

Strategic Annual Report 2022

The End of the “post-Cold War” Era
and the Future of the US-led International Order



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Message from the President



President, The Japan Institute
of International Affairs

Kenichiro Sasae

The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) began presenting the Strategic Annual Report (SAR) and holding the Tokyo Global Dialogue (TGD) in 2019, on the occasion of its 60th anniversary, and this is the fourth time to do so. They disseminate widely inside and outside Japan our analyses of regional situation and future prospects, reflecting the results of research and study activities conducted by JIIA research groups. I am happy to note that both the SAR and the TGD have been highly acclaimed in various circles and become the Institute's flagship programs in the short period of time.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, has fundamentally overturned the European security order and brought the "post-Cold War" era to an end. In the Indo-Pacific region, tensions between the United States and China are on the rise, and the world has entered a new era of fragmentation and instability that threatens the foundations of the international order led by the US since the end of the Cold War and even since the end of World War II. Under the theme of "The End of the 'post-Cold War' Era and the Future of the US-led International Order," the Strategic Annual Report 2022 analyzes the tense international situation, and presents an outlook, together with succinct recommendations on the roles expected of Japan, which has significantly revised its security policy in light of this situation.

JIIA has been stepping up its efforts to disseminate research findings in both English and Japanese in a timely manner and to strengthen its international intellectual exchange activities by posting "JIIA Strategic Comments" and "Research Reports" on its website and holding online events in addition to publishing its research group reports. Interested readers are encouraged to take a look at the materials listed at the end of this report.

I hope that this report will help to enhance the readers' understanding of international affairs.

Chapter 1 Overview

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, has fundamentally overturned the European security order, bringing to a complete end the "post-Cold War" era in which relatively stable and cooperative great power relations existed despite gradually increasing tensions. Western countries, including Japan, have implemented unprecedented economic sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine with the strong determination to uphold the principle that the change of status quo by force must not be allowed, and many countries have changed their own security policies. However, with no clear path to an end to the war in Ukraine while faced with uncertain energy supplies and inflation, the sustainability of support for Ukraine and the resilience of democracy are being tested in the West.

In the Indo-Pacific region, tensions between the United States and China, which have been on the rise for several years, increased in 2022, especially over Taiwan, and there is no prospect of a significant easing of tensions in the near future. Amid the war in Ukraine and the escalation of the US-China confrontation, Russia and China have become more united, and a confrontation with the West, between democracy versus authoritarianism, or a "new Cold War" as some call it, is dividing the world into blocs. International cooperation through multilateral frameworks is in serious jeopardy, and countries in the Global South most affected by the food and energy crises face the challenge of securing their national interests in an increasingly unstable international order. The world has entered a new era of fragmentation and instability in which the assumptions of the security structure that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War no longer hold, and even the foundations of the rules-based international order, which has been led by the United States since its construction at the end of World War II, are also threatened.

Looking back on 2022, a year of drastic changes in the international situation, the Strategic Annual Report 2022 analyzes the current state of the US-led international order, looks ahead to the post "post-Cold War" era, and makes recommendations for Japan's efforts in this context.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine and international response

In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine which began in February, the Ukrainian forces, with military support from Western countries, launched a large-scale counteroffensive in the summer. Russia unilaterally declared the annexation of four provinces in eastern and southern Ukraine in September, and since October it has been escalating the war, including carrying out missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, without a clear exit strategy.

Western nations, strongly determined not to allow the status quo to be changed by force, have deepened their unity and coordination through frameworks based on common values such as the G7, NATO and the EU, and swiftly launched unprecedented economic sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine. Many Western countries, including Japan, have also made major shifts in their own security policies. Economic sanctions have had no significant short-term impact on Russian politics and society, and support for President Vladimir Putin remains high, helped by restrictions on the freedom of speech, and the path to an end to the war in Ukraine remains unclear. Meanwhile, Western countries are facing instability in energy supplies and inflation, partly due to sanctions and Russia's "weaponization of resources," the impact of which on domestic politics has become apparent. Amid this situation, the sustainability of their support for Ukraine and the resilience of their democracies are being tested. Many developing countries are trying to protect their national interests as they suffer the effects of a rapidly deteriorating food and energy situation arising from the conflict and monetary tightening by developed countries, while they were recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Ongoing US-China competition and the Indo-Pacific situation

In Northeast Asia, where the Cold War structure has remained intact, North Korea has further heightened its threat to the region and the international community by launching numerous missiles including ICBMs. Amid this tension, the conservative administration came to power in South Korea after five years, and has drastically changed its predecessor's policies toward North Korea and Japan as well as in the security area. China continued to increase its military power and expand its political and economic influence, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, while struggling with its approaches towards COVID-19 at home and its economic slowdown. The US has continued to focus on the Indo-Pacific region even after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and views China as its most important strategic competitor, while trying to manage its relationship with China. However, the US-China relationship, which continues to be competitive and confrontational on all political, economic, and military aspects, has increased its level of tension in 2022, especially over Taiwan, and there is no prospect for a fundamental easing of tensions.

The US has worked to strengthen its relations with ASEAN countries in competition with China, and China's assertive outreach to Pacific island nations has brought attention to the strategic importance of the region. In the area of economic security, the US accelerated moves to promote "friend-shoring" in cooperation with allies and partners to reinforce supply chains and secure stable supplies of critical goods, while other countries, including Japan, took concrete steps to formulate new institutions and support measures.

International cooperation facing crisis

Amid the war in Ukraine and the escalation of US-China confrontation, Russia and China have strengthened their ties, leading to a confrontation with the West, one between democracy versus authoritarianism, or a “new Cold War” that is splitting the world into blocs. As the world becomes divided, various frameworks of international cooperation are facing serious crises. The UN Security Council was exposed as dysfunctional by Russia’s veto over the invasion of Ukraine and it has failed to respond to North Korea’s missile launches.

On the nuclear issue, negotiations between the US and Russia came to a screeching halt amid growing concern over the possible use of nuclear weapons in light of the intimidation by President Putin. The first meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the NPT Review Conference were held, but the latter failed to adopt a final document due to Russian opposition. While the war in Ukraine casts a heavy shadow over international economic and environmental issues, agreements were somehow achieved at the G20 and APEC summits, the WTO Ministerial Meeting, and COP27, but international policy coordination remains challenging and the future of multilateral cooperation frameworks is becoming increasingly uncertain.

Perspective

In Ukraine, neither the Russian nor the Ukrainian side has shown moves toward an early ceasefire, and fighting is likely to continue yet for some time. The sustainability of Western support for Ukraine and the resilience of democracy in these countries in the face of inflation and energy supply instability will encounter even greater tests as the war drags on. How the protracted war will change the positions of China, which has strengthened its strategic ties with Russia against the United States, and countries in the Global South, including India and the ASEAN countries, will be closely watched.

In the Indo-Pacific, there is no prospect for a fundamental improvement in US-China relations, and further escalation of tensions over Taiwan is expected. The US and China will continue to expand their influence in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, and both countries will also persist in their efforts to gain advantages in the economic security area. North Korea will continue its nuclear and missile development while strengthening ties with China and Russia. Facing this security threat, South Korea is expected to strengthen security ties with Japan and the United States, which share fundamental values.

Multilateral cooperation frameworks will continue to face serious crises, and the UN Security Council will likely remain dysfunctional on matters where the US, the UK and France are at odds with China and Russia. The credibility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime is also at stake, given Russia’s actions

against the nuclear order, including its nuclear intimidation, growing reliance on nuclear deterrence, and moves to increase nuclear capabilities by relevant countries. Multilateral frameworks have been functioning relatively well in the areas of the economy and climate change, and it is important to further bolster multilateral efforts in these areas.

The future of Japan's diplomacy and security and recommendations

As the free, open and stable international order faces a changing balance of power and intensifying geopolitical competition, the Japanese government revised its *National Security Strategy*, the *National Defense Strategy* and the *Defense Buildup Program* in December 2022. The *National Security Strategy* sets out Japan's diplomacy to reinforce the free and open international order, with a focus on the Japan-US alliance and greater cooperation with like-minded countries such as Australia, as well as the drastic enhancement of defense capabilities.

Regarding the strengthening of defense capabilities, stipulating the need for counterattack capabilities and concrete measures to achieve them notably represents a major shift in Japan's postwar security policy. It was also decided to take necessary measures so that the combined budget level for the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives will reach 2% of the current GDP in FY2027. The inclusion of economic security is another new feature of this *National Security Strategy*, symbolizing the expansion of the scope of security from traditional areas to the economy and technology.

The following is a summary of the recommendations based on this shift in Japan's foreign and security policy (see Chapter 5).

Regarding the fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities, the key to realizing the new strategy is an increase in defense spending, and a conclusion on stable financial resources needs to be reached as soon as possible with the understanding and support of the general public. As for counterattack capability, it will be necessary to make maximum use of existing equipment while waiting to acquire a stand-off capability, and resolving the reduced aircraft operating rates, stockpiling ammunition and fuel, including precision-guided bombs and interceptor missiles, and fortifying defense facilities such as undergrounding command posts are all urgently required. It is also important to address issues such as protecting the defense production bases, expanding the use of civilian transportation capabilities and airport and port facilities, and securing SDF personnel. With respect to cyber defense, legal revision will be needed to enable active defense while ensuring the confidentiality of communications as stipulated in Article 21 of the Constitution.

Japan-US cooperation should be deepened and an integrated deterrence posture established, and both countries need to quickly reconcile their understanding of defense cooperation and formulate joint operation plans. There are also other important issues to consider, such as examining ways to strengthen Japan-US coordination in terms of command and control, and improving the credibility of extended deterrence through deepening of extended deterrence talks between Japan and the United States.

As the only country to have suffered atomic bombing during wartime, Japan is expected to exercise leadership through its unique efforts to conduct proactive nuclear arms control and disarmament diplomacy, such as by leading international discussions through the “International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons” and promoting efforts to deepen the international community’s understanding on the realities of nuclear weapons use, including on the occasion of the G7 summit meeting.

In the area of economic security, the key issues include stepping up support and developing systems for fostering of advanced critical technologies, and formulating international rules and norms to ensure effective concrete measures to combat economic coercion.

In the Japan-US relationship, it is expected that Japan and the US will further strengthen their efforts to realize a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)”. It is also important to continue and augment efforts to improve understanding and support in the US for the importance of Japan as a reliable partner based on common values and for the Japan-US alliance, and to further broaden the foundation of the Japan-US relationship through personal exchanges and other means.

In relations with China, Japan should assert what it needs to assert and openly communicate its concerns, while at the same time pursuing closer dialogue aimed at resolving common issues such as climate change. It will also be necessary to communicate through various channels and opportunities, secure Japan’s economic interests and promote personal exchanges.

