclear explosion by some. And, when India threatened to veto the CTBT in this Conference, it was told in high-level letters that it need not adhere to the Treaty so long as it did not block the Treaty's transmission to the General Assembly. The Ambassador of a great power in New Delhi went further and assured that even an Indian veto of the CTBT would have no impact on bilateral relations. He was proved right by events.

17. This track record does not inspire any confidence that the new endeavours which are now urged are more sincere or will be more effective.

18. The events of the past few months have vividly confirmed our conviction that it is Pakistan and not India which is the real target of the non-proliferation crusade. The missile tests conducted by India over the past months evoked no concern or comment, even sanctions were loudly threatened against Pakistan and China. When the BJP-led government declared its aim of inducting nuclear weapons and conducting nuclear tests, no official concern was expressed, despite the warning conveyed in the letters sent by Prime minister Nawaz Sharif to the leaders of the major powers. Similarly, the concern expressed by Pakistan's Foreign Minister in this Conference on 19 March this year evoked no response. Instead, the high visiting envoys of the sole super power sang paeans of praise - even in Islamabad - for the 'restraint and responsibility' of the new Indian government. We are now witness to this 'restraint and responsibility'!

19. Such apparent gullibility did not greatly impress the Pakistani leadership. We were hardly amused when, soon after these visits, MTCR sanctions were instituted against a Pakistan-government entity. Meanwhile, no sanctions were considered for India's development of submarine-based missiles.

20. We also saw other curious and disturbing signals. The Indian Defence minister, notwithstanding the well-known improvement in Sino-Indian relations, suddenly declared that China rather than Pakistan was the 'number one threat' to India's security. He falsely asserted that China has deployed missiles in Tibet aimed at India.

21. Evidently, in the Indian view, it was felt that its nuclear tests were more palatable if they were seen as serving the goal of 'containing' China. Reported moves at the recently concluded NPT PrepCom meeting to accommodate India's concerns on the FMCT, full-scope safeguards, etc., have

added fuel to speculation about new deals and alignments.

22. Conspiracy theories have gained further credence due to the alleged absence of advance warning about the Indian nuclear tests. We have repeatedly been told of the awesome capabilities of the National Technical Means of one power. Indeed, sanctions have been (wrongly) imposed on Pakistan (and China) on the basis of 'evidence' said to be acquired through such NTMs. In December 1995, these NTMs detected Indian preparations for a test, enabling the international community to take measures to pre-empt these tests. Why was it different now? Was this really an intelligence failure?

23. A report circulated in Washington by an anti-Indian 'political action group' dated 7 May - i.e. 4 days before the 11 May tests - stated that 'in the meantime preparations for an Indian nuclear test have been further confirmed by our sources in India, (who so far have never been wrong, having millions of pairs of eyes and ears fixed on the ground) who report all kinds of feverish night time activities, in the vicinity of Pokharan in Rajasthan State sixty miles from the Pakistan border. The question is, will the United States *allow* the fundamentalist Hindu fascists in Delhi to circumvent US non-proliferation laws? Only time will tell.'

24. Well, the Hindu fundamentalists have acted. Now, unequal restraint is again urged on Pakistan.

25. The press statement issued by India on 11 May that 'it would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the CTBT' dependent on 'a number of reciprocal activities' and that 'it would be happy to participate in FMCT negotiations,' indicates a game plan to ease the cost of the nuclear tests. In India's eyes the CTBT seems to have shed its inequity overnight. Forgetting its 'not now, not later' declaration, India appears to have given up its call for 'nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework'. It was, after all, only a ploy. All of us suspected as much.

26. Interestingly, the demands being made now by some of the major powers appear to match the Indian 'offers'. Is this coincidence?

27. India has, however, asked for a price - undefined 'reciprocal activities' - for its acceptance of the CTBT. Is this a reference to India's desire for technology to carry out sub-critical nuclear tests? Or is this a reference to its demand for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council? Or even more ambitiously, is this a demand by India to be formally acknowledged as a nuclear-weapon State? Regrettably, at least two nuclear powers have expressed an interest in eliciting what price India may be asking for adherence to the CTBT. Is it merely a coincidence that the same two powers have recently expressed an interest in exploring deals for civil nuclear cooperation with India?

28. For Pakistan, the series of nuclear weapon tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May have significantly altered the strategic and security equation in our region. As the Indian press

statement itself has stated: These tests have established that India has a proven capability for a weaponised nuclear programme. They also provide a valuable database which is useful in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and for different delivery systems. Further they are expected to carry Indian scientists towards a sound computer simulation capability which may be supported by sub-critical experiments if considered necessary.'

29. Furthermore, as Mr. Joshi, the Indian Minister for Science and Technology, is quoted as saying on 12 May:

'Indian scientists will put a nuclear warhead on missiles as soon as the situation requires. India has not closed its option to conduct more tests if and when necessary. In the meantime work on the Agni Phase-II has started in earnest.'

30. What Pakistan confronts today is not merely a nuclear-capable State. We face a nuclear-weaponized power. It is strange that senior officials of a major nuclear power continue to argue, unconvincingly, that India has not 'weaponized' yet. We wonder if they would be convinced of this if India actually delivers a nuclear weapon against one of its neighbours?

31. In the new strategic environment, it is extremely disingenuous for anyone to call on Pakistan to exercise restraint, or to sign the CTBT or agree to FMCT negotiations. These calls are, of course, consistent with the discrimination to which Pakistan has been historically subjected.

32. The Government of Pakistan has adopted an important principle that 'we will accept obligations and commitments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation only if these are equitable and non-discriminatory'. We will not accept unilateral obligations or commitments. We will not accept commitments which would permanently jeopardise the ability of Pakistan to deter the nuclear and conventional threats which India poses to our security.

33. Pakistan has consistently acted as a responsible member of the international community. We have not resorted to Adventurism and provocation. But Pakistan will not allow itself to be subjected to any international conspiracy to compromise its security. We will not endorse any scheme which fosters or accepts India's nuclear or political hegemony in the region. The Indian tests are a direct and most serious challenge to Pakistan's security. It is Pakistan alone which [will] decide on and take the measures required to guarantee our security. The people of Pakistan, after decades of discrimination, have a right to insist that their nation's security and independence be fully respected by all the members of the international community.

34. In his statement before the Pakistan Senate yesterday, my Foreign Minister has stated:

'The news of the carrying out of two further nuclear tests today by India, corroborates our

assessment and provides further confirmation, if any were needed, about India's consistent pattern of irresponsible behaviour.

The blind pursuit of intrinsic and inherent hegemonic impulses, reflected too often in Indian behaviour and ignored largely by the international community, despite Pakistan's repeated efforts to draw attention to them, has definitely encouraged and emboldened India to throw all caution to the winds.

The invoking of mandatory sanctions under US laws against India hardly constitutes an effective response to Indian provocative actions or compensates for errors of judgement, which have seriously disrupted the regional strategic balance.

India is now admittedly testing the whole range of nuclear weaponry, including battlefield/tactical nuclear weapons which are Pakistan specific.

India's actions, which pose an immediate and grave threat to Pakistan's security, will not go unanswered.

Pakistan once again reiterates that responsibility for consequences that will inevitably ensue would lie squarely with India and those who have colluded and acquiesced in the weaponization of India's nuclear programme.'

国際社会の反応

(1) 国連事務総長スポークスマンの声明 5月11日

"Secretary-General Expresses Regret over Announcement that India Conducted Three Underground Nuclear Tests", 11 May 1998.⁶

Following is a statement issued today by the Spokesman for Secretary-General Kofi Annan:

The Secretary-General has learned with deep regret of the announcement that India had conducted three underground nuclear tests on Monday. He wishes to note that, for quite some time now, there has been a de facto moratorium on nuclear testing. The moratorium and the successful conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996 are seen by the international community as setting a norm with regard to nuclear non-proliferation. While noting that India is not a signatory to the CTBT, the Secretary-General is nevertheless concerned that the latest testing is inconsistent with the pattern which has been firmly endorsed by the international community. He calls on all States for maximum restraint with a view to facilitating nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The Secretary-General strongly supports accelerated

⁶ SG/SM/6555 of 11 May 1998

measures of nuclear disarmament, cessation of all nuclear tests by all States and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

(2) 国連事務総長スークスマンの声明 5月13日)

“Secretary-General Deeply Disturbed over Two More Nuclear Tests by India”, 13 May 1998.⁷

The following statement was issued today by the Spokesman for Secretary-General Kofi Annan:

The Secretary-General is deeply disturbed over the Government of India's announcement of two more nuclear tests on 13 May... India has stated that this is expected to complete the current series of tests and has made a qualified offer to adhere to some of the undertakings of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty selectively. The Secretary-General continues to look forward to the unequivocal assurance of India and all other States that the international community's norm on nuclear testing and non-proliferation would be adhered to in order that progress towards nuclear disarmament - a common desire of all States and peoples - can be achieved as soon as possible.

(3) 国連安保理議長声明

Statement by the President of the Security Council, 14 May 1998.⁸

At the 3881st meeting of the Security Council, held on 14 May 1998, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled “The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security”, the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

“The Security Council strongly deplores the three underground nuclear tests that India conducted on 11 May 1998, and the two further tests conducted on 13 May 1998 despite over-whelming international concern and protests. The Council strongly urges India to refrain from any further tests. It is of the view that such testing is contrary to the de facto moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The Council also expresses its concern at the effects of this development on peace and stability in the region.

“The Security Council affirms the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Council appeals to India, and all other States which have not yet done so, to become parties to the NPT, and to the CTBT without delay and without conditions. The Council also encourages India to participate, in a positive spirit, in the proposed negotiations with other States for a fissile material cut-off treaty in

⁷ SG/SM/6560 of 13 May 1998.

⁸ S/PRST/1998/12 of 14 May 1998.

Geneva with a view to reaching early agreement.

“With a view to preventing an escalation in the arms race, in particular with regard to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and to preserving peace in the region, the Security Council urges States to exercise maximum restraint. The Council underlines that the sources of tension in South Asia should only be resolved through dialogue and not by military build-up.

“The Security Council reiterates the statement by its President on 31 January 1992 (S/23500) which stated, inter alia, that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”

(4)主要 8 カ国(G 8)首脳会談共同声明 5月15日)

“G8 Statement on Indian Nuclear Tests, 'Regional Statements”, Birmingham, UK, 15 May 1998.⁹

We condemn the nuclear tests which were carried out by India on 11 and 13 May. Such action runs counter to the will expressed by 149 signatories to the CTBT to cease nuclear testing, to efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime and to steps to enhance regional and international peace and security. It has been met by immediate international concern and opposition, from governments and more widely. We underline our full commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as the cornerstones of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We express our grave concern about the increased risk of nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia and elsewhere. We urge India and other states in the region to refrain from further tests and the deployment of nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. We call upon India to rejoin the mainstream of international opinion, to adhere unconditionally to the NPT and the CTBT and to enter into negotiations on a global treaty to stop the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. India's relationship with each of us has been affected by these developments. We are making this clear in our own direct exchanges and dealings with the Indian Government and we call upon other states similarly to address their concerns to India. We call upon and encourage Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint in the face of these tests and to adhere to international non-proliferation norms.

(5)日本の声明

(i)村岡官房長官「インドの核実験実施に対する我が国の措置について」平成10年5月13日¹⁰

1. 11日、インドが核実験禁止の流れに逆行して、核実験を行ったことは極めて遺憾である。我が国は、12日、小淵外務大臣よりシン在京インド大使を招致し、この遺憾の意と共に各開発の早期停止をインド側に申し入れたところである。
2. 今般のインドによる核実験実施は、核兵器の無い世界を目指す国際社会全体の努力に対する挑戦

⁹ *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), p.11.より再録。

¹⁰ 外務省ホームページ(http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/happyo/danwa/danwa_10/dmu_0513.html)より再録。

であり、全く容認できないものである。インドに対しては核実験の即時停止と、NPT及びCTBTへの早期加入を改めて求めたい。

3. このため政府としては、ODA大綱原則に鑑み、以下の措置を講ずることとした。

- (1) 対インド無償資金協力については緊急・人道的性格の援助及び草の根無償資金協力を除き新規の協力は停止する。
- (2) 対インド円借款については、今後のインド側の対応を見て、我が国政府の具体的方針を決定する。
- (3) 本年6月30日～7月1日に対インド支援国会合（IDF）が世銀主催の下に東京で開催されることが予定されていたところ、我が国政府としては、東京開催招致を見合わせたい旨世銀に申し伝える。

4. また、インド向けの大量破壊兵器関連品目等の輸出については、厳格な審査を堅持していく。

(ii)村岡官房長官「インドによる第二回核実験実施を踏まえ我が国の措置について」平成10年5月14日¹¹

1. 13日、インドが新たに2回の核実験を実施したことは極めて遺憾であり、我が国としてはこれを重大に受け止め、インドに対し改めて核実験及び核開発の停止を強く申し入れたところである。この新たな事態に鑑み、13日の自分のコメントにもあるとおり、我が国政府としてはODA大綱の趣旨を踏まえ更なる措置につき検討せざる得ない状況に至ったが、今般、更に以下の措置を取ることにした。

- (1) インドに対する新規円借款の停止。
- (2) 国際開発金融機関による対インド融資については慎重に対応する。

2. なお、我が国は、この新たな事態を踏まえ、今後の対応を協議するため平林駐インド大使を一時帰国させることとする。また、我が国政府は来るバーミンガム・サミットの場において、インドに対し不拡散体制への参加に前向きに取り組むよう強く働きかけるよう呼びかけることとする。

(6)米国の声明

THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the Press Secretary: India Sanctions", Berlin, Germany, 13 May 1998.¹²

On Wednesday, May 13, 1998, the President reported to Congress that he had imposed sanctions on India as a consequence of that country's May 11 nuclear test explosion. These sanctions were required by Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, otherwise known as the Glenn Amendment. The sanctions imposed are as follows:

- termination of assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, except for humanitarian assistance for food or other agricultural commodities;
- termination of sales of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction

¹¹ 外務省ホームページ(http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/happyo/danwa/danwa_10/dmu_0514.html)より再録。

¹² 米国国務省ホームページ(<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/sa/>)より再録。

services under the Arms Export Control Act, and termination of licenses for the export of any item on the United States munitions list;

- termination of all foreign military financing under the Arms Export Control Act;
- denial of any credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by any department, agency or instrumentality of the United States Government;
- the United States opposition to the extension of any loan for financial or technical assistance by any international financial institution;
- prohibition of United States banks from making any loan or providing any credit to the Government of India, except for the purposes of purchasing food or other agricultural commodities; and
- prohibition of export of specific goods and technology subject to export licensing by the Commerce Department.