As North Korea accelerates its nuclear and missile development, it is important to deepen cooperation among Japan, the US and the ROK in all aspects of security. It would also be beneficial to deepen understanding of the growing threat posed by North Korea and of Japan’s policy responses, and to increase the effectiveness of sanctions on North Korea through cooperation with the G7 nations, Australia, the EU and other countries and through outreach to Asian countries. It is important to make early progress in pursuing closer cooperation with the ROK in defense, and early resolution of various concerns between Japan and the ROK is also desirable.

Japan-Russia relations have cooled to an unprecedented degree, and there is little hope for a recovery in relations for some time. Nevertheless, it is necessary to continue to negotiate with the Russian side on issues directly related to Japan's national interests, such as fisheries around the four northern islands and gas development in Sakhalin, and it is important to maintain relations for this purpose. It will be important for Japan to seek dialogue with Russia in areas that are in Japan's national interest to the extent compatible with its principled policy toward Russia, and to deepen frank exchanges of views on security issues, including those related to Ukraine.

Japan needs to further security and other cooperation with European countries, the EU and NATO, with whom Japan shares common values, and cooperation through the G7 would be beneficial in strengthening relations with European countries. There are high expectations of Japan in its role as the G7 presidency, including continued active support for Ukraine.

In the Indo-Pacific, Japan is expected to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN countries and Pacific island countries by providing high-quality infrastructure and human capacity development, and to actively promote cooperation in the provision of equipment and supplies and infrastructure development to improve the security and deterrence capabilities of the like-minded countries in the region.

It is important to promote defense cooperation with Australia and to expand and conduct concrete trilateral defense cooperation among Japan, the US and Australia. Greater defense cooperation with the Philippines is also needed, and closer multilateral defense cooperation, including that among Japan, the US, Australia and the Philippines, would contribute to regional peace and stability. Japan is also expected to improve defense cooperation and interoperability with India and, as the G7 chair country for 2023, to coordinate with India in the latter's capacity as G20 president.

Japan should continue to work on issues in the Middle East and Africa, such as assisting Afghanistan, promoting peace in the Middle East and supporting Palestine, and addressing the Iranian nuclear issue, as well as strengthening relations with countries in the Global South.

While there are organizational and structural difficulties in achieving UN reform, it is essential that Japan take advantage of the opportunity it has as a non-permanent member of the Security Council to advance discussions on UN reform, and to redouble its efforts to address global issues by leveraging its strengths in areas such as human security and health. It is also important that Japan contribute to maintaining and developing international and regional economic orders and promote international norms through regional frameworks such as the CPTPP, RCEP and IPEF, as well as to maintaining and strengthening the multilateral trade regime centered on the WTO. ■

Chapter 2 Russia's Aggression against Ukraine and International Response

Section 1 Russia's invasion of Ukraine

On February 24, 2022, President Putin launched an armed invasion of Ukraine, including the capital city of Kyiv, in what he called a “special military operation”. Western countries immediately declared this an invasion of Ukraine by Russia and imposed economic sanctions on an unprecedented scale, while continuing to provide arms and other military assistance to Ukraine as it fights against the Russian invasion with some successes. The military support from Western countries has been bearing fruit and, since September, the Ukrainian military has been engaged in a counteroffensive. On September 21, President Putin issued a partial mobilization order in view of his army's disadvantageous situation, but confusion continues as many Russians evading the order are trying to flee the country. Amid such situation, Russia unilaterally declared the annexation of four provinces in eastern and southern Ukraine on September 30, and since October has been escalating the war without a clear exit strategy, including missile attacks on Ukrainian cities in retaliation for the bombing of a bridge connecting Crimea and mainland Russia or for the destruction of infrastructure. On the other hand, Ukrainian forces have largely pushed back Russian forces in the southern Kherson Oblast and the eastern Donetsk Oblast since November, and the war remains in flux.

Putin's war in unexpected situation

As military clashes between the Ukrainian government and pro-Russian factions in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine calling themselves the “Donetsk People's Republic” and the “Lugansk People's Republic” escalated from 2021, Russia insisted that NATO membership for Ukraine would never be accepted and deployed 100,000 troops around the border to apply pressure. On January 10, 2022, the US and Russia held a “strategic stability dialogue” and, on January 21, a meeting between the US and

Russian foreign ministers took place, but no agreement was reached to ease tensions. France, the United Kingdom, and Germany also held talks with Russia to avert war, and at the end of January the United States warned the Ukrainian government of an imminent Russian military invasion, moving its embassy



A view shows the building of a theatre destroyed in the course of Ukraine-Russia conflict in the southern port city of Mariupol, Ukraine April 10, 2022. Picture taken with a drone. REUTERS/Pavel Klimov (Ukraine)

from the capital Kyiv to the western city of Lviv on February 14. Russia, meanwhile, held a meeting of its Security Council on February 21 and rejected the idea that it should continue diplomatic negotiations with the West on the Ukrainian issue, deciding instead to recognize the independence of the two “People’s Republics” in the Donbass region. The Russian parliament also recognized the independence of both regions.

On February 24, 2022, President Putin declared that, in accordance with the request of the two “People’s Republics” of the Donbass region, he would launch a “special military operation” aimed at protecting the region’s population and demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine, and the Russian military offensive throughout Ukraine began. Immediately after the war began, Russian troops invaded the Donbass region, the area around the capital Kyiv, the northern Ukrainian oblast of Kharkiv, and the southern oblasts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia and occupied the Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants. However, the Russians delayed the start of the invasion because the US and UK had disclosed Russian invasion plans in advance, and the soil was muddy due to melting snow, making it difficult for the Russians to advance. With Western support, the Ukrainian military maintained its air defense network, which prevented the Russians from dropping paratroopers into Kyiv and providing air support to their ground troops, leading to their withdrawal from the area around the capital Kyiv at the end of March. At that time, massacres and other atrocities were revealed in Bucha near Kyiv and other areas from which Russian troops had retreated, sending shockwaves through the international community. The ceasefire talks between Russia and Ukraine, which had been ongoing since the beginning of the war, was held in Istanbul on March 29 for the fifth time, but no further talks took place after the issue at Bucha came to light.

After failing in their attempt at assaulting Kyiv, the Russian forces redressed their posture. While they lost their maritime superiority in the Black Sea as evidenced by the sinking of their flagship Moskva, in May they captured Mariupol, a strategic point between eastern and southern Ukraine, and in July they declared control over the entire Luhansk Oblast. In the Russian-occupied areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, a military-civil administration was established. Residents were issued Russian passports, and de facto Russification was pursued, including the circulation of the Russian ruble as currency and the start of Russian TV and radio broadcasting. Meanwhile, Ukraine received military assistance from Western countries, especially the United States, including the provision of multiple rocket launchers and anti-radar weapons, and launched counterattacks in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Kherson oblasts. Since September, Ukrainian forces have retaken most of Kharkiv Oblast and are conducting recapture operations in Luhansk and Kherson oblasts.

On July 14, Russia, outmatched by the Ukrainian military's counterattack, established a de facto economic mobilization system targeting military industries and, on September 21, it issued a partial mobilization decree and began calling up military reservists. However, this partial mobilization order caused chaos, with many citizens who resisted the call to arms fleeing the country. In the meantime, on September 30, President Putin signed a treaty incorporating the "Donetsk People's Republic," the "Lugansk People's Republic," and the oblasts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia into a new federal entity of Russia and emphasized the "military gains" made by the "special military operation" to the Russian public. The annexation of these regions was also aimed at intimidating the Ukrainian military by insisting that any large-scale attack on "Russian territory" would be met with retaliation, including by nuclear weapons, and thereby forcing it to relax its counterattack.

Despite these Russian intentions, however, the Ukrainian military offensive in the south and east of the country continues. On October 8, a bridge connecting the Crimean Peninsula and the Russian mainland was blown up, and Russia declared this an attack by Ukraine and carried out large-scale missile and drone attacks in various parts of Ukraine, including the capital Kyiv, as retaliation. The war has since re-expanded regionally, with attacks continuing to destroy infrastructure, particularly in major cities. Russia also strengthened its wartime regime by imposing martial law on October 19 in the four eastern and southern provinces of Ukraine that it had unilaterally declared annexed, but the Russian military did not manage to turn the tables, and on November 9 the Russian defense minister ordered a retreat from the right bank of the Dnipro River in the Kherson Oblast. The war situation has become increasingly fluid.

Russian foreign policy

Immediately after Russia's invasion of Ukraine began, the Western powers imposed several rounds of sanctions against Russia on an unprecedented scale (see Section 2). Faced with these moves, the Russian government announced on March 7 that it would take countermeasures against countries participating in the sanctions, designating them as "unfriendly countries". By limiting gas supplies to "unfriendly countries" to those paid for in rubles, gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria, which refused to pay in rubles, were suspended at the end of April. Russia has also continued to put pressure on countries that have joined in sanctions against Russia by using its own energy resources as a weapon in its diplomatic strategy, for example, by restricting gas supplies via the Nord Stream pipelines and forcibly transferring the operating company of Sakhalin's oil and gas development project to a newly-established company owned by the Russian government. There was also an exchange of accusations between Russia and the West over the blowup of the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 pipelines in September.

While relations with the West have decisively deteriorated, Russia is working to strengthen its ties with

China and other countries of BRICS, the Middle East, and Africa. Foreign Minister Lavrov visited China and India in late March and early April, and four African countries (Egypt, Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia) in late July. President Putin visited China in early February before the invasion and, since the invasion began, he has attended BRICS meetings online, met with the chair of the African Union, the president of Turkmenistan, and the president of Indonesia, who visited Russia, and has himself visited Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Iran and Uzbekistan. In mid-September, on the occasion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tashkent, the first face-to-face China-Russia summit since the outbreak of war was held, underscoring the strategic unity of the two countries vis-à-vis the United States.

So far, these diplomatic efforts seem to have succeeded in keeping these countries from joining the sanctions against Russia initiated by Western countries, but they have yet to secure active support for Russia. Rather, there are signs that even friendly countries are trying to distance themselves to a certain extent: at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum held in mid-June, Kazakhstan's President Tokayev condemned Putin's Russia for recognizing the independence of the Donbass region and, at the SCO Summit, China and India notably expressed concern over the invasion of Ukraine (see Section 3 and Section 4). In addition, at a summit meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance led by Russia, held on November 23, various countries voiced a series of objections to the war against Ukraine, and the chairing country Armenia refused to sign the joint declaration, giving the impression that Russia's centripetal force is on the decline.

Economic sanctions against Russia and their impact

Despite the sanctions imposed by Western countries and the withdrawal of foreign companies from the Russian market, the Russian economy has so far remained calm on the surface. Although Western countries have reduced their imports of energy resources, Russia has increased its income from resource exports as resource prices have soared and countries not joining sanctions have increased their imports from Russia with relatively lower price. Financial sanctions have led to the recognition of defaults on Russian government bonds, but it is difficult to say that this has had a significant effect. Although the ruble plunged immediately after the sanctions were imposed, the central bank took defensive measures to support the price by its purchase, and the exchange rates against the dollar and the euro are both at their highest levels in five years. Commodity prices have not experienced the sharp inflation that was initially anticipated. Immediately after the sanctions took effect, there was a temporary panic as citizens hoarded goods, but the inflation rate has been declining since April. Following Western foreign companies' withdrawal from the Russian market, Russian companies often took over their operations. Since June, however, there has been increasing press coverage that reports the effects of the sanctions are gradually

appearing, particularly in the industrial sector. President Putin also acknowledged at the July 18 Cabinet meeting that it has become difficult to obtain foreign high-tech products.

The fact that the sanctions are not felt to be negatively affecting the lives of the Russian people themselves much has led to high levels of support for President Putin and the war in Ukraine. According to various polls, Putin's approval rating has remained in the high 70s, and support for the war in Ukraine has also remained in the 70s, although it has declined somewhat since the partial mobilization order was issued on September 21. Some observers have pointed out that the Russian government has kept a close eye on the anti-war activities of its citizens since the outbreak of war and has exerted extensive pressure on them, resulting in an increasing number of cases in which Russians do not respond truthfully in these polls, but all polls indicate a high level of support for Vladimir Putin.

Some observers in Russia believe that the more pressure from the West, the more the Russian public will rally around the president and support his actions. It has also been pointed out that Russia has been subject to Western sanctions since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the population becoming "accustomed to sanctions" is one reason why political dissatisfaction with the Putin administration has not grown. On the other hand, some analysts believe that if the war in Ukraine and the confrontation with the West intensify in



Relatives and acquaintances of Russian reservists react at a gathering point in the course of partial mobilisation of troops, aimed to support the country's military campaign in Ukraine, in the town of Gatchina in Leningrad Region, Russia October 1, 2022. REUTERS/Igor Russak (Russia)

future and have a serious impact on Russian society and economy, political dissatisfaction will grow among the population, which may eventually turn into political protest in unexpected ways. The issuance of the partial mobilization order has caused anxiety among the population that it may lead to further mobilization, and numerous people have fled Russia. There is also a growing, albeit slight, call among the population for peace negotiations to be prioritized over the continuation of the war. It remains to be seen how this confusion and change in public awareness will affect the political situation in Russia and, by extension, the Putin regime.

Perspective

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine continues to this day, despite President Vladimir Putin's expectation for a short-term end to the conflict. Although the Russian government initially pretended that it was a "special military operation," the partial mobilization of reserve forces became inevitable as it became clear that the Russian military was outmatched, and the conflict is now turning into an all-out war. For the first six months or so after the war began, the Russian people may have tried to believe that the war in Ukraine was limited and that it was happening somewhere far away and had nothing to do with their lives, as the regime advertised, but the war suddenly came to be perceived as a reality after the partial mobilization order was issued. It remains to be seen how the war situation will further affect these changes in perception and acceptance in Russia.

Despite the confusion over the partial mobilization order, there has not been a great upsurge in calls against the war or for a ceasefire, and so far there have been no moves from the Russian side to cease the fighting. The Ukrainian side also has no reason to propose a ceasefire, given the success of its counteroffensive operations in the east and south. For the time being, the current state of fighting is expected to continue.

Since the war of aggression in Ukraine was started by President Putin, and is thus often referred to as "Putin's war," it is up to him to decide how the war will end. With the war having become a quagmire, however, the conflict between the forces supporting the war and those seeking peace has become more pronounced in Putin's circle, and he himself has lost sight of a clear exit strategy. For now, he may seek a ceasefire mediated by a country with appropriate influence. Ultimately, it will be important for the US and Russia to engage in dialogue and find a solution that is acceptable to Ukraine. ■

Section 2 Response of Western countries

The Western nations, emphasizing the rules-based international order and opposing any change in the status quo by force, have launched swift and large-scale assistance to Ukraine and unprecedented sanctions against Russia, coordinating through the frameworks based on shared values such as the G7, the EU, and NATO. These moves are a sign of determination to maintain the US-led international order. At the same time, international relations have taken on the appearance of an intensifying confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism. However, as the war drags on, public discontent in the face of the energy crisis and soaring prices is affecting the domestic politics and foreign policies of Western countries. There are differences in the degree of these countries' responses, and the resilience of democracy as well as the sustainability of the West's support for Ukraine are being tested.

Values and alliances

Western countries have deepened their unity and coordination through frameworks based on shared values such as the G7, NATO, and the EU. The G7 held a number of flexible foreign ministerial and summit meetings immediately after the start of Russia's aggression against Ukraine and, in lock-step with each other, they have put forward one sanction after another against Russia. In addition, Western countries, including Japan, quickly launched unprecedented measures and military assistance in support of Ukraine. Some countries, such as Germany, even made a major shift in their own security policies.



dpatop - 28 June 2022, Bavaria, Elmau: U.S. President Joe Biden, Boris Johnson, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Fumio Kishida, Prime Minister of Japan, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the EU Commission, Charles Michel, President of the EU Council, Mario Draghi, Prime Minister of Italy, Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, Emmanuel Macron, President of France, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD), on the last day of the three-day G7 summit. At the end of the summit, the topics will be the new world order after the Russian attack on Ukraine and the topic of digitalization. Photo: Michael Kappeler/dpa

Before the start of the Russian aggression, US President Joe Biden consistently declared that he would not deploy troops to Ukraine and showed a stance of avoiding direct intervention, but he tried to deter Russian actions by actively providing information based on highly accurate intelligence to Ukraine and the international community. In particular, he countered Russian disinformation by disclosing information that anticipated Russian actions in advance. After the invasion began, the United States repeatedly provided overwhelming military assistance, including through passing of a lend-lease act that

made it possible to lend military supplies to Ukraine quickly, and clearly stated that it would continue to provide support.

European countries have also joined the United States in supporting Ukraine. Along with the US, the UK took the lead in actively supporting Ukraine, providing arms on a scale second only to that of the US. While Germany had long been reluctant to build up its military power, Chancellor Olaf Scholz promised on February 27 to achieve NATO's "2% of GDP" target to strengthen Germany's own defense capability, and also decided to provide self-propelled anti-aircraft guns to Ukraine, reversing its previously passive policy toward providing arms to Ukraine. The EU actively supported Ukraine by deciding to provide approximately 1.5 billion euros in military assistance, which included the provision of fighter aircraft. This was the first time the EU had provided such assistance to a party to a conflict. In addition, the US has taken the lead in establishing a NATO-led coordinating group to coordinate individual countries' support, and Western countries are coordinating their support for Ukraine with each other.

Sweden and Finland, in a major shift in their security policies from neutrality and military non-alignment, applied for NATO membership in May; NATO began the membership application process for both countries at the end of June. Poland's active provision of arms, on par with that of the Baltic states, reaffirmed the country's importance as a base for Ukrainian military assistance. NATO member states agreed at the June NATO summit on the need to significantly strengthen their deterrence and defense capabilities. For the first time in history, the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand were invited to the meeting, and Prime Minister Kishida of Japan participated. The leaders discussed Russia's aggression against Ukraine as well as the changing balance of power in East Asia.

Based on the strong sense of crisis that "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow" (Prime Minister Kishida's keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue), Japan announced a policy of drastically strengthening its defense capabilities. In a major shift from its previous diplomatic stance toward Russia, Japan, along with the other G7 nations, implemented sanctions against Russia and made clear its policy of support for Ukraine. The provision of defense equipment to Ukraine, including bulletproof vests, helmets, protective masks, protective clothing, and small drones, was the first such provision to a party to a conflict.

Unprecedented economic sanctions against Russia

Western countries were also quick to launch unprecedented economic sanctions against Russia. On February 22, prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, German Chancellor Scholz announced that he would be suspending the undersea pipeline Nord Stream 2 project with the aim of constraining Russia's

resource revenues. Subsequently, when Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, the G7 and other governments implemented a series of economic sanctions in close coordination against Russia and Belarus. These sanctions included exclusion from the SWIFT international payments network, freezing of assets of oligarchs and other entities, de facto export bans on commodities and luxuries, revocation of MFN status, and restrictions on imports of energy, diamonds, and other goods. The G7 also agreed to introduce a framework to cap the import price of Russian oil to prevent Russia from financing its war effort, while the EU also reached a political agreement at a special European Council meeting in May to ban imports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products, except for imports via pipeline, by year-end. Based on coordination through the G7, Japan also carried out a series of measures, including freezing assets, strengthening export controls, revoking MFN status, and introducing import control measures.

These sanctions were designed primarily by the G7 countries, but were also imposed by non-G7 countries (Switzerland, Australia, South Korea, etc.). However, it also became clear that it would be difficult to ensure wider international coordination of sanctions against Russia as China, India, and other countries continued to purchase Russian oil.

Some private companies in the US, Japan, Europe, and elsewhere voluntarily ceased commercial transactions with Russian companies and operations in Russia. This so-called “voluntary restraint” was a phenomenon not seen in the economic sanctions previously implemented by Western countries, and highlighted the seriousness with which private companies viewed the potential business risks posed by Russia.

Democracy and war

Public discontent in the face of the energy crisis and skyrocketing prices, along with the protracted war, has affected the domestic and foreign policies of Western countries. While there have been differences among Western countries over military aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia from the outset, domestic political unrest has the potential to disrupt these countries' alignments. Along with the sustainability of



A combination picture shows people queuing outside Moscow's first McDonald's restaurant during its opening in Moscow, Russia January 31, 1990 (top), and people gathering near the new restaurant "Vkusno & tochka", which opened following McDonald's Corp company's exit from the Russian market, in Moscow, Russia June 12, 2022. REUTERS/Corbis/Evgenia Novozhenina (Russia)

support for Ukraine, the resilience of democracy is also being tested.