Finally, the Secretary of State is making a similar determination under Section 2 (b) (4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945; thereafter, the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank may not give approval to guarantee, insure, or extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit, in support of United States exports to India.

2 パキスタン核実験

パキスタンの声明

(1) シャリフ首相テレビ演説 (5月28日)

“Text of Prime Minister Muhammed Nawaz Sharif at a Press Conference on Pakistan Nuclear Tests,” Islamabad, 28 May 1998.¹³

Pakistan today successfully tested five nuclear tests. The results were as expected. There was no release of radioactivity. I congratulate all Pakistani scientists, engineers and technicians for their dedicated teamwork and expertise in mastering complex and advanced technologies. The entire nation takes justifiable pride in the accomplishments of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories and all affiliated organisations. They have demonstrated Pakistan's ability to deter aggression. Pakistan has been obliged to exercise the nuclear option due to the weaponisation of India's nuclear programme. This had led to the collapse of the 'existential deterrence' and had radically altered the strategic balance in our region.

Immediately after its nuclear tests, India has brazenly raised the demand that 'Islamabad should realise the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region' and threatened that 'India will deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan'.

Our security, and peace and stability of the entire region was thus gravely threatened. As a self-respecting nation we had no choice left to us. Our hand was forced by the present Indian leadership's reckless actions.

After due deliberations and a careful review of all options, we took the decision to restore the strategic balance. The nation would not have accepted anything less from its leadership. For the past three decades, Pakistan repeatedly drew the attention of the international community to India's incremental steps on the nuclear and ballistic ladder. Our warnings remained unheeded. Despite the continuing deterioration in Pakistan's security environment, we exercised utmost restraint. We pursued in all earnest the goal of non-proliferation in South Asia. Our initiatives to keep South Asia free of nuclear and ballistic weapon systems were spurned. The international response to the Indian nuclear tests did not factor the security situation in our region. While asking us to exercise restraint, powerful voices urged acceptance of the Indian weaponisation as a fait accompli. Pakistan's legitimate security concerns were not addressed, even after the threat of use of nuclear weapons and nuclear blackmail. We could not have ignored the magnitude of the threat.

Under no circumstances would the Pakistani nation compromise on matters pertaining to its life and existence. Our decision to exercise the nuclear option has been taken in the interest of national self defence. These weapons are to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional. Pakistan will

¹³ *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), pp.13-14.より再録。

continue to support the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, especially in the Conference on Disarmament, bearing in mind the new realities. We are undertaking a re-evaluation of the applicability and relevance of the global non-proliferation regimes to nuclearized South Asia. We are ready to engage in a constructive dialogue with other countries, especially major powers, on ways and means to promoting these goals in the new circumstances. Pakistan has always acted with utmost restraint and responsibility. We would continue to do so in the future. We are prepared to resume Pakistan-India dialogue to address all outstanding issues, including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as peace and security. These should include urgent steps for mutual restraint and equitable measures for nuclear stabilisation. Pakistan has already offered a non-aggression pact to India on the basis of a just settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. I would like to reiterate this offer.

We have instituted effective command and control structures. We are fully conscious of the need to handle these weapon systems with the highest sense of responsibility. We have not and will not transfer sensitive technologies to other States or entities. At the same time, Pakistan will oppose all unjust embargoes aimed at preventing it from exercising its right to develop various technologies for self defence or peaceful purposes. I would like to again assure all countries that our nuclear weapon systems are meant only for self defence and there should be no apprehension or concern in this regard.

The Pakistani people are united in their resolve to safeguard, at all costs, Pakistan's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. I would like to congratulate the nation on the achievements of our scientists and engineers. They have made it possible for the people of Pakistan to enter the next century with confidence in themselves and faith in their destiny.

(2)軍縮会議での声明 5月28日)

“Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan, in the Conference on Disarmament”, 28 May 1998.¹⁴

First of all, this is a good opportunity for me, Mr. President, in the first session over which you preside, to extend to you my Government's and my personal felicitations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference at this critical juncture in the work of this body. I believe it is no secret that the close brotherly relations between our countries are legendary, and many searching for a rationale for these relations have described it as a love affair. We are therefore most happy to see you, so soon after assuming charge of your responsibilities in Geneva, come to this Conference and assume the Chair at this important point in our work. We also wish to extend our great appreciation to our brother, the distinguished representative of Syria, for the very diligent and successful manner in which he conducted the work of this Conference during the past four weeks. He has

¹⁴ CD/PV.794 of 28 May 1998.この声明は、パキスタン核実験実施の発表前になされたものである。

culminated the efforts of our body and achieved results which have been the most significant for this year.

At the last two sessions of this Conference, Pakistan has been obliged to take the floor and to draw attention to the grave implications of India's nuclear-weapons tests, as well as the accompanying escalatory actions and declarations of the Hindu fundamentalist Government in New Delhi, its declaration of India as a nuclear-weapon State, its decision to proceed with nuclear weaponization, its declaration of the right to use nuclear weapons and its threat of the use of force against Pakistan, especially across the Line of Control in Kashmir. In this context, I would like to read into the records of this Conference the text of a press statement which was issued in the early hours of this morning, 28 May 1998.

“In the wake of the Indian nuclear tests, we have been receiving information of the possibility of attacks on our nuclear installations. The purpose behind this action would be to prevent us from taking an appropriate decision in our supreme national interest. Last night we received credible information that an attack was to be mounted before dawn. We were fully prepared to meet any eventuality in our defence. Immediate messages were transmitted to Washington and other permanent members of the Security Council. The Indian High Commissioner was summoned to the Foreign Office at 1 a.m. Pakistan time and clearly told that any attack on our nuclear facilities would be in violation of our existing agreement against attack on such facilities. He was asked to convey to New Delhi that we expected the Indian Government to desist from any irresponsible act. Any such act would warrant a swift and massive retaliation with unforeseen consequences. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was also immediately informed and requested to counsel restraint to New Delhi.”

That is the text of the press statement that was issued early this morning in Islamabad. On behalf of my Government, I would like to urge the members of the Conference on Disarmament to also counsel restraint on the Government of India. We wish to caution that India's aggressive behaviour could lead to disastrous consequences. They must pull back from the brink.

Pakistan has exercised restraint. Whether or not Pakistan responds in kind to India's nuclear explosions, it should be noted that Pakistan has not claimed that it wants to become a nuclear-weapon State. We have not threatened to weaponize our nuclear capability. We have not threatened to use force, whether conventional or non-conventional. It is clear that the non-proliferation regime has been significantly eroded by the Indian actions. The NPT recognizes five nuclear-weapon States. Now one State has declared itself a nuclear-weapon State. Do the parties to the NPT, the permanent members of the Security Council and others accept India's proclamation of its status as a nuclear-weapon State? Until India's nuclear status is clarified and established, until this happens, Pakistan cannot be expected to negotiate or accept additional instruments for non-proliferation. Until India's nuclear status has been clarified, any proposal for the opening of FMCT negotiations, or for the

signature of the CTBT by other States, will be redundant and irrelevant. In being asked to join any treaty, we must know how many nuclear-weapon States will be its parties. If India signs the CTBT or joins the FMCT, will it do so as a nuclear-weapon State or as a non-nuclear-weapon State? We should know whether Pakistan will have the option to join these treaties as a nuclear-weapon State, as India is claiming, or only as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

The answers to these questions are not clear today. The answers will depend on what the international community decides in its response to India's claim to have become a nuclear-weapon State. Some voices unfortunately already want to accept the fait accompli created by India's tests and declarations. Will this also be the answer of the international community? That is the central question - not whether or not Pakistan decides to demonstrate its nuclear capability in reaction to India's provocative nuclear testing and its aggressive behaviour. This question must be answered if progress is to be made on various nuclear items on our agenda. Until then, to raise these questions and to press these in this hall would be a waste of time. We should focus on the real problem and not on irrelevant issues.

インドの声明

(1)外務省声明(5月28日)

“Official Press Releases, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi”, 28 May 1998.¹⁵

I: We have heard the news of Pakistan's nuclear tests. Full facts are being ascertained. Pakistan's nuclear tests have confirmed what has been known all along - that that country has been in possession of nuclear weapons. This event vindicates our assessment and our policy, as well as the measures that have been taken. We expect that those who disagreed with us will reassess their stand. The Government have taken all steps necessary for safeguarding the nation's security.

II: Our High Commissioner in Pakistan was called in by the Pakistan Foreign Secretary at 0210 hours (IST) this morning. The Pakistan Foreign Secretary conveyed to our High Commissioner that India was preparing to attack the nuclear facilities of Pakistan. Our High Commissioner dismissed this as an utterly absurd and malicious allegation. Pakistan has also sought to spread this canard in the UN and some important world capitals. In the normal course we would not have lent dignity to this vicious propaganda, but as it could be part of a more nefarious design, we would like to make it clear that India stands committed to uphold its treaty obligations and agreements including the India-Pakistan Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities. There is no intention, on our part, to heighten tension between India and Pakistan. We see in these Pakistani efforts yet another example of their deep frustration. We are confident that all concerned will reject these crude manifestations of the traditional Pakistani mindset of hostility against India.

¹⁵ *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), p.16より再録。

(2)外務省声明(5月31日)

“Official Press Releases, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi”, 31 May 1998.¹⁶

I: We are in the knowledge of Pakistan having conducted one more nuclear test today. The development was expected. Facts are being ascertained. ... As is well known, India is already observing a voluntary moratorium. Pakistan has sought to justify the nuclear tests by projecting an alleged threat from India. As [the] Prime Minister has already stated, India does not pose a threat to Pakistan. The Prime Minister reiterated the offer to hold discussions with Pakistan on a no-first-use agreement reflecting our desire to maintain peace and security in the region. ... [The] Government remains fully prepared to deal firmly and effectively with any threat to India's national security.

II: India calls upon all the NWS and indeed the international community to join with it in opening early negotiations for an NWC [Nuclear Weapons Convention] so that these weapons can be dealt with in a global, non-discriminatory framework as the other two weapons of mass destruction have been, through the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention... The international community can rest assured that, on our part, there is no desire to heighten tension and Pakistan faces no threat from India.

国際社会の反応

(1)国連事務総長の声明(5月28日)

“Secretary-General, Deploring Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests, Urges Both Governments to Sign Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, Calls for No-First-Use Pledge, Freezing of Nuclear Weapons Development Programmes”, 28 May 1998.¹⁷

Following is the text of Secretary-General Kofi Annan's statement issued today regarding Pakistan's nuclear tests:

I deplore both the Indian and Pakistani tests. They exacerbate tension in an already difficult situation.

I call on both Governments to sign the Comprehensive-Test-Ban Treaty(CTBT). They might also sign a no-first-use pledge with each other.

Finally, both nations should freeze their nuclear weapons development programme. The number of nuclear weapons should decrease, not increase.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*より再録。

¹⁷ SG/SM/6575, 28 May 1998.

As we approach the new century, we should be asking how best to preserve life, culture and civilization, not how to become more destructive.

(2)国連事務総長の声明 5月30日)

“Secretary-General Calls on Pakistan to Join India in Declaring Moratorium on Future Nuclear Weapon Tests”, 30 May 1998.¹⁸

Dismayed by Sixth Test by Pakistan

The following statement was issued today by the Spokesman for Secretary- General Kofi Annan:

The Secretary-General has learned with profound dismay that, despite the appeals for restraint by him as well as by the Security Council and leaders of many Member States, Pakistan has conducted a sixth underground nuclear weapon test on Saturday, 30 May. This further dangerous and senseless escalation of tension could lead to a nuclear arms race with incalculable consequences. The international community must move to prevent a further deterioration of the situation.