While Western countries have imposed sanctions targeting Russia's energy resources, Russia has also used energy as a tool to threaten the EU, resulting in energy supply shortages. The sharp decline in food exports from Russia and Ukraine has also had an impact, resulting in high inflation and energy crises in many countries. Record inflation has occurred in the US, with the consumer price index hitting its highest level in 40 years. Voter dissatisfaction with high gasoline prices was particularly strong, leading to a drop in support for the Biden administration. In response to energy supply shortages, the US approached Saudi Arabia, one of the world's leading oil producers but, in October, OPEC Plus decided to make a coordinated production cut, symbolizing the decline of US influence (see Section 5). The Biden administration's response to inflation was not well-received by voters and was one of the key issues, along with the abortion issue, in the November midterm elections where voters' assessment of the current administration were revealed. In December, Ukrainian President Zelensky visited the United States, having left Ukraine for the first time since the Russian military invasion. President Biden noted the continued support to Ukraine during the summit meeting. In addition, President Zelensky delivered a speech to members of both the Senate and House representatives in which he called for the US's continued support, stressing the importance of defending democracy. This is expected that President Zelensky wanted to stress the importance of the continued support, understanding that the Republican party will take the majority in the House in January 2023.

The EU is facing a quadruple whammy of high energy and food prices, a trade deficit, a weak euro, and a gas crisis. In preparation for the supply cutoff of Russian gas, member states are being required to voluntarily reduce their natural gas consumption by 15% from August to the end of March 2023. Securing new and stable energy supply sources has thus become an urgent task for each country, and a sharp rise in energy prices has been observed. Dissatisfaction among the poor, who are most affected by this, led to major breakthroughs by the radical right and left in France in the presidential election in April and the National Assembly election in June. Reelected President Emmanuel Macron has stressed the importance of maintaining channels of dialogue with President Vladimir Putin both before and after the start of the war. In the UK, Liz Truss, who advocated for a significant tax cut, won the leadership election of the ruling Conservative Party and became prime minister. However, her tax cut policy lacked financial backing and led to market turmoil, with Truss' early resignation to take responsibility a sign of the turmoil in British politics; nevertheless, the UK has consistently maintained strong support for Ukraine. Instability of democracy was also seen in Italy, as Prime Minister Mario Draghi resigned following the defection of the Five Star Movement, the main party in the coalition, and a right-wing government was formed in the general election in September. While the economic plight of the poor thus became clearly

a common political issue for all countries, even a radical right-wing government such as Italy's has not wavered in its position on support for Ukraine, pledging new arms aid in October.

Perspective

In response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which began in February, Western countries imposed unprecedentedly extensive economic sanctions on Russia. While some regard Western sanctions as having been effective in reducing Russia's capability to continue war fighting, others have questioned whether the sanctions have gone far enough to make changes in the views of Russia's domestic political elites and the general public. Another negative impact of sanctions against Russia has been pointed out that Western countries, the initiators of the sanctions themselves, have been hit hard by the repercussions. Against this backdrop, the election results in Europe have reflected the uncertainty in people's lives stemming from inflation and soaring energy prices, leading to the rise of far-right and far-left parties. In addition, there are large differences in each country's ability to mobilize public finances to fight inflation, and these differences in economic strength are beginning to attract criticism for leading to differences in energy and other prices among countries. The US is the largest supporter of Ukraine, and voter backing of this support for Ukraine remains high. However, in early October ahead of the midterm elections, Kevin McCarthy, the top Republican leader in the House of Representatives, stated with an eye on retaking the House that "the US will not give Ukraine a 'blank check'", signaling discord. As the conflict drags on, the sustainability of Western unity in support of Ukraine is being tested. ■

Section 3 China's response and Sino-Russian relations

Amid criticism from Western countries regarding human rights issues, China invited President Vladimir Putin to the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympics and a joint statement was issued at the summit meeting that impressed the world with the good relationship between the two leaders and their countries. China attached importance to its relations with Russia from strategic viewpoint to counter the United States, displaying their relations as the “honeymoon”. However, as Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine drags on, the reality that the relationship between the two countries is not monolithic has come to the fore. Confronting the Taiwan issue and domestic ethnic problems, China cannot fully support Russia's aggression against Ukraine, and is faced with the difficult decision of whether to strengthen its ties with Russia in anticipation of its strategic interests vis-à-vis the United States.

China-Russia “honeymoon” and emerging cracks in relations

In early February, just before Russia invaded Ukraine, President Putin visited China to attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympics as a guest of honor and held a summit meeting with President Xi Jinping. The Sino-Russian joint statement issued on that occasion stated that “friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation” in a staged display of a honeymoon relationship, giving observers around the world the impression that Sino-Russian bonds were tighter than ever.

It is unclear whether President Putin informed President Xi of the invasion plan at this summit meeting. At the Munich Security Conference held just before the outbreak of war, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed, “the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each country should be respected and maintained. This is the basic rule of international relations. This is the main purpose of the UN Charter, and it is also the principal position that China has consistently taken. The Ukraine issue is no exception.” In addition, The Chinese Embassy in Ukraine did not issue an evacuation advisory either before or after the outbreak of war. From these facts, it can be inferred that either the Chinese had not been notified in advance or, even if they had, they assumed that it would not necessarily lead to a large-scale war.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, China has maintained cooperative relations with Russia, but has been cautious in expressing its own attitude. Officially, China has adopted a neutral stance, saying, for example, that concerned parties should “push for an appropriate resolution of the crisis,” but it has not actively mediated between Russia and Ukraine, in effect maintaining a pro-Russian stance. China has not aligned itself with Western sanctions against Russia and, indeed, it has been strengthening its economic ties with Russia by continuing to purchase oil and other natural resources from Russia and expanding the scale of trade between China and Russia, thereby indirectly weakening the effects of the sanctions. China

has not voiced direct accusation of Russia, nor has it called the “special military operation” invasion. Until around March, European countries had been hoping and encouraging China to play a mediating role, but China had not shown any positive movement in this direction.

Nevertheless, China has not fully supported or aligned itself with Russia. China does not supply arms to Russia and does not provide military support. In the UN, China has abstained from several resolutions condemning Russia while Belarus and North Korea have opposed them. In addition, China has maintained a delicate distance from Russia in the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and other multilateral frameworks in which China and Russia participate by supporting the resolution of disputes through dialogue, while demonstrating the unity of China and Russia externally without isolating Russia. In September, as Ukraine stepped up its counteroffensive, the first face-to-face meeting between the leaders of China and Russia since the military invasion took place on the occasion of the SCO summit, and President Putin praised China's position on Ukraine as “balanced”. At the same time, Putin also referred during the meeting to “questions and concerns” from China, suggesting that these messages had been conveyed to Russia from the Chinese side. As the war has dragged on and the situation on the ground has changed, Chinese dissatisfaction with Russia has intensified, and differences in positions between China and Russia appear to be surfacing. At the online China-Russia summit held at the end of December, President Xi referred to the expansion of cooperation with Russia and other issues, but said he would maintain an “objective and fair position” on the situation in Ukraine, suggesting a possible diplomatic solution.

China cannot fully support Russia

Several factors may be behind this Chinese stance. First, it is impossible for China to officially come out in support of Russia. Russia's recent aggression clearly deviates from the spirit of the UN Charter, and it is not consistent with China's traditional position, which emphasizes national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia held a “referendum based on the right to national self-determination” in the occupied areas of four provinces in eastern and southern Ukraine and declared the annexation of the four provinces based on the “results” of the referendum, a move unacceptable to China given its problems with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Taiwan. China cannot fully support Russia because of its own internal political issues.

Moreover, the influence of Russia, which is isolated internationally and subject to strong economic sanctions, is evidently declining, and it would be too risky to keep in complete step with Russia. In addition, China has had good relations with Ukraine in the past. China's first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, was purchased from Ukraine, which had suspended construction of the carrier then named Varyag. 2013 saw

the signing of the China-Ukraine Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which includes a provision that China will provide Ukraine with adequate security guarantees in the event that Ukraine faces a nuclear threat. Thus, China also had to consider its relationship with Ukraine.

On the other hand, China also has reasons to strengthen its relationship with Russia. First, it is to counter the United States from a strategic standpoint.

Although Russia's economic position is gradually declining, it remains a major power in terms of military power, international influence, and resource supply. For China, a stable cooperative relationship with Russia is essential in order to engage in strategic competition with the United States. The fact that China has repeatedly criticized the US in connection with Russia's invasion of Ukraine clearly demonstrates the importance of the perspective of countering the US.

Another important factor is the intentions of President Xi. During his 10-year rule, President Xi has pursued the concentration of power and has come to play a central role in the foreign policy decision-making process. With regard to relations with Russia in particular, he has deepened direct exchanges with President Putin, including dozens of meetings, and a strong personal relationship of trust has been formed between the two leaders, contributing to the strengthening of bilateral relations. In addition, both China and Russia are under strong pressure from the US and the logic of the two countries toward the US is common in many respects. Therefore, US intervention in the Ukraine situation likely engendered a natural Chinese empathy for Russia. Given these facts, it can be assumed that President Xi's personal sentiments are largely reflected in China's policy toward Russia.

Perspective

China's attitude toward Russia's aggression against Ukraine has greatly undermined China's credibility in the international community. The discrepancy between the principles of maintaining sovereignty and respecting territorial integrity that China has been loudly advocating and China's words and actions this time is obvious, and it has become widely known to the international community that China's theory of



Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks with Chinese President Xi Jinping before an extended-format meeting of heads of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit (SCO) member states in Samarkand, Uzbekistan September 16, 2022. Sputnik/Sergey Bobylev/Pool via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY. TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY (Uzbekistan)

principles is not accompanied by substance. China finds it beneficial to cooperate with Russia in terms of countering the US, but it cannot fully support Russia in light of China's domestic ethnic problems. This dilemma has manifested itself in China's ambiguous attitude, and the international community's view of China has become increasingly severe. Ten months have passed since Russia's invasion of Ukraine began and China continues to strengthen its ties with Russia, but relations with Russia could also pose a major risk for China. It remains to be seen how China's dissatisfaction with Russia, which became clear in September, will change if the war becomes more protracted and the course of the war turns against Russia. ■

Section 4 Response of India and ASEAN countries

Numerous developing countries, caught between Japan and Western countries opposed to Russia's aggression against Ukraine that have imposed strong sanctions against Russia on the one hand and Russia-leaning countries such as China on the other, have been responding in their own ways with the primary goal of securing their own interests based on their respective national circumstances. While India shares the common value of democracy with the West and is a member of the Quad, it is also heavily dependent on Russia in terms of security, a circumstance that compels India to steer a course that gives due consideration to both the West and Russia. The ASEAN countries have not been able to present a united position, as they took divergent and shifting positions in addressing each of the resolutions condemning Russia at the UN. These countries taking their own independent lines have become a growing presence in the international community as the "Global South".