The Secretary-General urgently reiterates his appeal to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to demonstrate their leadership at this critical stage by exercising restraint and reducing the high tensions between them. Noting that India has already announced a moratorium on future tests, he calls upon Pakistan to make a parallel declaration. He also urges both countries to accede to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) without conditions.

The Secretary-General reiterates the offer made to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in the letters he addressed to them on 29 May to assist them in initiating a constructive dialogue.

(3)国連安保理議長声明

Statement by the President of the security Council, 29 May 1998.¹⁹

At the 3888th meeting of the Security Council, held on 29 May 1998, in connection with the Council’s consideration of the item entitled “The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security”, the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

“The Security Council strongly deplores the underground nuclear tests that Pakistan conducted on 28 May 1998, despite overwhelming international concern and calls for restraint. Reaffirming the Statement of its President of 14 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/12), on Indian nuclear tests of 11 and 13

¹⁸ SG/SM/6577 of 30 May 1998

¹⁹ S/PRST/1998/17 of 29 May 1998.

May, the Council strongly urges India and Pakistan to refrain from any further tests. It is of the view that testing by India and then by Pakistan is contrary to the de facto moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The Council also expresses its concern at the effects of this development on peace and stability in the region.

“The Security Council reaffirms the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Council appeals to India and Pakistan, and all other States which have not yet done so, to become parties to the NPT, and to the CTBT, without delay and without conditions. The Council also encourages India and Pakistan to participate, in a positive spirit, in the proposed negotiations with other States for a fissile material cut-off treaty in Geneva with a view to reaching early agreement.

“The Security Council calls upon all parties to exercise maximum restraint and to take immediate steps to reduce and remove tensions between them. The Council reaffirms that the sources of tension in South Asia should be reduced and eliminated only through peaceful dialogue and not by the use of force or other military means.

“The Security Council urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues, including all those that the parties have already discussed, especially matters concerning peace and security, in order to remove the tensions between them and to enhance their economic and political cooperation. The Council calls upon India and Pakistan to avoid any steps or statements that could lead to further instability or impede their bilateral dialogue.

“The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.”

(3)日本

村岡官房長官「パキスタンの核実験実施に対する我が国の措置について」平成10年5月29日²⁰

1. 28日、パキスタンが我が国を初めとする国際社会による自制に向けた懸命の働きかけにもかかわらず、核実験を行ったことは極めて遺憾である。我が国は、同日、小淵外務大臣よりクレシ在京臨時代理大使を招致し、強く抗議すると共に核実験と核開発の停止をパキスタン側に申し入れたところである。

2. 今般のパキスタンによる核実験実施は、核兵器のない世界を目指す国際社会全体の努力に対する挑戦であり、全く容認できないものである。パキスタンに対して核実験と核開発の即時停止を求めると共に、インド及びパキスタンに対して危険な核軍拡競争を開始しないよう、そしてNPT及びCTBTを無条件に締結するよう改めて求めたい。我が国は更に国連安保理をはじめ国際的な場で核不拡散体制の堅持、南アジアの平和維持の問題に積極的に取り組む。

²⁰ 外務省ホームページ(http://www.moda.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/happyo/danwa/danwa_10/dmu_0529.html)より再録。

3. このため政府としては、ODA大綱原則に鑑み、以下の措置を講ずることとした。(1) 対パキスタン無償資金協力については、緊急・人道的性格の援助及び草の根無償を除き新規の協力は停止する。

(2) パキスタンに対する新規円借款は停止する。

(3) 国際開発金融機関による対パキスタン融資については慎重に対応する。

4. また、パキスタン向けの大量破壊兵器関連品目等の輸出については、厳格な審査を堅持していく。

(5)米国

“Fact Sheet: India and Pakistan Sanctions”, Released by the Bureau of Economic and Agricultural Affairs, 18 June 1998.²¹

The United States imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan as a result of their nuclear tests in May. In imposing these sanctions, we seek:

- to send a strong message to would-be nuclear testers;
- to have maximum influence on Indian and Pakistani behavior;
- to target the governments, rather than the people; and,
- to minimize the damage to other U.S. interests.

Our goals are that India and Pakistan:

- halt further nuclear testing;
- sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) immediately and without conditions;
- not deploy or test missiles or nuclear weapons;
- cut off fissile material production for nuclear weapons;
- cooperate in Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations in Geneva;
- maintain and formalize restraints on sharing sensitive goods and technologies with other countries; and,
- reduce bilateral tensions, including Kashmir.

Accordingly, the United States:

- Terminated or suspended foreign assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act, with exceptions provided by law (e.g., humanitarian assistance, food, or other agricultural commodities).
 - \$21 million in economic development assistance and housing guarantee authority for India terminated.

²¹ 米国国務省ホームページ(<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/sa/>)より再録

- \$6 million Greenhouse Gas program in India suspended.
 - Trade Development Agency will not consider new projects.
 - Most assistance to Pakistan had already been prohibited.
- Terminated foreign military sales under the Arms Export Control Act, and revoked licenses for the commercial sale of any item on the U.S. munitions list.
 - Suspended delivery of previously approved defense articles and services to India.
 - Halted any new commitments of USG credits and credit guarantees by USG entities (EXIM, OPIC, CCC).
 - The Administration will support legislation to permit CCC credits for food and agricultural commodities.
 - OPIC had only recently reopened in Pakistan; however, India was one of OPIC's top five countries receiving an average of \$300 million annually in OPIC support.
 - EXIM had only recently reopened in Pakistan with one expression of interest pending for \$1.1 million; \$500 million in pending financing in India will not go forward.
 - Gained G-8 support to postpone consideration of non-basic human needs (BHN) loans for India and Pakistan by the International Financial Institutions (IFI) to bolster the effect of the Glenn amendment requirement that the U.S. oppose non-BHN IFI loans.
 - \$1.17 billion in IFI lending postponed for India.
 - although no IFI loans for Pakistan have been presented for board consideration, \$25 million in IMF assistance has been postponed for failure to meet economic benchmarks.
 - Will issue Executive Orders to prohibit U.S. banks from extending loans or credits to the Governments of India and Pakistan.
 - Will deny export of all dual use items controlled for nuclear or missile reasons. Will presume denial for all other dual-use exports to entities involved in nuclear or missile programs.
 - will toughen existing controls for government military entities;
 - will continue denial of nuclear exports licensed by NRC or authorized by DOE; and
 - will continue to favorably consider on a case-by-case basis other transactions which do not support nuclear, missile, or inappropriate military activities.

3 軍縮會議(6月2日)²²

47力国共同声明

“Statement read by Ambassador Clive Pearson, New Zealand, in the Conference on Disarmament”,
2 June 1998.

Mr. President, first may I take the opportunity to congratulate you on assuming the presidency? It is good to see you in the Chair and you can rely on the full support of my delegation.

I am taking the floor at this special session to read into the record a statement from the following member States and observers of the Conference: Australia, New Zealand, United States of America, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Ukraine, Canada, Greece, Slovakia, Hungary, Sweden, Belarus, Germany, Poland, Switzerland, Norway, Philippines, Denmark, Italy, Romania, Croatia, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Japan, Malta, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Mongolia, Russian Federation, Republic of Korea, France, China, Turkey, Spain, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Chile, Ireland, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina, Portugal, Slovenia and Belgium.

They are alarmed and deeply concerned at nuclear testing by India and Pakistan.

They condemn all nuclear testing and consider such acts to be contrary to the international consensus which bans the testing of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.

The tests undertaken by India and Pakistan's decision to respond with its own tests blatantly undermine the international regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The actions of India and Pakistan threaten and undermine the process of disarmament and the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether.

The testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan is totally irreconcilable with claims by both countries that they are committed to nuclear disarmament.

International security will not be enhanced by provocative and dangerous acts. Nor will regional or global security be improved or maintained by indulging in competitive manoeuvres to further develop nuclear capability and delivery systems. The approach that India and Pakistan seem determined to pursue belongs to a bygone age.

Peace in the Asia region is a global concern. Tensions will only be resolved permanently through constructive dialogue and negotiation.

It is now crucial that India and Pakistan announce immediately a cessation to all further testing of

²² CD/PV.795 of 2 June 1998.

these weapons, renounce their nuclear-weapons programmes and sign and ratify, unconditionally, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. This is a matter of urgency and essential for generating the confidence necessary for security differences to be resolved through dialogue and negotiation.

We also call on India and Pakistan to accede, without delay, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to join all States in ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to engage in negotiations to conclude a ban on the production of fissile material. These are further essential steps that should be taken in the process of working collectively and constructively towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

This is a moment for all countries to exercise calm and maximum restraint. We call on India and Pakistan to abandon immediately the course of action they are pursuing and to settle their security concerns and differences through political engagement. Such an approach will have the full support of the international community which is striving towards nuclear disarmament.

インドの声明

“Statement by Ambassador Savitri Kunadi, India, in the Conference on Disarmament”, 2 June 1998.

Mr. President, it gives me great pleasures to avail of this opportunity to express how pleased we are to see you in the Chair guiding our deliberations with your characteristic diplomatic skills. While we congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency, we recall the very warm relations that exist between our two countries, and, in particular, the immense contribution that you have personally made. I assure you of the fullest cooperation of my delegation in discharging your functions. We would also like to place on record our deep sense of appreciation to the Ambassador of Syria, Mr. Taher Al-Hussami, for his diligent efforts as the President of the Conference.

I have requested the floor today to read into the records extracts from the suo moto statement made by the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, before the Indian Parliament on 27 May 1998. We have requested the secretariat to circulate the complete version of the statement as an official document of the CD, along with a paper entitled "Evolution of India's nuclear policy" which had been tabled in Parliament on 27 May 1998.

I take this opportunity to read extracts from the suo moto statement of 27 May made by the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

“In 1947, when India emerged as a free country to take its rightful place in the comity of nations, the nuclear age had already dawned. Our leaders then took the crucial decision to opt for self-reliance, and freedom of thought and action. We rejected the cold war paradigm and chose the more difficult path of non-alignment. Our leaders also realized that a nuclear-weapon-free world would

enhance not only India's security but also the security of all nations. That is why disarmament was and continues to be a major plank in our foreign policy.

“During the 1950s, India took the lead in calling for an end to all nuclear-weapons testing. Addressing the Lok Sabha on 2 April 1954, Pandit Jawaharlal Neru, to whose memory we pay homage today, stated that 'nuclear, chemical and biological energy and power should not be used to forge weapons of mass destruction'. He called for negotiations for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and, in the interim, a standstill agreement to halt nuclear testing. This call was not heeded.

“In 1965, along with a small group of non-aligned countries, India put forward the idea of an international non-proliferation agreement under which the nuclear-weapon States would agree to give up their arsenals, provided other countries refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. This balance of rights and obligations was not accepted. In the 1960s our security concerns deepened. The country sought security guarantees but the countries we turned to were unable to extend to us the expected assurances. As a result, we made it clear that we would not be able to sign the NPT.

“The Lok Sabha debated the issue on 5 April, 1968. The late Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, assured the House that 'we shall be guided entirely by our self-enlightenment and the considerations of national security'. This was a turning point, and this House strengthened the decision of the then Government by reflecting a national consensus.

“Our decision not to sign the NPT was in keeping with our basic objectives. In 1974, we demonstrated our nuclear capability. Successive Governments thereafter have taken all necessary steps in keeping with that resolve and national will, to safeguard India's nuclear option. This was the primary reason behind the 1996 decision for not signing the CTBT, a decision that also enjoyed consensus of this House.

“The decades of the 1980s and 1990s had meanwhile witnessed the gradual deterioration of our security environment as a result of nuclear and missile proliferation. In our neighbourhood, nuclear weapons had increased and more sophisticated delivery systems inducted. In addition, India has also been the victim of externally aided and abetted terrorism, militancy and clandestine war.

“At a global level, we see no evidence on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. Instead, we have seen that the NPT has been extended indefinitely and unconditionally, perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the five countries.

“Under such circumstances, the Government was faced with a difficult decision. The touchstone

that has guided us in making the correct choice clear was national security. These tests are a continuation of the policies set in motion that put this country on the path of self-reliance and independence of thought and action.

“India is now a nuclear-weapon State. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers. It is India's due, the right of one sixth of humankind. Our strengthened capability adds to our sense of responsibility. We do not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for mounting threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defence, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion. We do not intend to engage in an arms race.

“We had taken a number of initiatives in the past. We regret that these proposals did not receive a positive response from other nuclear-weapons States. In fact, had their response been positive, we need not have gone in for our current testing programme. We have been and will continue to be in the forefront of the calls of opening negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention, so that this challenge can be dealt with in the same manner that we have dealt with the scourge of two other weapons of mass destruction - through the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

“Traditionally, India has been an outward-looking country. Our strong commitment to multilateralism is reflected in our active participation in organizations like the United Nations. This engagement will continue. The policies of economic liberalization introduced in recent years have increased our regional and global linkages, and my Government intends to deepen and strengthen these ties.

“Our nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness. We have not violated any international agreements either in 1974 or now, in 1998. The restraint exercised for 24 years, after having demonstrated our capability in 1974, is in itself a unique example. Restraint, however, has to arise from strength. It cannot be based upon indecision or doubt. The series of tests recently undertaken by India have led to the removal of doubts. The action involved was balanced in that it was the minimum necessary to maintain what is an irreducible component of our national security calculus.

“Subsequently, the Government has already announced that India will now observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear-test explosions. We have also indicated willingness to move towards a de jure formalization of this declaration.”

India's commitment to the moratorium was reiterated by the Prime Minister in his statement to the Indian Parliament on 29 May, a day after the Pakistani test. The Prime Minister of India also reiterated interest in engaging in negotiations on an FMCT, undertaking stringent export controls

on nuclear and missile-related technologies, as well as those relating to other weapons of mass destruction, and a "no first use" agreement with Pakistan, as also with other countries bilaterally, or in a multilateral form.

The logic and rationale of India's approaches, which have been set out earlier by me in the Statement, have been vindicated by Pakistan's nuclear tests. These tests have established what has been known all along: that Pakistan has been in possession of nuclear weapons. The clandestine nature of their programme is well documented. It is relevant to note in this context that the transborder terrorism promoted, aided and abetted against India for the last 10 years by Pakistan, has a component of its nuclear capability. India has been a victim of this terrorism which must end.

Let me turn now to our concerns relating to peace and security in our region. These concerns have increased as India's security environment has become complicated with the accumulation of nuclear weapons and missiles in our neighbourhood. The improvements in the security environment in the West have not been replicated in our region. Our concerns are not limited to South Asia alone, but are far deeper and broader in scope. On the other hand, Pakistan's approach has always been Indocentric, as has been made abundantly clear by the justification they have sought to give for their test.

India is committed to the maintenance of peace and security in our region and beyond. Our perspectives on security issues are global in range and scope. Such concerns are natural for a country like India, the home of one sixth of humanity. India's security concerns cannot be relegated to South Asia alone.

We have pursued a policy of maintaining security and stability in our region and of striving for the enlargement of friendly and cooperative relations with our neighbours. With our neighbour to the West, Pakistan, we have always sought to develop a relationship of friendship and cooperation based on mutual respect and regard for each other's concerns. We have sought ways of enhancing cooperation and of addressing all issues, including those on which the two countries do not see eye to eye. For this purpose, we have always been ready to pursue the path of comprehensive, constructive and sustained bilateral dialogue. The process of dialogue was reinstated at India's initiative. The two sides have engaged in the process of framing the modalities of dialogue, and our suggestions in this regard were given to Pakistan in January 1998. We await their response. An important part of our policy towards Pakistan is the promotion of confidence-building measures (CMBs) between the two countries. Several suggestions in this regard have been made by us. Meanwhile, we have scrupulously adhered to the CMBs which are in place. These include an agreement on the prohibition of attack on each other's nuclear facilities and installations. In this context, the recent canard sought to be spread by Pakistan about the possibility of an Indian attack on its nuclear installations was reprehensible. It indicates a mindset which Pakistan must abandon. Attempts to heighten tensions at the border, or propaganda by Pakistan, are not conducive to

building better ties.

Before I conclude, I would like to state that we have consistently maintained that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament have to be discussed in a global framework and in a comprehensive and non-discriminatory manner. Artificial delimitation and selective, compartmentalized approaches which seek to limit these issues to "South Asia" are defective. I have already pointed out that India's security parameters go beyond South Asia. Our concerns in this regard should not be ignored. The communiqué adopted by the NAM Ministerial Conference at Cartagena recently noted that the present situation, whereby nuclear-weapon States insist that nuclear weapons provide unique security benefits and yet monopolize the right to own them, is highly discriminatory, unstable and cannot be sustained. India remains committed to NAM positions for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time. India calls on all nuclear-weapon States and indeed the international community to join with it in opening early negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention so that these weapons can be dealt with in a global, non-discriminatory framework, as the other two weapons of mass destruction have been through the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

パキスタンの声明

"Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan, in the Conference on Disarmament", 2 June 1998.

This is probably the first special session which the Conference on Disarmament has ever held, and my delegation is very glad that this special session has been devoted to the crisis in South Asia. For many years, Pakistan has been trying to draw the attention of the international community and of this body to the dangers of conflict, including the nuclear threat emanating from India. Therefore, we not only did not object to this specific discussion, as India objected to a special session after its own tests, but we welcomed this special session. We are glad that a full and thorough debate has taken place on all aspects of the situation.

Pakistan did not instigate or initiate the present security crisis in South Asia. We were obliged by security considerations and national considerations to respond to India's provocative nuclear tests. We are glad this action-reaction sequence has been widely acknowledged in the statements we have heard here today.

India conducted its tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. As we found, these tests were soon followed by provocative statements and threats against Pakistan. These threats culminated in reports of a planned pre-emptive strike against Pakistan's sensitive facilities in the night of 28 May 1998. Others may discount these reports, but Pakistan, which has been subjected to Indian aggression on three occasions, could not afford to ignore the credible reports of such strikes that we received on that night, and that night brought to the attention of the world the nature, the depth and the

dangers of the crisis in South Asia.

The nuclear proliferation crisis in South Asia has thus been transformed into a major security crisis, and it is this security crisis which the international community must deal with. The Government of Pakistan understands and appreciates the sense of concern in many parts of the international community at the resumption of nuclear testing and the escalation of tensions in South Asia. We fully appreciate the endeavours of the world leaders - President Clinton of the United States, President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Blair of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Hashimoto of Japan and several others - who sought personally to convince our Prime Minister and the Government that Pakistan should exercise restraint. We appreciate their efforts. We want to tell them that we gave full consideration to their views. We carefully weighed the factors in favour of and against the conduct of our tests. As the distinguished representative of the United States has noted, we dealt with all our friends honestly. There was no deception. And I wish to address my colleague from Australia in this regard and to say to him that we reject such assertions as he has made about deception.

In this context, let me recall another deception. During the CTBT negotiations, while exhorting France to cease its nuclear testing programme, the former Prime Minister of Australia stated that the process of banning nuclear testing was about stopping countries like Iraq and Pakistan, and therefore France should stop worrying about countries such as Germany. This is not only deception but has a tinge of racism.

While we appreciate the sentiments that have been expressed, we would urge all our friends to refrain from the use of intemperate language. I want to tell our friends from Canada that when they supplied an unsafeguarded research reactor to India from which fuel was diverted for India's first test explosion, Pakistan did not describe that action as an irresponsible act, although we could have. So, I believe that we must address this issue with the gravity and seriousness that it deserves, and Pakistan has taken actions with full responsibility and with full knowledge of the costs that were involved.

Our decision to test became virtually inevitable because of three factors: firstly, the steady escalation in the provocations and threats emanating from India. We were told that India is a nuclear-weapon State. We have just heard that repeated here today. We were told India would use nuclear weapons. We were told that the strategic balance has been altered by India's tests, and now India could teach Pakistan a lesson. We had to take that into account. Secondly, there was the weak and partial response of the world community to India's tests and threats. Obviously, no one was - and no one is - willing to underwrite Pakistan's security. We have to do it ourselves. Therefore, the criticism of Pakistan's testing which has been voiced by some of our friends, who enjoy the NATO security umbrella, this we believe was not even-handed. The third factor relevant to our decision was the realization that, given the nature of the Indian regime, we could not leave them in any

doubt about the credibility of our capability to deter and respond devastatingly to any aggression against our country or pre-emptive strikes against other facilities.

Pakistan thus took the very difficult, painful decision to respond to India's tests. But the difference between India's and Pakistan's actions is crucial, and we hope that our friends will bear that in mind. India's tests were a provocation. Pakistan's were a reaction. India's tests had destabilized the security balance in South Asia. Pakistan's tests have restabilized the balance of mutual deterrence in South Asia. Pakistan therefore regrets the failure of some of our friends to appreciate this distinction between India's action and our reaction. We believe that the sanctions and other actions that some have taken against Pakistan are unfair and unjust and in the final analysis will prove to be counter-productive.

Pakistan has welcomed the offer of mediation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Unfortunately, India has rejected the Secretary-General's mediation. We also welcome the initiative taken by the United States to call for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the permanent members of the Security Council in Geneva from the day after tomorrow. We look forward to a fair and just conclusion from this meeting which reflects the realities of the situation.

Every crisis presents a challenge, but it often also presents an opportunity. This crisis today offers the opportunity for the international community to build a stable structure of peace and security in South Asia through dialogue and consensus. Thus, it is essential that we do not maintain a narrow focus only on the issue of non-proliferation. Peace and security in South Asia must be dealt with in a comprehensive manner.

The international community now needs to look to the future. We believe that there are at least four aspects which need to be addressed: first, measures to avoid a conflict and ease current tensions; second, steps to promote nuclear stabilization in South Asia and insure against further nuclear proliferation; third, the dangers posed by the imbalance in conventional arms and forces between India and Pakistan; and fourth, the need for a resolution of the underlying core dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, a dispute which is at the root of the confrontation between India and Pakistan.

As regards the avoidance of conflict, it should be clear that the Indian proposal for a no-first-use agreement is somewhat disingenuous. Perhaps it is designed to make it safe for India to continue to use its conventional weapons superiority to threaten and coerce Pakistan and other smaller neighbours. Pakistan has proposed a more comprehensive non-aggression agreement banning all use or threat of force, as required by the United Nations Charter.

As regards the nuclear issue, in the short-term, at least what is required most is an international consensus on how to stabilize the situation - in other words, how to prevent an open nuclear arms race in South Asia. Pakistan is willing to participate in and contribute to international endeavours

to achieve such stabilization, to establish what might be called a nuclear restraint regime in South Asia. Pakistan is not interested in an arms race with India, nor is Pakistan seeking nuclear-weapon status. Our tests were defence-oriented and meant to restore strategic balance in the region. We will adjust ourselves in the best interest to Pakistan, as developments in various related areas take place. We will continue to show restraint in the field of weaponization as a mature and responsible nation. Our response will be carefully calibrated to the provocation.

In this context, we in Pakistan cannot ignore that India has declared itself a nuclear-weapon State, declared that it will be placing nuclear warheads on its missiles. It is already deploying nuclear-capable missiles and has threatened to use its nuclear weapons in case of either a conventional or non-conventional conflict. This has been confirmed by the Indian statement made here a few minutes ago. The question arises: does the world accept India as a nuclear-weapon State? And if it does not, how does the world change the reality of India's nuclear-weapons capabilities? Is the demand for India - and also Pakistan - to sign the NPT now realistic after their tests, knowing full well that India has refused to sign the NPT for the past 30 years?

These are relevant questions, but they are extremely relevant for Pakistan. In evaluating our position on the CTBT, it will be important for us to know whether India will continue to conduct further nuclear tests, whether it will be accommodated in the CTBT as a nuclear-weapon State, a non-nuclear-weapon State or as something else. Similarly, as regards the FMCT, for Pakistan, this issue is now dependent on India's nuclear status, its degree of weaponization and the size and quality of its fissile material stockpiles. Pakistan cannot afford to allow India to once again destabilize the balance of deterrence in future through asymmetry in the level of fissile material stockpiles. Likewise, we cannot afford a situation of inferiority in missile capabilities.

Nevertheless, Pakistan is prepared to consider means for mutual restraint which can help to stabilize the nuclear situation in South Asia. This could be done through existing agreements or through specific measures especially designed for a nuclear restraint regime in South Asia. This regime could also include measures to insulate the proliferation effect of the recent developments in South Asia on the rest of the world.

Nuclear restraint and balance in South Asia will be made possible if this is accompanied by credible effective measures for greater balance and symmetry in conventional arms capabilities in the region. In this context, we should not ignore the huge arms purchases which India has contracted or is considering from various sources. The Indian defence budget announced today has escalated spending further. Nor can the world ignore that Pakistan's conventional capabilities have been steadily eroded over the years by discriminatory embargoes and restraints.

Finally, it must be acknowledged that the danger of conflict between Pakistan and India, whether conventional or non-conventional, arises from the underlying dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. It

will not be sufficient to ease tensions and sweep this burning problem once again under the carpet. India seeks to portray Kashmir as a problem of terrorism. This carries no credibility. The fact of the matter is that there are 600,000 Indian troops occupying Kashmir, a territory the size of Belgium. There is one Indian soldier for every three Kashmiri men. This is not a problem of terrorism. This is a campaign to suppress the freedom of movement of a people which has remained under India's colonial domination for the past 50 years. India must agree to credible steps for a solution of this problem.

India and Pakistan have been unable to resolve this problem bilaterally for 50 years. It is therefore time that the international community took collective action to try to implement the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Kashmir. At the very least, it should evolve a political framework within which a solution for Kashmir can be found. It should give active support and impetus to future bilateral negotiations between Pakistan and India on Kashmir. It should not allow India to circumvent genuine negotiations on the Kashmir issue once again.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan has reaffirmed our Government's determination to resume Pakistan-India dialogue to address all outstanding issues, including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as peace and security. Last year, India and Pakistan had reached agreement on the modalities for such negotiations. We hope that India will live up to that agreement and implement that agreement so that we can resume our talks as soon as possible. We want to defuse regional tension, which can only be achieved by resolving the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. It is therefore incumbent on all those who genuinely want peace to lend their weight to an early settlement of this basic problem.