India faces difficulty in steering its course

In response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, India has noted the importance of the rule of law and the principle of territorial integrity, and Prime Minister Modi has directly told President Putin that this is "no time for war". However, India has abstained from all draft resolutions condemning Russia at the UN Security Council and General Assembly, urging settlement of the issue through dialogue and diplomacy. India has also maintained its pursuit of national interests on the economic front



Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attend a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan September 16, 2022. Sputnik/Sergey Bobylev/Pool via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY. (Uzbekistan)

by increasing imports of cheap Russian crude oil without participating in sanctions against Russia. The value of Russian fossil fuel exports to India was 5.7 times higher in July-August than in February-March 2022, the highest of any country, and the importance of Russia as a crude oil procurement source is increasing for India.

While these actions by India have frustrated Quad countries and others seeking to strengthen relations with India as a partner in democracy, there are circumstances unique to India behind these actions. India has depended on Russia for a large part of its weapons systems since the Cold War era and has developed diplomatic and security cooperation with Russia, which is also a supplier of fertilizers and energy. In

addition to this historical relationship, India, which has territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, is concerned that any worsening of its relations with Russia could undermine its own vital national interests by, for instance, strengthening of ties between Russia and China.

On the other hand, India also considers its dependence on Russia a risk factor and has been working to diversify its defense equipment procurement sources in recent years. It has accelerated this move since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and its statements with Western countries (the US in April, the UK in April and October, and France in May) reflect this stance. India has been participating in Russian strategic exercises since 2019 and also took part in the Vostok 2022 strategic exercise held in the Russian Far East in September, but it showed consideration for Japan and the United States by reducing the size of its delegation and limiting the scope of its participation compared to the exercise held in western Russia in 2021. On the occasion of this exercise, a meeting between Chinese and Indian army commanders was held to ease tensions over disputed border areas, but in December, the two sides clashed again, resulting in casualties. Thus, there has been no substantial improvement in Sino-Indian relations. Against this backdrop, the joint US-India exercise in November was conducted in an area only about 100 km away from the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control, and is believed to have been intended to deter China. The confrontation with China remains a top national security priority for India, which aims to strengthen cooperation with the West even while maintaining relations with Russia to prevent excessive rapprochement between China and Russia.

ASEAN countries divided in their responses

ASEAN as a whole has failed to come up with a unified response, leaving each country to make its own decisions, and each country's response has been on a case-by-case basis. Most (eight out of ten) ASEAN countries supported the UN General Assembly resolution in March demanding immediate withdrawal of Russian troops, but only the Philippines and Myanmar voted in favor of the April resolution calling for the suspension of Russia's membership in the Human Rights Council. In addition, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam abstained from an October resolution declaring Russia's declaration of annexation of four Ukrainian provinces invalid. Singapore, which follows a policy of balanced diplomacy, opposes actions that undermine international law and order, and was the only ASEAN member to issue a statement condemning Russia and to impose economic sanctions against Russia. The Philippines and Vietnam are increasingly concerned that, if Russia succeeds in changing the status quo by force in Ukraine, China may take similar action in the South China Sea, but the two countries' responses have differed. In the Philippines, the Marcos administration formed in May has issued harsh statements describing Russian military attack as "aggression" and cancelled a contract to purchase Russian-made combat helicopters, but it has also approached Russia regarding the purchase of fuel and fertilizers. Vietnam, on the other

hand, abstained from the UN General Assembly resolution because, like Laos, it has had close ties with Russia in areas such as arms procurement since the days of the former Soviet Union. Myanmar's ambassador from the Suu Kyi administration voted in favor of all the UN resolutions but the country's military government issued a statement supporting the invasion of Ukraine and praising President Putin. Indonesia, a leading member of ASEAN, focused on ensuring the success of the G20 meetings as the G20 chair, but it endorsed the March and October resolutions. APEC chair Thailand voted in favor of the March resolution but abstained from the October resolution. ASEAN chair Cambodia, which maintains good relations with both Russia and China, has pursued a foreign policy based on law and the UN Charter. As Cambodia is not economically or militarily dependent on Russia, it co-sponsored the March resolution, voted in favor of the October resolution and has shown a positive attitude toward accepting displaced persons from Ukraine.

Perspective

Countries that do not take sides with either the West or China/Russia have their own unique circumstances. While India is concerned about strengthening of relations between China and Russia given India's border issue with China, it remains to be seen to what extent India will keep pace with the West and other Quad countries as a democratic nation while maintaining its strategic autonomy. ASEAN countries have traditionally taken different positions on many political issues and their responses to Russia's invasion of Ukraine were also divided. ASEAN's policy coordination in response to international crises is expected to remain difficult as the member countries will continue to pursue policies that focus on their relations with Russia and on the impact of energy/food crises and price hikes on themselves. As the war drags on, continued engagement and support by Japan for India, ASEAN member states and other countries in the "Global South" will become all the more important. ■

Section 5 Impacts on Middle Eastern and African countries and responses

The Ukraine crisis destabilized global resource markets and caused widespread price hikes. This is because both Russia and Ukraine were resource-rich countries in the food, fertilizer, and energy sectors. Although prices had already risen globally due to economic recovery from the COVID pandemic and monetary easing mainly in the US, the overall price index through 2022 soared and remained high, reaching twice the 2016 average according to IMF. Directly hit by this situation was the Middle East and Africa region, which has been dependent on grain imports from the two countries across the Black Sea. As competition develops among the major powers for stable supplies of food, fertilizer and energy while new energy politics emerges, the lives of people in the region are severely affected, causing fears of further political instability.

Black Sea blockade and food insecurity/crisis in the Middle East and Africa

The blockade of the Black Sea following Russia's invasion of Ukraine has caused food insecurity in the Middle East and Africa, further destabilizing a region that has long suffered from conflicts, refugee problems, the COVID pandemic, and financial crises. According to the WFP, as of the end of December, some 345 million people in 82 countries around the world faced acute food insecurity, and the figure swells to more than 800 million if the number of people suffering from chronic food shortages is included. The top 12 countries suffering from severe food insecurity were all in the Middle East and Africa, with the exception of Haiti.

The "Black Sea Grain Initiative" among the UN, Turkey, Russia and Ukraine was signed in Istanbul on July 22 and extended for another 120 days on November 19. Grain and fertilizer exports from three Ukrainian ports resumed and, as of the end of December, approximately 16 million tons of grain and other food items have been shipped. Whereas around 80% of the initial cargo ships were headed to high-income and middle-income destinations such as European countries and China, emergency food shipments, especially to the Horn of Africa region hit by the worst drought in 40 years and other conflict areas, are urgently awaited.

Economic sanctions against Russia and Middle East energy and economic policies

The West has been hit by the effect of the economic sanctions it has imposed against Russia, a major energy resource producer; de-Russification, in addition to de-carbonization, have become global keywords in 2022. While the weight of the Middle East in US diplomacy was already on the decline due to the global trend toward decarbonization and the US shale gas revolution, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries having OPEC+ channels with Russia have become key players in stabilizing oil prices in the global market.

During President Biden's July trip to the Middle East, his visit to Saudi Arabia, with which tensions over human rights issues had been high, attracted particular attention. Turkish-Saudi relations improved after Turkish prosecutors suspended the trial of Saudi defendants accused of assassinating the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, but President Biden remained critical of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. The Ukraine crisis had caused oil prices to spike in March (over \$120 a barrel), and President Biden shelved the human rights issue in trying to secure increased oil production and stable prices from Saudi Arabia. However, a coordinated production cut was decided at the October OPEC+ meeting, highlighting a closer relationship between Saudi Arabia and Russia.

With the ongoing shutdown of the "Nord Stream" natural gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, new competitive relationships and connectivity are being formed among Europe, Russia, China and the Middle East over natural gas. Noteworthy developments include an Israel-Lebanon maritime demarcation deal in relation to Mediterranean natural gas development (October), Russia's proposal to expand natural gas supply to Europe via Turkey (October), UAE and Qatar gas exports deals to Europe (September and November respectively), long-term contracts between China and Qatar for the supply of four million tons of natural gas (November), and an agreement between Israel and Morocco to develop gas fields based on the Abraham Accords (November). This trend is expected to continue.

On the other hand, the global trend toward decarbonization in progress even before the Ukraine crisis has been pushing GCC countries to shift their industrial structure. In particular, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are accelerating their research and development and investment in large-scale solar power, wind power, green hydrogen and other projects, and their impact on the international energy market is also garnering attention.

"Balanced diplomacy" among regional powers and the shifting balance of power among the US, China and Russia

With the US presence in the Middle East declining, including the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2021, and with negotiations on the Iran nuclear agreement stalling, a realignment of the regional order toward "post-JCPOA" is underway. In addition to the rapprochement among Iran, Russia and Turkey symbolized by the photo of President Raisi, President Putin, and President Erdogan in Tehran, China has been strengthening its presence in the region.

Furthermore, what has become apparent with the war in Ukraine is the weight of the Global South. The world is not simply divided into West and East; many countries, including those in the Middle East and Africa, are practicing "balanced diplomacy" to protect their respective national interests and

behaving differently from the West. On the battlefield, Ukraine with the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 military drone and Russia with the Iranian Shahed 136 loitering munition have been attacking each other, while mercenaries and volunteer soldiers trickle into Ukraine from Syria, which has been ravaged by war for over a decade. To evade sanctions, Russian capital is pouring into real estate and financial markets as well as tourist destinations in Turkey and the UAE. Even Israel, a close ally of the US, is pursuing its own foreign policy, being host to large numbers of immigrants from both countries. Saudi Arabia, which has made a deal with Russia, also moves rapidly closer to China, welcoming President Xi Jinping to its capital in December, concluding a bilateral comprehensive agreement, and hosting the first China-Arab summit.



APTOPIX : Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, center, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pose for a photo prior to their talks at the Saadabad palace, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, July 19, 2022. (Sergei Savostyanov, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

As if in response, President Biden held the US-Africa Summit in Washington, DC, where he announced a total of \$55 billion in support for Africa and endorsed the African Union's entry into the G20. The balance of power among the US, China and Russia in the Middle East and Africa will continue to shift.

Perspective

As the Ukraine crisis has made clear, global supply chains for strategic resources such as food, fertilizer and energy are not rock-solid. It will be necessary to urgently strengthen production, supply, and cooperation framework in every country and region. In addition, India's population will overtake China's to become the world's largest in 2023, and Africa's population will continue to grow. The presence of the Global South is expected to expand further with this demographic transformation. ■

Chapter 3 Ongoing US-China Competition and the Situation in the Indo-Pacific

Section 1 Political situation

The US-China rivalry continued in 2022, with the visit of US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in August leading to a breakdown in dialogue amid heightened tensions. A US-China summit meeting was held in November and efforts were made to manage bilateral relations, but there is no prospect for a fundamental improvement in relations, partly due to domestic circumstances on both sides. On the Korean Peninsula, the new South Korean administration inaugurated in May has steered the country toward greater cooperation with Japan and the US, while North Korea is trying to get closer to Russia and China over the situation in Ukraine and Taiwan. North-South relations have consequently deteriorated and there currently seems little chance for US-North Korea dialogue.