The Conference on Disarmament must play its role in promoting peace and security in South Asia. The CD is in a position to address the problem in South Asia in two ways. Firstly, the CD could reach important agreements for genuine movement towards nuclear disarmament. As has been said here, this is a wake-up call for nuclear disarmament. This crisis, if utilized in this way, could contribute to progress in this field. Nuclear disarmament would be a contribution to restraint in South Asia as well. Secondly, the CD could contribute more directly to discussions of the situation in South Asia and try to promote a concept for regional peace and stability, which can be guaranteed or which can be evolved within the framework of a global security environment.

Pakistan is prepared to cooperate with the international community to arrest the crisis in South Asia and to build a stable structure of peace and security in the region. But let us remember, cooperation and coercion are not mutually compatible.

4 国連安全保障理事会

安保理常任理事国外相会談コミュニケ(6月4日)

“Joint Communiqué adopted during the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America”, Geneva, 4 June 1998.²³

1. Bearing in mind the responsibility of their countries for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Geneva on June 4, 1998 to coordinate their response to the grave situation created by the nuclear tests carried out in May 1998 by India and then by Pakistan. The Ministers condemned these tests, expressed their deep concern about the danger to peace and stability in the region, and pledged to cooperate closely in urgent efforts to prevent a nuclear and missile arms race in the Subcontinent, to bolster the non-proliferation regime, and to encourage reconciliation and peaceful resolution of differences between India and Pakistan.

2. The Ministers agreed that quick action is needed to arrest the further escalation of regional tensions stimulated by the recent nuclear tests. India and Pakistan should therefore stop all further such tests. They should refrain from the weaponisation or deployment of nuclear weapons, from the testing or deployment of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and from any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. They should also halt provocative statements, refrain from any military movements that could be construed as threatening, and increase transparency in their actions. Direct communications between the parties could help to build confidence.

3. To reinforce security and stability in the region and more widely, the Five strongly believe that India and Pakistan should adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty immediately and unconditionally, thereby facilitating its early entry into force. The Five also call upon India and Pakistan to participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations with other States in the Conference on Disarmament for a Fissile Material Cut-off Convention with a view to reaching early agreement. The Five will seek firm commitments by India and Pakistan not to weaponize or deploy nuclear weapons or missiles. India and Pakistan should also confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them, and should undertake appropriate commitments in that regard.

4. The Ministers agreed that the international non-proliferation regime must remain strong and effective despite the recent nuclear tests in South Asia. Their goal continued to be adherence by all countries, including India and Pakistan, to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as it stands,

²³ *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.26 (May 1998), pp.20-21.より再録。

without any modification. This Treaty is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Notwithstanding the recent nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapons States in accordance with the NPT.

5 The Ministers concluded that efforts to resolve disputes between India and Pakistan must be pursued with determination. The Ministers affirm their readiness to assist India and Pakistan, in a manner acceptable to both sides, in promoting reconciliation and cooperation. The Ministers pledged that they will actively encourage India and Pakistan to find mutually acceptable solutions, through direct dialogue, that address the root causes of the tension, including Kashmir, and to try to build confidence rather than seek confrontation. In that connection, the Ministers urged both parties to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocative acts.

6. The Ministers also considered what actions the Five could take, individually or collectively, to foster peace and security in South Asia. They will encourage India and Pakistan to adopt practical measures to prevent an arms race. They confirmed their respective policies to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons. They also undertook to do all they could to facilitate a reduction of tensions between those States and to provide assistance, at the request of both parties, in the development and implementation of confidence- and security building measures. They remain determined to fulfill their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.

7. The Ministers viewed their meeting in Geneva as setting in motion a process aimed at strengthening peace and stability in South Asia, at encouraging restraint by India and Pakistan, at promoting the resolution of outstanding differences, and at bolstering the international non-proliferation regime. They will remain fully engaged in pursuing these goals, and will work actively to build broad support in the international community for the objectives agreed today.

安保理決議1172(6月6日)

Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) on international peace and security²⁴

The Security Council,

Reaffirming the statements of its President of 14 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/12) and of 29 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/17),

Reiterating the statement of its President of 31 January 1992 (S/23500), which stated, *inter alia*,

²⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of 6 June of 1998.

that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely concerned at the challenge that the nuclear tests conducted by India and then by Pakistan constitute to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and *also gravely concerned* at the danger to peace and stability in the region,

Deeply concerned at the risk of a nuclear arms race in South Asia, and *determined* to prevent such a race,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty for global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the successful outcome of that Conference,

Affirming the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and *welcoming* the determination of the five nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of that Treaty,

Mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

1. *Condemns* the nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998;
2. *Endorses* the Joint Communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at their meeting in Geneva on 4 June 1998 (S/1998/473);
3. *Demands* that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests and in this context *calls upon* all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
4. *Urges* India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocations in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation;

5. *Urges* India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security, in order to remove the tensions between them, and *encourages* them to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir;

6. *Welcomes* the efforts of the Secretary-General to encourage India and Pakistan to enter into dialogue;

7. *Calls upon* India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and to undertake appropriate commitments in that regard;

8. *Encourages* all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and *welcomes* national policies adopted and declared in this respect;

9. *Expresses* its grave concern at the negative effect of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan on peace and stability in South Asia and beyond;

10. *Reaffirms* its full commitment to and the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as the cornerstones of the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as essential foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament;

11. *Expresses* its firm conviction that the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be maintained and consolidated and *recalls* that in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons India or Pakistan cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State;

12. *Recognizes* that the tests conducted by India and Pakistan constitute a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament;

13. *Urges* India and Pakistan, and all other States that have not yet done so, to become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions;

14. *Urges* India and Pakistan to participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, with a view to reaching early agreement;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Council on the steps taken by India and Pakistan to implement the present resolution;

16. *Expresses* its readiness to consider further how best to ensure the implementation of the present resolution;

17. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

国連安保理決議に対する印パの反応

(1)パキスタン(6月6日)

“Statement issued by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations in Response to the Security Council Resolution 1172”, 6 June 1998.²⁵

Mr. President,

1. Pakistan has kept the UN Secretary General and the Security Council fully informed, at all stages, of the developments pertaining to the current grave security crisis in South Asia.

2. Indeed, to some extent, it was the dereliction of its responsibilities by the Security Council that emboldened India to implement its hegemonic and aggressive designs, by crossing the nuclear threshold, threatening the use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan, and resorting to nuclear blackmail to impose a military solution on Kashmir.

3. We informed the Council about India's provocative actions and unambiguous expression of intent to commit aggression against Pakistan. Unfortunately, the Council did not pay heed to the impending breach of peace.

4. Faced with these ominous developments resulting from India's deliberate and calculated actions to alter the strategic equation, Pakistan was left with no choice but to exercise its nuclear option in its supreme national interest, to restore the strategic balance and to preserve peace.

5. For almost fifty years, Pakistan repeatedly drew attention of the United Nations to the Indian

²⁵ *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.27 (June 1998), pp.21-25.より再録。

illegal occupation of Jammu and Kashmir. We demanded the implementation of the Council's own resolutions. We sought to draw attention of the international community to the Indian brutal campaign to deny to the Kashmiri people their inalienable right to self-determination, as provided for in the Council's resolutions.

6. We repeatedly drew attention of the Secretary General and his Council to the extremely volatile situation in Kashmir, resulting from grave violations of the Line of Control by Indian troops. We urged the Secretary General and his Council to take cognizance of this situation and even proposed the strengthening of the present United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

7. We regret to note that the Council paid no attention, whatsoever, to Pakistan's repeated warning and requests. Today again, the central issue which has bedeviled relations between India and Pakistan and is at the source of all conflicts and tensions in South Asia, is being ignored.

8. Now that the Council is seized of the volatile situation in South Asia, we note with regret that the approach that is being adopted is once again devoid of realism. Non-proliferation cannot be pursued by creating or acquiescing in situation of a security void. This has been and continues to be a major failure on the part of all those who have sought to promote the goal of non- proliferation. It is obviously counter-productive to bank once again on a uni-dimensional approach to non-proliferation based on selective sanctions, pressures and intimidation.

9. The Council has contented itself to deal with the non-proliferation aspects. Non-proliferation is no longer an issue in South Asia. South Asia, which we wanted to be a nuclear weapon free zone, is today nuclearized, thanks to the encouragement and acquiescence of major powers. There is a real danger of nuclear conflict. Proliferation, regrettably has taken place. No amount of sermonizing and lamentations can rectify or reverse this unfortunate development.

10. If this Council really wishes to have any role in containing the crisis and preventing the situation from deteriorating further, it must adopt a pragmatic and realistic approach.

11. We are convinced that a comprehensive approach to the issues of peace, security, confidence building, conventional imbalance, and conventional an nuclear arms control, is the only realistic way, whereby this Council and the international community could contribute to defusing the security crisis in South Asia which has endangered global peace and stability.

12. Mr. President, the Resolution which has emerged from the consultations is deficient in several aspects.

13. Let me first deal with procedure. Under Article 31 of the Charter, "Any member of the United

Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without a vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council, whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected". We deeply regret that the Council has disregarded this Charter provision by not giving us an opportunity to participate in the discussions on this Resolution.

14. The attitude of the Council can, in short be described as, "My mind is made up; please do not confuse me with facts".

15. While I would be pointing out the substantive inadequacies, let me make a more general point.

16. I wish to state for the record and for posterity that the adoption of this Resolution will further marginalize the role of the Security Council, not only in dealing effectively with the security crisis in South Asia but on global security issues as a whole.

17. The approach that the Security Council has adopted is not only again devoid of realism but also of legality and morality.

18. I wonder whether the Security Council is not about to ignite an extremely short fuse that will destruct the entire global security order as is envisioned in the UN Charter.

19. Now let me deal with salient aspects of this Resolution which I believe fall in the following three categories:

- a) Non-Proliferation;
- b) The security problem in South Asia; and
- c) The role of the Council

20. As far as the non-proliferation aspects of this resolution are concerned, we cannot help but comment on the extremely short sighted approach that the Council has chose to pursue.

21. This Resolution is not an expression of global concern about the failure of non-proliferation and ways and means to deal with this serious issue. It is in fact a transparent exercise in self assurance by the official Nuclear-5 to seek legitimacy for their possession of lethal arsenals of weapons of mass destruction.

22. The Nuclear-5 draw comfort and questionable legitimacy from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan had never questioned this dubious distinction that they draw from the NPT. Today we are obliged perforce to reconsider our position.

23. For the first time, this sacrosanct institution is being used, today, to confer legitimacy upon the Nuclear-5. It is, therefore, not what is contained in this Resolution, but what is implied, which needs to be seen in its proper legal, strategic and political perspective.

24. For the first time, the Security Council is being asked to play a role in enforcing non-proliferation. This is contrary to the letter and spirit of the various international instruments and treaties on this subject.

25. Nuclear non-proliferation is the obverse side of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear non-proliferation cannot be promoted in the absence of corresponding progress towards nuclear disarmament.

26. The Nuclear-5 have continued to use the NPT for a two-fold purpose: to legitimize their own possession of huge nuclear arsenals and the right to retain them in perpetuity; and as blunt instrument to curb further proliferation.

27. It is indeed evident that the Resolution "welcomes" the commitment of the Nuclear-5 to Article VI of the NPT. There could be no more poignant travesty of facts.

28. Treaty provisions cannot be enforced on non-parties. Treaty obligations can only be assumed on a voluntary basis. Any attempt at imposition of treaty obligations on non-parties is, by its very nature, unequal and unsustainable.

29. How would the Council deal with the issue so aptly raised by the decision of IC on the illegitimacy of nuclear weapons? How would the Council deal with the question of non-proliferation? How would the Council deal with the inter-linked issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation? The Council has given its verdict. Nuclear disarmament is apparently in safe hands! Nuclear non-proliferation is the only real issue.

30. The Non-Aligned Movement has consistently held that there is no justification for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals, or for concepts of international security based on a policy of nuclear deterrence.

31. The Non-Aligned movement has also categorically pronounced itself on the present situation, whereby nuclear weapon states insist that nuclear weapons provide unique security benefits, and continue to make feverish efforts to monopolize them. The Non-Aligned Movement has said that this is a highly discriminatory and untenable approach, and one that cannot be sustained.

32. The Non-Aligned Movement's ministerial meeting in Cartagena recently affirmed the importance of the adoption of an action plan for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework, as well as the need for negotiating and implementing universal, non-

discriminatory disarmament measures, and mutually agreed confidence-building measures.

33. If the Council is, today, really concerned about non-proliferation, then the resolution that it has adopted does less than full justice to the predominant views of the Non-Aligned Movement, including of those who are parties to the NPT.

34. Let me once again clarify that the issue for Pakistan is one of security, and not of status.

35. Pakistan has demonstrated its nuclear weapon capability. We have officially stated that the nuclear devices tested on 28 and 30 May 1998 correspond to weapons configuration compatible with delivery systems.

36. We have already stated that South Asia has been nuclearized. We have been compelled to join the process of nuclearization by India's decision to weaponize and induct nuclear weapons.

37. We have been obliged to do so for our self-defence and to restore the strategic balance in South Asia.

38. It is India that has claimed status as the sixth nuclear weapon state. Does the Council, by its lop-sided approach, desire that we also claim status as a nuclear weapon state, and thus contribute to shredding to bits the myths about the legitimacy or otherwise... of nuclear weapons?

39. Moreover, the resolution does not take into account the fact that besides India and Pakistan, there are other states, non-parties to the NPT, which possess nuclear weapons and have so acknowledged.

40. We do not want to complicate the issue. The issue is simple and straight forward. It is about the security crisis in South Asia. We do not want to dilute the focus, and enter into academic arguments about non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

41. We also do not want to link extraneous issues which only serve to detract from the main issue, that is the security crisis in South Asia, which has endangered global peace and stability.

42. So, Mr. President, a highly skewed and self-defeating approach has been taken by the Security Council in trying to handle non-proliferation, which is strictly not within its competence.

43. The future of non-proliferation cannot be assured by setting aside its very legal and moral basis. This is exactly what is being done today by this Council. It is evident, therefore, that what is at stake is not the future of non-proliferation, but the exclusive privileges and status that the Nuclear-5 arrogate to monopolize, caring little about the wider aspects.

44. I, therefore, dread to say that the Council is about to embark on a totally unrealistic and self-defeating course as far as the future of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is concerned.

45. Mr. President, Pakistan has been subjected to double discrimination. At the regional level, we are discriminated because of a failure by the Security Council to make a distinction between an action and reaction, between a provocation and a response, between a cause and its effect.

46. Pakistan has acquired its nuclear capability only in reaction to India's steady development of its nuclear weapons programme. We cannot be asked to give up the right to defend our country against any external threat emanating from conventional or weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan reserves the right to maintain the ability to deter aggression by conventional weapons or non-conventional means.

47. We are also suffering a discrimination at the global level by the Nuclear-5 states, who claim for themselves the right to acquire and retain weapons of mass destruction against each other, or against non-nuclear weapon states, and thus threaten the rest of the world.

48. This discrimination, at the global level, is epitomized by the possession of over 30,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of the Nuclear-5 states, which they claim they will retain indefinitely while taking coercive measures to prevent any other state from acquiring similar capability, even in the legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence.

49. This is totally unjust and unacceptable.

50. While the Security Council adopts this unjust decision, we are confident that the international community, the majority of the membership of the United Nations General Assembly, will reject this unfair and unequal decision, and uphold its demand for general and complete nuclear disarmament in the shortest period of time by the Nuclear-5 states.

Mr. President,

51. The resolution before the Council presumes to deal with the security aspects of the situation in South Asia. Here again, the Council is ensuring that it would, in fact, have at best a disinterested spectator's role.

52. What are the immediate issues in the context of the situation in South Asia? We would have expected that that the Council would seek to address earnestly and reasonably the following:

- a) Reducing the risk of a nuclear conflict.

- b) Promoting nuclear restraint and stabilization measures between Pakistan and India.
- c) Defusing the volatile situation in Jammu and Kashmir, especially along the Line of Control.

53. Unfortunately, the Security Council is once again abnegating its responsibility under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security by adopting a totally unpragmatic and unrealistic approach.

54. This Resolution urges India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations or other provocations in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation. This Resolution also urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all matters pertaining to peace and security and encourages them to find mutually acceptable solutions to address the root cause of tension.

55. The mere mentioning of the root cause, Kashmir, is not enough. We regret that even the important element contained in the P-5 Ministerial Communique, of their readiness to assist India and Pakistan in promoting reconciliation and cooperation has been omitted from this Resolution.

56. It is evident that by adopting this approach the Council is in fact acknowledging its failure to address the critical elements of the situation.

57. In short, the Council wants Pakistan and India settle the issues bedeviling their relations by them selves.

58. If Pakistan and India could have sorted out these problems by themselves, today South Asia would not have been nuclearized.

59. What you, Mr. President, are asking us today, in short, amounts to an appeal to two nuclear weapon states to settle their differences on the basis of the de-facto situation. This de-facto situation is based on complex factors underlying the power balance in strategic and conventional terms.

60. In fact, what you are asking us today is to remain embarked on a disastrous course. You are asking us today to cross new thresholds in nuclear and ballistic system escalation.

61. You are asking us today to set aside UN Charter, and international law, and to base our conduct on the imperatives of maintaining a strategic balance, whatever the cost.

62. You have once again ignored the fact that the direct cause of aggravation of the security situation in South Asia was the unilateral altering by India of the delicate strategic balance that had maintained peace in South Asia for the past two decades.

63. We cannot read any other message in your Resolution. You have once again abandoned your responsibility by asking us to find mutually acceptable solution.

64. I say this more in sorrow than in anger, for the implications of this approach would be far and wide.

65. Not only would it oblige the countries in South Asia, but also 180 member states of the United Nations, to draw their own conclusions about the pathetic state of the UN and the global security order, which is premised to serve the strategic interests of the official Nuclear-5.

66. Mr. President, I regret to say that Pakistan is disappointed. We had pinned our hopes on the UN for more than 50 years. We were confident that it would be able to usher a new era, free from the scourge of war for our succeeding generations. What we have witnessed instead is a tale of missed opportunities, abdication of responsibilities, and selective and discriminatory application of the Charter. This track record does not fill anybody with pride. Nor does it conform to the ideals of its founding fathers, or to the principles of democracy.

67. Let me, however, hasten to add that we would still continue to base our conduct and actions on the noble principles of the UN Charter. The vision of the UN Charter would, I hope, one day bring the dawn of a new era. This would come about if the nations of the world would become true adherents to the principles and purposes of the Charter.

68. The Government and the people of Pakistan have faith in the inherent goodness of human kind. We place great value on the collective civilizational accomplishments of the human race, and the eventual triumph of morality. It is in view of these sublime sentiments that we have taken the liberty, today, to make a critical analysis of the shortcomings of the Security Council, that have only contributed to the spread of chaos and anarchy in various parts of the world.

Mr. President,

69. Pakistan will continue to comply with its obligations under the UN Charter and international law.

70. We would continue to seek a just resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, in accordance with Security Council resolutions. May I, at this stage, remind the Council of its own resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir, which explicitly provide for the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

71. The Prime Minister of Pakistan has already stated, as I would like to reiterate that Pakistan is ready to enter into talks with India on all matters of mutual concern including a Non-Aggression Pact, on the basis of a just, equitable, and expeditious settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

I thank you, Mr. President.

(2)インド(6月8日)

“Statement by Prime Minister Vajpayee to Parliament”, New Delhi, 8 June 1998.²⁶

We regret that the Security Council has acted in a manner in which it has and produced a Resolution which is completely unhelpful in respect of the objectives it seeks to address. The Resolution contains a number of references to nuclear non-proliferation. As I had mentioned in my earlier statement in the House, we are a responsible and committed member of the international community. The Resolution urges us not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosions. For India, such an urging is redundant because we have already instituted a voluntary moratorium. We have also indicated our willingness to explore ways and means of converting this undertaking into a de jure obligation. Further, we have made clear our readiness to engage in multilateral negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We cannot, however, be expected to commit ourselves in advance of these negotiations, to unilaterally restrain production of fissile materials. In keeping with our commitment to non-proliferation, we maintain the strictest controls over exports of nuclear materials and technologies. Our record in this regard has been impeccable and better than that of some countries who are parties to the NPT or members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group or even Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

However, the call made in the Resolution that we should stop our nuclear programmes or missile programmes is unacceptable. Decisions in this regard will be taken by the Government on the basis of our own assessments and national security requirements, in a reasonable and responsible manner. This right, which we claim for ourselves is not something new; it is the right of every sovereign country, and a right that every Government in this country has strongly upheld for the last 50 years.

A glaring lacuna in the Resolution is the total absence of a recognition that the non-proliferation issue is not a regional issue but has to be dealt with a non-discriminatory global context. We find it unfortunate that the UN Security Council Resolution does not reflect on the judgement of the highest international judicial body - the International Court of Justice, which has questioned the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and called for urgent negotiations for their elimination. In the paper on the Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy laid on the Table of this House, we have reiterated our

²⁶ *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.27 (June 1998), pp.20-21.より再録。 .

commitment to nuclear disarmament. Let me categorically state that unlike other nuclear weapon states who have sought to retain their exclusive hold over their nuclear arsenals, India has no such ambition. [The] Government is committed to initiatives that can open negotiations for a global convention for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The attempt to project the recent tests by India as a threat to peace and security is totally misguided and grossly out of focus. Such a portrayal of our policy ignores the positive steps announced by [the] Government to which I have already referred, both in the global disarmament framework and the regional context. Our tests were necessary because of the failure of a flawed non-proliferation regime, and, therefore, we categorically reject the notion that these have adversely affected either regional or global security. [The] Government have indicated willingness to engage in a meaningful dialogue with key interlocutors on the whole range of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues. Last week, Special Envoy Shri Brajesh Mishra visited Paris and London in this regard. He had meetings at the senior most levels in the two capitals. Dialogues with other countries are also planned. These dialogues have to be seen as part of a process, a process that will lead to a better understanding of India's position.

...India has always desired a peaceful, friendly, and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan based on confidence and respect for each other's concerns. ... [A] secure and prosperous Pakistan is in India's interest. Our vision of our bilateral relationship is not confined to a resolution of outstanding issues, but is also directed to the future by seeking to building a stable structure of cooperation, which will benefit the people of both countries. As I wrote recently to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, we must not remain mired in the past, prisoners of old contentions. And I say to him today, let us put the past behind us, let us think of the welfare of our children and grandchildren.

We have remained committed to a path of direct bilateral dialogue with Pakistan. This reflects the nation's conviction and confidence that it is only through direct discussions in a sustained and constructive manner that we can move ahead in our bilateral relationship. I would again like to reiterate our desire for the earliest resumption of the official talks with Pakistan. The subject for discussions including peace and security, (along with confidence building measures) Jammu & Kashmir, economic and commercial cooperation and cross-border terrorism have been identified. Our proposals for the modalities of these talks have been with Pakistan since January this year. We await their response. We have also made it clear once again that there is no place for outside involvement of any nature whatsoever in our dialogue process with Pakistan.

Honourable Members have expressed strong reservations against attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue. There is simply no question of India ever agreeing to such internationalism. [The] UN Security Council has chosen to mention Kashmir in its Resolution. This is unacceptable and does not change the reality that the state of Jammu & Kashmir is an integral part of the Indian Union. I would also like to draw...attention...to the terms in which Kashmir finds mention in the resolution. The UN Security Council has recognised that bilateral dialogue has to be the basis of

India-Pakistan relations and mutually acceptable solutions have to be found for outstanding issues including Kashmir. This is in keeping with our position.

5 印パ核実験後の国際社会の声明

8 カ国共同声明

“A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda”, Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, 9 June 1998²⁷

1. We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden have considered the continued threat to humanity represented by the perspective of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, as well as by those three nuclear-weapons-capable States that have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the attendant possibility of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The seriousness of this predicament has been further underscored by the recent nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan.

2. We fully share the conclusion expressed by the commissioners of the Canberra Commission in their Statement that 'the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used - accidentally or by decision - defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again.

3. We recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations already in January 1946 – in its very first resolution – unanimously called for a commission to make proposals for ‘the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction’. While we can rejoice at the achievement of the international community in concluding total and global prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons by the Conventions of 1972 and 1993, we equally deplore the fact that the countless resolutions and initiatives which have been guided by similar objectives in respect of nuclear weapons in the past half century remain unfulfilled.

4. We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon States and the three nuclear-weapons-capable States to take that fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and we urge them to take that step now.

5. The vast majority of the membership of the United Nations has entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We are deeply concerned at the persistent reluctance of the nuclear-weapon States to approach their Treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

²⁷ *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.27 (June 1998), pp.30-32.より再録。

6. In this connection we recall the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

7. The international community must not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the maintenance of these weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future, when the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to eradicate and prohibit them for all time. We therefore call on the governments of each of the nuclear-weapon States and the three nuclear-weapons-capable States to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement.

8. We agree that the measures resulting from such undertakings leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons will begin with those States that have the largest arsenals. But we also stress the importance that they be joined in a seamless process by those with lesser arsenals at the appropriate juncture. The nuclear-weapon States should immediately begin to consider steps to be taken to this effect.

9. In this connection we welcome both the achievements to date and the future promise of the START process as an appropriate bilateral, and subsequently plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon States, for the practical dismantlement and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

10. The actual elimination of nuclear arsenals, and the development of requisite verification regimes, will of necessity require time. But there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon States can, and should, take immediately. We call on them to abandon present hair-trigger postures by proceeding to de-alerting and de-activating their weapons. They should also remove non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites. Such measures will create beneficial conditions for continued disarmament efforts and help prevent inadvertent, accidental or unauthorized launches.