Intensified US-China confrontation over Taiwan

The Biden administration emphasized the importance of the Indo-Pacific region to the United States in its Indo-Pacific Strategy issued in February 2022 and its National Security Strategy issued in October. In the latter, the administration maintained its stance – set forth in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance issued in March 2021 – of positioning China as the United States' most important strategic competitor. Even after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the US considers strategic competition between the US and China a top foreign policy priority.

The basic structure of the US-China confrontation remained unchanged after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In the first half of 2022, there were several meetings between US and Chinese leaders and foreign ministers, building momentum for dialogue but, after the summer, a confrontational tone was evident, especially over Taiwan. Although the November summit saw efforts to manage relations and cooperate on global issues such as climate change and energy supply, the two countries' claims



Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with U.S. President Joe Biden in Bali, Indonesia, Nov. 2022. (Photo by Xinhua/Afro)

over the issues such as Taiwan, human rights, trade practices and freedom of navigation remain far apart, and there is no prospect for a fundamental improvement in relations between the two countries. Immediately after the US-China summit meeting, the leaders of Japan and China met face-to-face for the first time in about three years, agreed to strengthen cooperation in areas such as the environment, medical and nursing care, and to resume various dialogues and exchanges, in an attempt to reestablish relations despite a number of pending issues.

In 2022, human rights issues in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region remained a major focus of US-China confrontation. The US continued to criticize China on human rights issues, including the enactment of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which China strongly opposed as interference in its internal affairs. Furthermore, in early August, US Speaker of the House Pelosi, who has long emphasized human rights issues, visited Taiwan. China, which upholds “one China” as its core interest, strongly opposed the visit, and conducted large-scale military exercises in response and stepped up military activities in the Taiwan Strait (see Section 2). The US-China relationship has turned confrontational despite the efforts to improve relations and ease tensions in the first half of 2022, and has entered a phase that makes risk management of contingencies between the two countries all the more important.

In addition to China’s expansion of power in the military and economic fields, the current state of US-China relations was also greatly affected in 2022 by the domestic situations in both countries. In the US, prices continued to soar to record highs, with the consumer price index reaching its highest level in 40 years. Voter dissatisfaction with the rising cost of gasoline and other commodities was so strong that the Biden administration’s approval rating declined. In the November midterm elections, often referred to as a “report card” for the current administration’s policies, the Democrats maintained control of the Senate, but yielded a slight advantage to the Republicans in the House, while the results of gubernatorial races were almost equally divided between the two parties. Although Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan took place under such severe partisan political division, 26 opposition Republican members of Congress, including Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, the top Republican in the Senate, issued statements of support. While the division continued in the US domestic politics due to sharply different partisan positions on such domestic issues as inflation, abortion, and immigration, Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan was seen by some as an opportunity to build a sense of congressional unity. Even with the change in the balance of political parties in Congress after the midterm elections, there is no expectation that US policy toward China will shift in a more conciliatory direction in the near future, since policies to oppose China, such as strengthening support for Taiwan, have bipartisan support (see Section 2).

In China, the National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), held once every five years, was convened in October. Xi Jinping was reappointed as General Secretary and began an unprecedented third term, breaking with the principle of two terms with 10-years. The newly inaugurated third-term leadership has been solidified by President Xi's close associates, and the collective leadership system designed to prevent personal dictatorship has been reduced to a mere formality. The possibility that policy decisions will be made solely according to the wishes of President Xi has increased, and there is concern that more hardline foreign policies will be chosen. In the past, Party Congress years have tended to be more inward-looking with a priority on the logic of domestic politics, and were characterized by hardline stances in foreign policy to avoid China being seen as weak. Although President Xi had continued to consolidate power during his decade-long rule and had established a stable administration, 2022 was a sensitive time for achieving a third term, making it difficult for him to offer concessions to the United States on a variety of issues. In response to a resurgence in COVID-19 infections, the Chinese government maintained a zero-COVID policy and sought to contain the disease by force. A two-month lockdown was implemented in Shanghai, with severe limitation in access to regular medical care and food shortages resulting in widespread discontent among citizens. The damage to the economy caused by the zero-COVID policy was considerable: real GDP growth from April to June was a low 0.4%; real GDP growth from July to September rose to 3.9%, but the recovery in domestic demand remains sluggish. China had adhered to the zero-Covid policy at the expense of the economy but, in response to the outbreak of social discontent in the second half of November with numerous protests in Beijing, Shanghai and other parts of the country, the government took an abrupt step of drastically easing restrictions from December. The sudden change in response has led to a rapid spread of infection across China, and there are concerns that risk factors such as social unrest and economic stagnation caused by the Covid response will continue to impact China's domestic and foreign policies.

Formation of a new South Korean government and the situation on the Korean Peninsula

In South Korea, the new Yoon Seok-yue administration that took office in May advocated liberal democracy, market economy, and universal international norms as its policy tenets. With respect to relations with the US, the new administration announced immediately after assuming office its intention to participate in Quad working groups and the "Chip 4" and clearly adopted a cooperative direction by joining the IPEF and formulating its own Indo-Pacific policy. On the other hand, certain aspects of South Korea's troubled relations with China became conspicuous. At a meeting between the foreign ministers of China and South Korea held immediately after US Speaker Pelosi's visit to Asia in August, conflicts of opinion surfaced over the THAAD issue and participation in the Chip 4 initiative. In terms of policy toward North Korea, the Yoon administration emphasized a shift away from the appeasement policy and reaffirmed the strengthening of extended deterrence by the US (May). North Korea was offered an

economic and development assistance package in return for denuclearization in the “Audacious Initiative” that was strongly rejected by North Korea as “a product of hostile policy” (August).

In his relations with Japan, President Yoon emphasized the need to improve relations through the dispatch of a delegation even before his inauguration, and Japan’s foreign minister Yoshimasa Hayashi attended the presidential



President Joe Biden meets with South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol, left, and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida during the NATO summit in Madrid, Wednesday, June 2022. (Photo by AP/Afro)

inauguration ceremony as a special envoy of the prime minister. Furthermore, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and North Korea’s escalating provocations have raised security concerns, the leaders of the US, Japan, and South Korea held a trilateral summit meeting during the June NATO summit for the first time in about five years (the last having been in September 2017), and the leaders of the three countries also met during ASEAN-related meetings in November. In addition, frequent working-level consultations have been held both in person and online among the US, Japan, and South Korea on how to deal with North Korea’s repeated missile launches. Working-level consultations between Japan and South Korea have been conducted frequently and, following informal talks during the UN General Assembly (September), a formal summit meeting was held for the first time in nearly three years during the ASEAN-related meetings in November. A telephone call between the leaders also took place in response to North Korea’s first missile launch over Japan in about five years on October 6. On the other hand, it is still unclear whether the resumption of dialogue, including at a high level, will lead to the resolution of various bilateral issues, including the most contentious issue between the two countries, that of former civilian workers from the Korean Peninsula.

In North Korea, control has been further tightened under the guise of a “people-first” policy in the wake of the announcement of COVID-19 cases (May), and the “declaration of victory” over COVID (August) was also proclaimed to be the result of the zero-COVID policy. Shoring up agriculture to increase food production has been stressed since the end of 2021, the aim being to produce visible results in order to ward off regime-threatening destabilization. In terms of foreign policy, North Korea has made clear its pro-Russian position by successively opposing a series of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (March, April, and October), by cutting off diplomatic relations with Ukraine (July), and by supporting the “annexation” of four provinces by Russia (October). It also

supported China's position by linking the Taiwan situation to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and called for closer military ties (August). The proceedings of the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China (October) were reported in detail through the domestic media, giving the impression of a rapprochement between the two countries. This has been interpreted as a move to emphasize North Korea's role as a bulwark against US-centered coordination in the Indo-Pacific region and to justify its nuclear and missile development. China and Russia also responded by taking a pro-North Korea position at the Security Council to the string of missile launches since September. On the other hand, North Korea in September denied reports that it was providing arms to Russia, but the allegation has been raised frequently since then.

Pacific island and ASEAN countries at the forefront of competition

Amid the growing strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region, the United States released its Indo-Pacific Strategy in February, demonstrating its intention to contribute to the region's development and increase its involvement along with its allies and partner countries. For its part, China concluded a security agreement with the Solomon Islands in April, which was seen as a move to increase its military presence in the South Pacific region, causing concern and opposition from Western countries. Alarmed, the US immediately dispatched senior government officials to the Solomon Islands and moved to reopen its embassy there at an early date. From Australia, where a change of government took place in May, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong visited the Solomon Islands and other Pacific island countries soon after taking office to strengthen relations. On the other hand, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited eight Pacific Island countries from the end of May to the beginning of June, aiming to conclude a comprehensive agreement covering security and other issues with the region, but the agreement was not concluded due to opposition from some countries. Diplomatic efforts by the US and Australia have yielded some results, including a meeting in September of the foreign ministers of the "Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP)," a support framework for Pacific island countries by Japan, the US, Australia, the UK, New Zealand, and other countries, and the first summit meeting between the leaders of the US and Pacific island countries at which a partnership declaration that includes cooperation on climate change measures and economic development was issued.

The US and China are also engaged in a power struggle in Southeast Asia. While China and ASEAN upgraded their relationship in 2021, the US decided to upgrade the US-ASEAN relationship to a "comprehensive strategic partnership" at a May summit meeting with ASEAN in Washington and issued a declaration on the details of the partnership at the US-ASEAN summit in Cambodia in November. In its National Security Strategy released in October, the US also expressed its strong commitment to stepping up its engagement with Southeast Asian countries. Meanwhile, China has also been working

to strengthen its relations with ASEAN. In July, Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Southeast Asian countries to conduct diplomacy that emphasized cooperation in economic and development issues, and in November, President Xi Jinping attended the G20 Summit in Indonesia and the APEC Summit in Thailand, where he held separate meetings with the leaders of five ASEAN countries. In the Philippines, the new president Bongbong Marcos, in a departure from the previous administration, took a strong stance toward China regarding maritime interests in the South China Sea while emphasizing the economic relations with China. During a visit by Vice President Kamala Harris in November, he agreed to expand the base of operations of US forces, thereby strengthening the alliance with the United States. Japan and the Philippines also deepened their security cooperation, holding the first “2+2” ministerial meeting in April, dispatching the first SDF fighter jets to the Philippines in December, and hosting the first trilateral uniformed personnel meeting among the SDF and the US and Philippine armies in Japan.