11. In order for the nuclear disarmament process to proceed, the three nuclear-weapons-capable States must clearly and urgently reverse the pursuit of their respective nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any actions which could undermine the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament. We call upon them, and all other States that have not yet done so, to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and take the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument. We likewise call upon them to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.

12. An international ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Cut-Off) would further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As agreed in 1995 by the States Parties to the NPT, negotiations on such a convention should commence immediately.

13. Disarmament measures alone will not bring about a world free from nuclear weapons. Effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of these weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, *inter alia*, the extension of controls over all fissile material and other relevant components of nuclear weapons. The emergence of any new nuclear-weapon State, as well as any non-State entity in a position to produce or otherwise acquire such weapons, seriously jeopardises the process of eliminating nuclear weapons.

14. Other measures must also be taken pending the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Legally binding instruments should be developed with respect to a joint no-first-use undertaking between the nuclear-weapon States and as regards non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, so called negative security assurances.

15. The conclusion of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the Antarctic Treaty have steadily excluded nuclear weapons from entire regions of the world. The further pursuit, extension and establishment of such zones, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represents a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

16. These measures all constitute essential elements which can and should be pursued in parallel: by the nuclear-weapon States among themselves; and by the nuclear-weapon States together with the non-nuclear-weapon States, thus providing a road map towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

17. The maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons will require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.

18. We, on our part, will spare no efforts to pursue the objectives outlined above. We are jointly resolved to achieve the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. We firmly hold that the determined and rapid preparation for the post-nuclear era must start now.

Glossary

The numbering of the paragraphs in this Glossary corresponds to the relevant paragraphs in the Declaration.

1. The nuclear-weapon States also known as the P-5 are Britain, China, France, the Russian Federation and the US. Nuclear weapons-capable States are: India, Pakistan and Israel. They are not declared nuclear-weapon States.

2. The Canberra Commission was an initiative of the Australian government and reported in 1996. The conclusions of the Report are considered a moderate and authoritative presentation of the case for nuclear disarmament in the post Cold War era. There are many parallels between its approach and that of the present Declaration.

3.(a) The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force in 1993. It represents a model for nuclear disarmament. The CWC is a total ban on development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of CW and includes a comprehensive verification mechanism to oversee its implementation by States Parties.

(b) The Biological Weapons Convention (BTWC) which was concluded in 1972 bans biological weapons but lacks a verification mechanism. Currently negotiations are taking place in Geneva to develop this Treaty in depth. Ireland is an original State Party to both the CWC and the BTWC.

4. The nuclear-weapon States interpret their obligations under Article VI of the NPT as requiring nuclear disarmament in the context of general and complete disarmament. The non-nuclear States reject this. The language of the Treaty supports this interpretation. However, in view of the nuclear-weapon States' interpretation, there is required – in addition to what is contained in the Treaty but without amending the Treaty – a statement of political commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons, as such a political commitment would require a novel approach to nuclear force reductions – each step being premised on elimination.

5. The adherence to the NPT and the halt of nuclear weapons development by the vast majority of States represented a restraint which was premised on rapid nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States are clearly in default in the performance of their obligations to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

6. The ICJ agreed that the nuclear-weapon States were obliged to pursue negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. This obligation is not couched in terms of general and complete disarmament as the nuclear-weapons States have attempted to interpret Article VI of the NPT, and it is therefore a landmark statement.

7. Nuclear weapons like other weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons will have to be prohibited in due course. The ICJ Opinion has undermined the arguments for the retention of nuclear weapons. The possibility of the use of nuclear weapons consistent with humanitarian law, the laws of neutrality etc., are presented in the Opinion as unreal and

implausible. However, to adopt an approach that foresees the rapid abolition of these weapons will require a political decision, on the basis of which a legal framework giving effect to that inevitable conclusion can be begun.

8. The United States and the Russian Federation have by far the largest arsenals and they must therefore begin the process of force reductions premised on their rapid elimination. However, Britain, France and China will have to be integrated into this process at the appropriate time as once the US and RF reduce their nuclear forces to a certain point, the security of all the nuclear-weapon States becomes interlinked in a more fundamental way. The most unstable period in nuclear disarmament will occur when nuclear arsenals are a minimum. It is therefore necessary to integrate the smaller nuclear States and the nuclear-capable States into that process from the start. Appropriate arrangements relating to India, Pakistan and Israel will also have to be included in this process.

9. The Declaration does not follow recent approaches to nuclear disarmament which call for a programme with fixed time-frames for the complete dismantlement of existing nuclear weapons negotiated multilaterally. Instead, the Declaration proposes the use of existing bilateral machinery and its development to take account of the need to incorporate the other nuclear-weapon States at an appropriate stage in the process.

10. The nuclear-weapon States themselves have been considering what measures should be taken to stabilize existing nuclear weapon deployments. The most urgently needed of such measures are called for in the Declaration.

11. This paragraph is addressed expressly at the nuclear weapons-capable States, India, Pakistan and Israel to secure their renunciation of nuclear weapons. It includes a call to join the NPT – clearly with non-nuclear-weapon status – as South Africa and the Ukraine have done in the wake of democratization and to take the necessary measures, such as submitting to full-scope safeguards and dismantling their nuclear weapons capability. They are also called upon to sign and ratify the CTBT without conditions. Israel has signed but not ratified the CTBT.

12. The control of fissile material has always been central to the process of nuclear disarmament. In a nuclear weapons-free world, all fissile material will be controlled by the IAEA as is now the case with the fissile material in Ireland and other non-nuclear-weapons States. The negotiation of a cut-off of the production of fissile material is an obvious first step.

13. This paragraph develops paragraph 12 and emphasizes that the verification regime which will be required to secure the world free from nuclear weapons will require controls on all fissile material and controls over all other relevant components of nuclear weapons and weapons systems. The emergence of any new nuclear weapons-capable States (or the acquisition of a nuclear device by

terrorists) during this process clearly jeopardizes the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, leaving as it does a State or entity with a capacity to threaten at the same time as that capacity is being relinquished by the existing nuclear-weapon States.

14. Negative security assurances or guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States that they will not attack any non-nuclear-weapon State, are considered important as interim measures which should be in place during the process of nuclear disarmament. There are currently different approaches by the nuclear-weapon States in this regard and indications from some that they are moving away from earlier more comprehensive assurances in this regard.

15. The conclusion of nuclear weapon-free zones is considered to be an important contributory step in preventing proliferation at regional level. The two areas of tension where there are no such zones are the Middle East and South Asia. Nuclear weapon-free zones are an incremental means of preventing nuclear armaments' development and deployment.

16. The multilateral negotiating structures required to elaborate the treaty or treaties that will make up the regime to prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons for all time, is not outlined here in detail. However, there is clearly a role for multilateral diplomacy in nuclear disarmament. The final abolition and prohibition of nuclear weapons will require a non-discriminatory Convention prohibiting these weapons, and this will have to be negotiated by sovereign States in equality and in a multilateral environment.

17. While the Declaration does not define the types of treaty or conventions required, it is clear that there will be a legal instrument or set of instruments to prohibit these weapons. Many proposals have been put forward, including the possibility of amending the NPT or adding protocols, or even the elaboration of a single nuclear weapons convention.

18. This Declaration represents a call for the launching of a reinvigorated process. It acknowledges the efforts that have been made but it also recognizes that these have been inadequate and that the international community needs to proceed with a novel commitment to nuclear disarmament. This initiative will be followed up at the General Assembly of the United Nations later this year.

G 8 コミュニケ

“G8 Foreign Ministers Communiqué on Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests”, Lancaster House, London, 12 June 1998²⁸

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of eight major industrialised democracies and the Representative of the European Commission, held a special meeting in London on 12 June 1998 to consider the

²⁸ *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.27 (June 1998), pp.30-32.より再録。

serious global challenge posed by the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan. Recalling the statement issued by our Heads of State or Government on 15 May, and emphasising the support of all of us for the communiqué issued by the P5 in Geneva on 4 June and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, we condemn the nuclear tests carried out by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 May and 30 May. These tests have affected both countries' relationships with each of us, worsened rather than improved their security environment, damaged their prospects of achieving their goals of sustainable economic development, and run contrary to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

2. The negative impact of these tests on the international standing and ambitions of both countries will be serious and lasting. They will also have a serious negative impact on investor confidence. Both countries need to take positive actions directed towards defusing tension in the region and rejoining the international community's efforts towards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Urgent action is needed both to halt an arms race on the Sub-Continent, which would divert resources from urgent economic priorities, and to reduce tension, build confidence and encourage peaceful resolution of the differences between India and Pakistan, so that their peoples may face a better future.

3. With a view to halting the nuclear and missile arms race on the Sub-Continent, and taking note of the official statements of the Indian and Pakistani Governments that they wish to avoid such an arms race, we consider that India and Pakistan should immediately take the following steps, already endorsed by the United Nations Security Council:

- stop all further nuclear tests and adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty immediately and unconditionally, thereby facilitating its early entry into force;
- refrain from weaponisation or deployment of nuclear weapons and from the testing or deployment of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and enter into firm commitments not to weaponise or deploy nuclear weapons or missiles;
- refrain from any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations with other States in the Conference on Disarmament for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Convention with a view to reaching early agreement;
- confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials and technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them, and undertake appropriate commitments in that regard.

We believe that such actions would be strongly in the interest of both countries.

4. With a view to reducing tension, building confidence and encouraging peaceful resolution of their differences through dialogue, India and Pakistan should:

- undertake to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, including infiltrations or hot pursuit, or other provocative acts and statements;

- discourage terrorist activity and any support for it;
- implement fully the confidence- and security-building measures they have already agreed and develop further such measures;
- resume without delay a direct dialogue that addresses the root causes of the tension, including Kashmir, through such measures as early resumption of Foreign Secretary level talks, effective use of the hot-line between the two leaders, and realisation of a meeting between Prime Ministers on the occasion of the 10th SAARC Summit scheduled next month;
- allow and encourage progress towards enhanced Indo-Pakistani economic cooperation, including through a free trade area in South Asia.

We encourage the development of a regional security dialogue.

5. We pledge actively to encourage India and Pakistan to find mutually acceptable solutions to their problems and stand ready to assist India and Pakistan in pursuing any of these positive actions. Such assistance might be provided, at the request of both parties, in the development and implementation of confidence- and security-building measures.

6. The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan do not change the definition of a nuclear-weapon State in the NPT, and therefore, notwithstanding those tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapon States in accordance with the NPT. We continue to urge India and Pakistan to adhere to the NPT as it stands, without any conditions. We shall continue to apply firmly our respective policies to prevent the export of materials, equipment or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons.

7. It is our firm view that the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan reinforce the importance of maintaining and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and as the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We all, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, reiterate our determination to fulfil the commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. These commitments were reaffirmed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and included the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. We note the progress already made in this direction and welcome the firm intention both of the United States and of the Russian Federation to bring START II into force, and to negotiate and conclude a START III agreement at the earliest possible date. We also note contributions made by other nuclear-weapon States to the reductions process. We call upon all States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty rapidly to ensure its entry into force, and welcome the determination of the member governments of the G8 that have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so at the earliest possible date. We continue to look for the accession to the NPT of the remaining countries which are not yet parties to

it.

8. We call on all the member States of the Conference on Disarmament to agree on the immediate opening of the Cut-Off negotiation at the CD.

9. Both India and Pakistan face enormous challenges in developing their economies and building prosperity. However, the recent nuclear tests have created an atmosphere of regional instability which will undermine the region's attractiveness to both foreign and domestic investment, damaging business confidence and the prospects for economic growth. The diversion of their resources to nuclear and other weapons programmes displaces more productive investment and weakens their ability to pursue sound economic policies. It calls into question the commitment of both governments to poverty reduction and undermines the regional cooperation between SAARC countries on social and economic issues. In line with the approach to development set out in the Naples, Lyon, Denver and Birmingham Communiqués, we call on both governments to reduce expenditure that undermines their objective of promoting sound economic policies that will benefit all members of society, especially the poorest, and to otherwise enhance cooperation in South Asia.

10. We believe it is important that India and Pakistan are aware of the strength of the international community's views on their recent tests and on these other subjects. Several among us have, on a unilateral basis, taken specific actions to underscore our strong concerns. All countries should act as they see fit to demonstrate their displeasure and address their concerns to India and Pakistan. We do not wish to punish the peoples of India or Pakistan as a result of actions by their governments, and we will therefore not oppose loans by international financial institutions to the two countries to meet basic human needs. We agree, however, to work for a postponement in consideration of other loans in the World Bank and other international financial institutions to India and Pakistan, and to any other country that will conduct nuclear tests.

11. We pledge to convey the common views of our Governments on these matters to those of India and Pakistan with a view to bringing about early and specific progress in the areas outlined above. We plan to keep developments under review and to continue the process of pursuing the goals on which we are all agreed."

6 国連総会におけるインドおよびパキスタンの声明
パキスタン首相の声明(9月23日)

“Speech by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan in the United Nations”, 23 September 1998.²⁹

This year the nuclear cloud has cast its dark shadow over South Asia. Our neighbour, India, has always perceived nuclear weapons as the key to great power status and a permanent seat on the Security Council. Thirty years ago, we warned the world that India would develop nuclear weapons. Our warnings were ignored. When India conducted its first explosion in 1974, the reaction of the major powers was to impose restraints against Pakistan. We felt compelled to acquire a matching capability. Yet, even after we had done so, Pakistan continued to promote a nuclear weapons free zone, conventional arms restraint and a zero-missile-zone in South Asia, India rejected all these initiatives.

India's nuclear tests in May should not have come as a surprise to the world. We had warned the world several weeks before the tests. Even after India conducted its tests, the response of the major powers was weak and ambiguous. Once again, greater energy was devoted to restraining Pakistan than in responding to India. Immediately after its nuclear tests, India's leaders adopted a belligerent posture towards Pakistan. They told us that the geo-strategic balance had changed and Pakistan should abandon its principled support for Kashmiri self-determination. Pakistan faced the threat of force. We felt compelled to convince India that any military aggression against Pakistan would have the most disastrous consequences.

The world must appreciate that Pakistan did not initiate the tests. India tested to alter the strategic balance and threatened our security and sovereignty. We waited for 17 days for the world to respond. We knew that no country could provide us security assurances against a nuclear India. Thus circumstances forced us to test and establish nuclear deterrence in self defence. We have violated no international norm. Regrettably, some friendly countries have imposed sanctions and other restrictions against Pakistan. These are unjust. I ask the international community to determine who is in the wrong, and why should Pakistan be subjected to punitive measures? Pakistan's nuclear tests were conducted not to challenge the existing non-proliferation regime, nor to fulfil any great power ambition. They were designed to prevent the threat or use of force against Pakistan. Our tests in response to India thus served the cause of peace and stability in our region.

We are not insensitive to the concerns aroused by the South Asian nuclear tests. Despite the transformed strategic situation, we remain opposed to an arms race, nuclear or conventional. We have announced a unilateral moratorium on testing. We are prepared to strengthen peace and stability in the region by mutually agreed measures to avoid a war, to create a regime for nuclear restraint and conventional balance and to promote solutions to the underlying causes of conflict in

²⁹ *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.30 (September 1998), pp.15-16.より再録。

particular the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. We will discuss these issues with India when our dialogue commences. We are also engaged in a dialogue with several friendly countries to advance these objectives. Pakistan has never contributed to nuclear proliferation. We will continue to adhere strictly to our policy of not exporting sensitive technologies and equipment.

Pakistan has consistently supported the conclusion of a CTBT for over 30 years. We voted for the Treaty when it was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996. We have declared a moratorium on further testing; so has India. There is no reason why the two countries cannot adhere to the CTBT. In a nuclearized South Asia, CTBT would have relevance if Pakistan and India are both parties to the Treaty. The Non-Aligned Summit has called for universal adherence to the CTBT, specially by the nuclear-weapon States.

This demand is consistent with the Treaty's requirement, that all nuclear capable States, including India, must adhere to the CTBT before it can come into force, Pakistan will oppose, any attempt to change this fundamental requirement at the Conference of States Parties to the treaty scheduled to be held in September 1999. Such a change can only be made by consensus. Pakistan is, therefore, prepared to adhere to the CTBT before this Conference. However, Pakistan's adherence to the Treaty will take place only in conditions free from coercion or pressure. In this regard, we expect that the arbitrary restrictions imposed on Pakistan by multilateral institutions will be speedily removed. We also expect that discriminatory sanctions against Pakistan will be lifted. And we count on the full support of the world community for a just resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. On the nuclear issue, Pakistan will insist on the principle of equal treatment with India, be it in terms of status or any kind of incentives. It must also be well understood that if India were to resume nuclear testing, Pakistan will review its position, and in case we have adhered to the CTBT, invoke the supreme interests clause as provided under Article Nine of the Treaty.

Nuclear deterrence between Pakistan and India will remain fragile and dangerous so long as there is a growing imbalance in conventional forces. This needs to be redressed. Above all, durable peace between Pakistan and India - and restraint in their military postures - will be, as always, critically dependent on the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute which has been the root cause of all conflicts and tensions between Pakistan and India. ...

My government is committed to resolving our problems with India through dialogue. This is all the more important in a nuclear environment in which neither side has the luxury to contemplate the use of force. In June 1997, we had agreed with India on an eight item agenda and a mechanism for the dialogue. Unfortunately, the dialogue was interrupted due to differences over modalities. I am, however, happy to say that, in a meeting which concluded a short while ago, Prime Minister Vajpayee and I have reached an agreement to resume the dialogue with the commencement of Foreign Secretary level talks, which will address at the outset, the primary issues of peace and security and Jammu and Kashmir.

インド首相の声明(9月24日)

“Speech by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India, in the United Nations”, 24 September 1998.³⁰

In the closing years of the 20th century, the challenge of nuclear disarmament is another of the priorities facing the international community. We have successfully prohibited chemical and biological weapons in recent decades. The present century has witnessed the development and the tragic use of nuclear weapons. We must ensure that the legacy of this weapon of mass destruction is not carried into the next century.

For the last half-century, India has consistently pursued the objectives of international peace along with equal and legitimate security for all through global disarmament. These concepts are among the basic tenets of our national security. India has, over the years, sought to enhance its notional security by promoting global nuclear disarmament, convinced that a world free of nuclear weapons enhances both global and India's national security.

The negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty began in 1993 with a mandate that such a treaty would 'contribute effectively to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore, to the enhancement of international peace and security'. India participated actively and constructively in the negotiations, and sought to place the Treaty in a disarmament framework by proposing its linkage with a time-bound program for the universal elimination of all nuclear weapons.

It is a matter of history that India's proposals were not accepted. The treaty, as it emerged, was not accepted by India on grounds of national security. We made explicit our objection that despite our stand having been made clear, the treaty text made India's signature and ratification a pre-condition for its entry into force.

Mindful of its deteriorating security environment which has obliged us to stand apart from the CTBT in 1996. India undertook a limited series of five underground tests, conducted on 11 and 13 May, 1998. These tests were essential for ensuring a credible nuclear deterrent for India's national security in the foreseeable future.

These tests do not signal a dilution of India's commitment to the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, after concluding this limited testing program, India announced a voluntary moratorium on further underground nuclear test explosions. We conveyed our willingness to move towards a de jure formalization of this obligation. In announcing a moratorium, India has

³⁰ *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No.30 (September 1998), pp.14-15.より再録。

already accepted the basic obligation of the CTBT. In 1996, India could not have accepted the obligation as such a restraint would have eroded our capability and compromised our national security.

Mr. President, India, having harmonized its national imperatives and security obligations and desirous of continuing to cooperate with the international community is now engaged in discussions with key interlocutors on a range of issues, including the CTBT. We are prepared to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion, so that the entry into force of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999. We expect that other countries, as indicated in Article XIV of the CTBT, will adhere to this Treaty without conditions.

After protracted discussions, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is now in a position to begin negotiations on a treaty that will prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Once again, we are conscious that this is a partial step. Such a treaty, as and when it is concluded and enters into force, will not eliminate existing nuclear arsenals. Yet, we will participate in these negotiations in good faith in order to ensure a treaty that is non-discriminatory and meets India's security imperatives. India will pay serious attention to any other multilateral initiatives in this area, during the course of the negotiations in the CD.

As a responsible State committed to non-proliferation, India has undertaken that it shall not transfer these weapons or related know-how to other countries. We have an effective system of export controls and shall make it more stringent where necessary, including by expanding control lists of equipment and technology to make them more contemporary and effective in the context of a nuclear India. At the same time, as a developing country, we are conscious that nuclear technology has a number of peaceful applications and we shall continue to cooperate actively with other countries in this regard, in keeping with our international responsibilities.

A few weeks ago, at the Non-Aligned Summit in Durban, India proposed and the Movement agreed that an international conference be held, preferably in 1999, with the objective of arriving at an agreement, before the end of this millennium on a phased program for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. I, call upon, all members of the international community, and particularly the other nuclear-weapon States to join in this endeavor. Let us pledge that when we assemble here in the new millennium, it shall be to welcome the commitment that mankind shall never again be subjected to the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons.

国連総会決議案

(1)核実験

“Nuclear Testing”³¹

³¹ A/C.1/53/L.22 of 23 October 1998.

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming that the cessation of all nuclear testing will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and therefore to the further enhancement of international peace and security,

Also Reaffirming its commitment to and the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as essential foundations for the purpose of nuclear disarmament.

Convinced that all States that have not yet done so should adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions,

Should alarm expressed internationally, regionally and nationally, at recent nuclear tests,

Recalling Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) adopted unanimously on 6 June 1998,

1. *Expresses* grave concern over and strongly deplores the recent nuclear tests conducted in South Asia;

2. *Notes* that the States concerned have declared moratoria on further testing and have said that they are willing to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear tests, and reiterates the need for such legal commitments to be expressed in legal form by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

(2)核兵器のない世界に向けて - 新しいアジェンダの必要性

“Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: The Need for a New Agenda”³²

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Concerned at the prospect of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons,

³² A/C.1/53/48/Rev.1 of 5 November 1998.

Concerned at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States that are nuclear-weapons capable and that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),

Believing that the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained and never used accidentally or by decision - defies credibility, and that the only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again,

Concerned that the Nuclear-Weapon States have not fulfilled speedily and totally their commitment to the elimination of their nuclear weapons,

Concerned also that those three States that are nuclear-weapons capable and that have not acceded to the NPT have failed to renounce their nuclear-weapons option,

Bearing in mind that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that these undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally-binding commitments by the nuclear-weapons States to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

Stressing that the international community must not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the possession of nuclear weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future and convinced that the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to proceed to prohibit and eradicate them for all time,

Recognizing that the total elimination of nuclear weapons will require measures to be taken firstly by those nuclear-weapon States that have the largest arsenals, and *Stressing* that these States must be joined in a seamless process by those nuclear-weapon States with lesser arsenals in the near future,

Welcoming the achievements to date and the future promise of the START process and the possibility it offers for development as a plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon States, for the practical dismantling and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons,

Believing that there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon States can and should take immediately before the actual elimination of nuclear arsenals and the development of requisite

verification regimes take place, and in this connection noting certain recent unilateral and other steps,

Welcoming the agreement recently reached in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee under Item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament' to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and considering that such a treaty must further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Emphasising that for the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be achieved, effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, *inter alia*, the extension of international controls over all fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Emphasising the importance of existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaties and of the signature and ratification of the relevant protocols to these treaties,

Noting the Joint Ministerial Declaration of 9 June 1998 and its call for a new international agenda to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, through the pursuit, in parallel, of a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels,

1. *Calls upon* the Nuclear-Weapon States to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and without delay to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of these weapons, thereby fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
2. *Calls upon* the United States and the Russian Federation to bring START II into force without further delay and immediately thereafter to proceed with negotiations on START III with a view to its early conclusion;
3. *Calls upon* the Nuclear-Weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five Nuclear-Weapon States into the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
4. *Calls upon* the Nuclear-Weapon States to pursue vigorously the reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities;

5. *Calls upon* the Nuclear-Weapon States, as an interim measure, to proceed to the de-alerting of their nuclear weapons and in turn to the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles;
6. *Urges* the Nuclear-Weapon States to examine further interim measures, including the measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines;
7. *Calls upon* those three States that are nuclear weapons-capable and that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to clearly and urgently reverse the pursuit of all nuclear weapons development or deployment and to refrain from any actions which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;
8. *Calls upon* those States that have not yet done so to adhere unconditionally and without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to take all the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument;
9. *Calls upon* those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on 15 May 1997;
10. *Calls upon* those States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify, unconditionally and without delay, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and, pending the Treaty's entry into force, to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests;
11. *Calls upon* those States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to work towards its further strengthening;
12. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to pursue its negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee established under Item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament' on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives, and to conclude these negotiations without delay; and pending the entry into force of the treaty, urges States to observe a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
13. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to establish an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and, to that end, to pursue as a matter of priority its intensive

consultations on appropriate methods and approaches with a view to reaching such a decision without delay;

14. *Considers* that an international conference on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, which would effectively complement efforts being undertaken in other settings, could facilitate the consolidation of a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free- world.

15. *Recalls* the importance of the Decisions and Resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and *underlines* the importance of implementing fully the "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" Decision;

16. *Affirms* that the development of verification arrangements will be necessary for the maintenance of a world free from nuclear weapons and requests the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), together with any other relevant international organisations and bodies, to explore the elements of such a system;

17. *Calls* for the conclusion of an internationally legally-binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

18. *Stresses* that the pursuit, extension and establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represent a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear- weapon-free world;

19. *Affirms* that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;

20. *Requests* the Secretary General, within existing resources, to compile a report on the implementation of this resolution;

21. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled "Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free-World: The Need for a New Agenda", and to review the implementation of this resolution.