Deepening cooperation among Quad countries and a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)

The Quad has been pursuing close cooperation, holding a face-to-face foreign ministers’ meeting in February, an online summit meeting in March in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, a second face-to-face summit meeting in Tokyo in May, and another foreign ministers’ meeting in September. At the May summit, against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the leaders reiterated their support for the principles such as the rule of law and the sovereignty and territorial integrity. They also announced new initiatives on cybersecurity, the provision of satellite data, and the start of consultations with regional countries on maritime domain awareness (MDA) (see Section 3).

Security cooperation was promoted on a country-by-country basis. Japan concluded a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Australia in January, and a new “Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation” replacing the 2007 Japan-Australia Joint Security Declaration was announced at the Japan-Australia Summit in October, further upgrading defense cooperation between the two countries. Defense cooperation between Australia and India is also gaining momentum, including high-level visits by defense officials and joint maritime exercises. In November, a joint US-India exercise was held in the mountainous state of Uttarakhand, which borders China.

Regarding FOIP, a series of policy statements were made by major countries in the region. In February, the US emphasized the importance of FOIP, including an order based on international law, in its Indo-Pacific Strategy, and placed its promotion at the forefront. For the deepening of FOIP, Prime Minister Kishida in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June announced that he would publish a new plan to promote FOIP by spring 2023 to further promote the FOIP vision. The importance of peace and stability

in the Indo-Pacific region was also emphasized at the June NATO Asia-Pacific Partners (AP4) Summit attended by Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand. In November, Canada announced its own Indo-Pacific Strategy, which includes enhanced cooperation with Japan on FOIP. In December, South Korea also launched its “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region,” emphasizing solidarity and cooperation among nations that share values.

Perspective

US-China relations in 2022 were characterized by mutual distrust and narrowing communication channels. The intensification of the US-China confrontation, which has been sometimes described as a “new Cold War,” and the destabilization of the Taiwan Strait are increasing security risks for Japan. Since the confrontation between the US and China has structural factors, including differences in their positions on the US-led order and the values that the US emphasizes, the basic structure of the confrontation will not change despite efforts to manage the relationship to avoid unexpected conflicts, and the conflict will undoubtedly remain protracted.

North Korea is expected to promote closer relations with both China and Russia amid the deepening competition and confrontation between the US and China/Russia to bypass sanctions and continue its nuclear and missile development. South Korea is expected to continue strengthening relations with Japan, with which it shares fundamental values. Given the Yoon administration’s fragile political power base, being a minority government which will continue at least until the next general elections in April 2024, however, the prospects for progress in bilateral relations remain unpredictable.

The contest for influence between the US and China is likely to continue in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Many ASEAN and Pacific island countries do not wish to explicitly take sides with either the US or China, with the majority more interested in extracting favorable support for their countries from both countries and from other countries involved. It is hoped that the implementation of assistance carefully tailored to the needs of each country will be provided. The new plan to promote FOIP, to be released by Japan in the spring of 2023, is expected to contribute to the maintenance and promotion of a rules-based, peaceful, and stable order in the region. ■

Section 2 Security and military situation

The United States sought to manage the competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region responsibly even as the situation in Ukraine worsened, but China was particularly strong in its opposition to US support for Taiwan, and tensions between the United States and China increased over Taiwan. China and Russia, which share interests in countering the US, strengthened their military ties in Asia. North Korea stepped up its efforts to deter US military intervention on the Korean Peninsula by improving its tactical nuclear capabilities and launching ICBMs.

US-China competition and crisis management

In its Indo-Pacific Strategy announced in February, the US expressed its intention to increase its involvement in the region in security and well as foreign and economic affairs with competition from China in mind. In the National Defense Strategy fact sheet released after the invasion of Ukraine began, the Biden administration also made it clear that, while Russia poses acute threats, China is its “most consequential strategic competitor” and that, again from a long-term perspective, the challenge by China to the international order is of paramount importance. The Biden administration has requested \$6.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and announced a policy of emphasizing the expansion of joint warfare capabilities, including a supply system to support the dispersed deployment of US forces around the First Island Chain, as China is gaining an advantage over the United States in conventional forces especially in the Western Pacific. The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, whose announcement was delayed until October in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, positions China as “the only competitor that has both the will and the ability to change the international order,” and notes that the next ten years will be crucial for winning the competition. The emphasis was on strategic stability through crisis management, greater transparency, and arms control in order to compete with China in a responsible manner. While the Biden administration emphasizes competition with China to maintain US dominance in emerging technologies and economic strength, it is evident on the military front that the administration is trying to be very careful not to escalate the confrontation with China into a conflict. On the other hand, the National Defense Strategy released at the end of October reiterates the pursuit of integrated deterrence in all areas and regions by leveraging the capabilities of the United States and its allies, and the Nuclear Posture Review published at the same time mentions China’s nuclear capability before that of Russia, indicating an emphasis on countering China’s nuclear arms expansion in terms of strategy.

Although China criticizes the US policy of emphasizing competition as “outdated,” a positive attitude toward avoiding conflict with the US was expressed, and stabilization of the military relationship between the US and China described as a common interest, in the meetings between Secretary of Defense

Lloyd Austin and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe (May) and between Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley and Chief of the Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Li Zuocheng (July). The US continued freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and passage through the Taiwan Strait and, although China criticized these, it did not take actions that would create a dangerous situation. However, Chinese military provocations against US allies increased, with the PLA Navy targeting an Australian patrol aircraft with a laser over waters near Australia (February). In the East China Sea, Chinese aircraft repeatedly made abnormal approaches to Canadian military patrol aircraft monitoring North Korea's evasion of sanctions in the spring (April-May) and, in the South China Sea, Chinese aircraft released flares and chaff at Australian military patrol aircraft (June). When Speaker Pelosi visited Taiwan in August, China announced a unilateral suspension of the US-China military-to-military crisis management and confidence-building framework in protest. This is a sign that China is more concerned with political goals than crisis management and demonstrates the difficulty of managing the conflict between the US and China.

Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait threatened

While the international community was busy responding to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there was increasing awareness in Asia of the growing possibility of a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan: in May, the Chinese military conducted carrier-based drills along Taiwan's eastern coast, and in June it formally announced that it would no longer recognize the Taiwan Strait as international waters. In December, a Chinese aircraft carrier strike group conducted drills in the waters near Guam, strongly warning against possible US



In this photo released by the Taiwan Presidential Office, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi speaks during a meeting with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, second from right, in Taipei, Taiwan, Wednesday, Aug. 3, 2022. U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, meeting top officials in Taiwan despite warnings from China, said Wednesday that she and other congressional leaders in a visiting delegation are showing they will not abandon their commitment to the self-governing island. (Taiwan Presidential Office via AP)

military intervention in the Taiwan contingency. In the US, efforts to enhance Taiwan's self-defense capabilities have intensified not only in the executive branch but also in Congress, with five arms sales approved in 2022 alone. The US Congress also debated the Taiwan Policy Act, which would designate Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally and include \$6.5 billion over five years for arms sales and military training with the US military. In conjunction with these moves, a string of visits to Taiwan were made by congressional delegations. When Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan as Speaker of the House for the first time since 1997, China conducted a maritime blockade exercise around Taiwan in response. During the exercise, some ballistic missiles flew over Taipei and landed in Japan's exclusive economic zone

and at a point only 80 km from Yonaguni Island in Okinawa Prefecture. Since then, Chinese military activities across the median line in the Taiwan Strait, which had been the de facto cease-fire line, have also become the norm, and Chinese drones have been intruding into Taiwan's airspace. Meanwhile, the Biden administration postponed a previously scheduled intercontinental ballistic missile launch test in response to rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, indicating its willingness to avoid escalation with China.

In his interactions with the media, Biden repeatedly made positive statements about US military intervention in the event of a Taiwan contingency, but each time his government emphasized that there was no change in its Taiwan policy. Although the Taiwan Relations Act requires the US government to sell arms to maintain Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, the president is supposed to consult with Congress on whether the US military would intervene in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Therefore, increased involvement by the US Congress is important for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, there is concern that China may repeat its maritime blockade of Taiwan, a hub for semiconductor production, in the name of exercises in the future, thereby demonstrating its ability to inflict economic losses on Taiwan and the world. While there are indications that US arms transfers to Taiwan are being delayed due to supply chain disruptions and support for Ukraine, a full-scale maritime blockade of Taiwan by China would be expected to make it more difficult to transport arms to the island.

Despite the growing threat from Russia, Europe continued its engagement in Asia as the situation in Taiwan worsened; NATO noted in its new strategic concept formulated in June that China poses a "serious challenge," and in August, British, French, and German fighter jets participated in a multilateral air force exercise hosted by Australia. Germany also sent fighter jets to Japan, South Korea, and Singapore for training to deploy forces in the Indo-Pacific region. Until now, Europe's military involvement in Asia has been mainly naval, but the deployment of air power, which can reach Asia more quickly, gave the impression of growing European engagement in the region. The AUKUS security pact among the US, the UK and Australia also deepened cooperation, and Royal Australian Navy personnel began training on British nuclear submarines. France, the UK, and observers from NATO participated in the November US-Japan joint integrated exercise "Keen Sword," and the UK included its naval vessels in the exercise alongside those of Canada and Australia. This indicated the possibility of involvement by US allies from outside the region in an East Asian contingency.

Military developments around Japan

The Chinese military continued to deploy sea and air power in the vicinity of Japan, and in particular began to operate reconnaissance and attack drones more often. Dealing with unmanned aircraft entering the air defense identification zone is more difficult than dealing with manned aircraft, raising concerns that this

could lead to unforeseen circumstances. In addition, China began to conduct frequent observations and intelligence gathering, including intrusions into Japan's territorial waters, in and around the Tokara Strait, which it unilaterally considers an "international strait". This move is believed to be aimed primarily at gathering information necessary for submarine operations in order to prevent US aircraft carriers from heading toward the Nansei Islands in the event of an emergency. As in the past, the China Coast Guard repeatedly intruded into territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands and approached Japanese fishing boats, but there was also an incident in which a Chinese warship remained in the surrounding waters for a week, raising the degree of provocation to another level.

The Russian military in the Far East is believed to have been greatly reduced in size as ground troops were deployed to the Ukrainian front. However, exercises were repeatedly conducted, including those featuring maritime and air forces in the Northern Territories and tests of new submarine-launched cruise missiles in the Sea of Japan. In September, the annual strategic exercise "Vostok 2022" was conducted on a much reduced scale, with Chinese and Indian forces participating. In May, while the Quad Summit meeting was being held in Tokyo, joint flights were conducted by Chinese and Russian strategic bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. Furthermore, Chinese and Russian naval vessels simultaneously entered the waters adjacent to the Senkaku Islands and circled the Japanese archipelago, thus confirming the deepening of cooperation between the two militaries at the operational level reflecting closer strategic alignment of the two countries.

Rising military tensions on the Korean Peninsula in a "new Cold War"

Since the latter half of 2021, North Korea has clearly stated that it would continue its nuclear development program while avoiding any statement on its stance toward the US. At a ceremony commemorating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the People's Army in April, however, Kim Jong-un referred to a nuclear first strike and, at a June meeting of the Central Committee, he declared a shift to a hardline stance that would not back down from an arms race



This photo released on Nov. 19, 2022, by the North Korean government shows of North Korea's missile launch a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile at Pyongyang International Airport in Pyongyang, North Korea, Friday, November. 18, 2022. Photo by Office of the North Korean government press service / UPI

with the US under a principle of "power for power and head-on contest". In particular, he highlighted the pursuit of a precision strike capability with tactical nuclear weapons; since June North Korea has

announced the operation of a “tactical nuclear weapons unit” and in October it even dared to launch a medium-range ballistic missile over the Japanese archipelago, emphasizing the actual deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. It has also focused on diversifying the missiles and platforms that will serve as the means of delivery and has launched missiles aiming at diversified and highly accurate flight ranges and trajectories (the Hwasong-17 ICBM that can reach the US mainland, SLBMs, hypersonic missiles, and irregular-trajectory short-range ballistic and cruise missiles) a total of 37 times in 2022. Furthermore, the nuclear force policy newly decreed in September declared that a preemptive nuclear attack could be carried out “if an attack by nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction were launched or deemed imminent” or “if compelled to respond with catastrophic force to a threat to the existence of the state and safety of the people that only nuclear weapons can pose,” thereby declaring the right to “utilize” nuclear weapons, a step beyond the claim of status comparable to that of nuclear weapon states under the NPT that North Korea had made before. In line with the “Five-Year Plan for the Scientific Development of National Defense and Weapon Systems” announced at the Party’s 8th Congress (January 2021), provocative actions intended to improve the operational capability of nuclear weapons are expected to intensify, including conducting nuclear tests on a controlled scale, employing nuclear submarines as a means of delivery, and launching military surveillance satellites.

These moves appear to be aimed at making the US military hesitate to intervene and expand its operations in the event of an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the conduct of air, artillery, and missile launch drills simulating saturation attacks in response to the Japan-US-South Korea joint drills in the Sea of Japan (September) suggests North Korea’s intention to avoid a repeat of circumstances during the Korean War by embracing the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy that China adopted after the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1996). However, North Korea’s posture in 2022 was not limited to mere deterrence but characterized especially by its perception of superiority (based on its nuclear capabilities) over South Korea and its open threat to use nuclear weapons first. In the September decree, North Korea reiterated its compliance with nonproliferation obligations as a “responsible nuclear power,” while further clarifying its pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons as “usable nuclear weapons”. This further heightened the threat to Japan, the US, and South Korea and brought greater instability to the region.

While the international community fell into disarray with the failure of the UN Security Council to adopt resolutions and statements to condemn a series of missile launches and to strengthen sanctions (in May, October, and November) due to opposition and vetoes by China and Russia, the US, Japan, and South Korea strengthened their security cooperation. The US and South Korea agreed to strengthen US extended deterrence through nuclear, conventional, and missile defense (US-South Korea summit meeting in May) and, in August and October, they conducted joint military exercises on an expanded

scale. In addition, the three countries have not only sent political messages by emphasizing coordination at the summit and foreign ministerial levels in response to provocations, but have also formulated a policy of strengthening military responses, such as conducting prompt missile launch tests and joint drills. In particular, the first large-scale exercises by the US-South Korea Combined Division were held in August, and in September, joint US-Japan-South Korea anti-submarine warfare drills were conducted for the first time in five years, clearly showing a visible stance of bolstering bilateral and trilateral military coordination against North Korea.

Perspective

As the US-China confrontation over Taiwan deepens, the Biden administration is seeking to manage the confrontation, but it is unlikely that China will show interest in managing the conflict with the US as the US Congress moves to support Taiwan in a bipartisan manner. The US faces the dilemma that the more it increases its own support for Taiwan, the more China will increase its military pressure on Taiwan. In particular, the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act included up to \$10 billion in military assistance to Taiwan over five years and the annual dispatch of US government officials to Taiwan to strengthen US-Taiwan defense ties. Although analyses by US intelligence agencies have concluded that President Xi Jinping has not decided on an armed invasion of Taiwan and still prioritizes unification by nonmilitary means, deterrence signals need to be strengthened to prevent China from deciding that an armed invasion would be successful.

Deepening strategic coordination between China and Russia could make the defense of the Senkaku Islands and US-Japan operations in a Taiwan contingency more difficult. Although it is unlikely that Russian forces would directly participate in a Senkaku or Taiwan contingency and support Chinese forces, it is necessary to prepare for Russian military provocations in the Sea of Japan and around Hokkaido while Japan and the United States conduct operations around the Nansei Islands and Taiwan.

While keeping a close eye on the situation in Ukraine, North Korea is likely to further strengthen and diversify its nuclear capabilities, including through conducting its seventh nuclear test, to enhance its ability to attack US forces in South Korea and Japan, Guam, and the US mainland in an attempt to break up the Japan-US/US-ROK alliance. In addition, provocations over the Northern Limit Line (NLL) have resumed, and there is concern that the situation may worsen due to a perception of superiority over the South due to nuclear capabilities. Although cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea to deter North Korea has made progress, there are still many issues of defense cooperation that need to be addressed between Japan and South Korea, such as the reactivation of the Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the conclusion of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). ■

Section 3 The Indo-Pacific in an era of economic security

In recent years, natural disasters, infectious diseases, US-China competition, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have changed the course of the way supply chains have developed across borders. The year 2022 continued to see supply chain disruptions due to the pandemic, and the Chinese government's zero-COVID policy led to the lockdown of Shanghai City for two months from the end of March 2022, causing a slowdown in production activities and international logistics. In addition, Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which has been ongoing since February 24, has caused instability in energy, food, and other supplies, while at the same time revealing the risks of economic interdependence through the imposition of economic sanctions against Russia, mainly through coordination at the G7, and Russia's countermeasures (see Chapter 2, Section 2). Furthermore, China's military exercises around Taiwan in response to US House Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August reminded us of the risk of a maritime blockade against Taiwan and the resulting disruption of supply chains.

Against this backdrop, governments around the world began to formulate institutions and support measures to strengthen supply chains. One of the aims is to ensure the stable supply of critical materials and other products that could have a profound impact on people's lives and the economy. In addition, the efforts to establish various international frameworks to promote cooperation among allies and partners have been accelerated. However, these measures could also lead to fragmentation of the global market and inefficient resource allocations. Therefore, it is important to maintain and develop a free and open trading system while at the same time ensuring the stability of critical supplies and other resources.

Toward an era of friend-shoring

Globalization thrived on international economic interdependence, which developed significantly after the end of the Cold War, has recently come under reconsideration from a security perspective. For example, diversification and restructuring, including reshoring of supply chains presently stretched across national borders, began to be pursued. In addition to the multilateral free trade regime underpinned by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other institutions, there is also a movement to establish frameworks consisting of security allies and partners.

Believing it should reduce its dependence on China and other geopolitical competitors with regard to critical supplies, the US has been accelerating its move toward "friend-shoring," which the Biden administration has been emphasizing to strengthen supply chains through cooperation with allies and like-minded countries. In the process of restructuring supply chains for critical products, the US has sought out collaboration with allies and partners while at the same time concretizing measures to keep China out of these supply chains. Measures to strengthen supply chains have been put in place to support

various sectors, primarily aimed at advancing domestic investment. Specifically, Congress authorized \$50 billion in investments in the semiconductor industry for domestic manufacturing and R&D related to the US government's efforts to bring Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and Samsung semiconductor plants to the US (CHIPS Act). On the other hand, the CHIPS Act restricts semiconductor companies that received federal subsidies to invest in advanced semiconductor projects or build new fabs in China for 10 years (guardrail provision). In addition, the US Department of Energy decided to invest \$7 billion in infrastructure to establish domestic supply chains for storage batteries.

Strengthening international partnerships for economic security

Generally said, the Biden administration is more focused on working with allies and partners than the previous Trump administration. As the Biden administration entered its second year, the substance of international collaboration in areas related to economic security such as supply chain resilience, data governance, export controls, and investment screenings gradually became clear.



U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo participate in a family photo with Japan's Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi and Koichi Hagiuda, Japan's Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry, during the U.S.-Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee (EPCC) at the State Department in Washington, U.S., July 29, 2022. REUTERS/Tom Brenner/Pool (United States)

Several new frameworks in the Indo-Pacific region were launched in 2022. Between

Japan and the US, it was agreed at the Japan-US Summit in May 2022 to launch a new Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the Economic “2+2”). The Economic 2+2 is a framework in which ministers in charge of the economy and foreign affairs discuss economic and security issues in an integrated manner, aiming to maintain and strengthen a rules-based free and open international economic order and to strengthen cooperation in economic security areas such as export control, international standards, supply chain resilience, and technology investment (including R&D for next-generation semiconductors). The Economic 2+2 meeting held in July discussed (1) achieving peace and prosperity through a rules-based economic order, (2) countering economic coercion and unfair and opaque lending practices, (3) promoting and protecting critical and emerging technologies and critical infrastructure, and (4) strengthening supply chain resilience.

At the Japan-US-Australia-India (Quad) Summit held in Japan the day after the Japan-US Summit in May, the leaders discussed economic security areas such as sharing threat information to strengthen

cybersecurity, harmonizing basic software security standards in government procurement, establishing international standards for critical technology supply chains such as semiconductors, and holding forums for industry partnership building. Furthermore, the Quad, as an advocate for the principles of quality infrastructure investment agreed at the G20, will also work to promote debt sustainability and transparency by providing capacity-building support to countries that need to address their debt problems. In addition, the Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP) was launched with the aim of providing more than \$50 billion in infrastructure assistance and investment in the Indo-Pacific region over the next five years.

The day after the Japan-US summit, the US government announced in Japan the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which consist of 14 countries, including South Korea and Southeast Asian countries in addition to the Quad members. The IPEF covers four areas: trade, supply chains, infrastructure/decarbonization, and taxes/anti-corruption. A ministerial meeting was held in Los Angeles in September, where it was agreed to formally enter into negotiations, and specific items in each area were announced in a ministerial statement. While India will not participate in the trade area, the other participating countries have expressed their willingness to participate in all four areas. The IPEF has significance as a framework for the US to engage the Indo-Pacific region economically after the US withdrawal from the TPP. However, the challenge is how much incentive can be given to developing countries in particular in a framework that does not involve market access through reduced tariffs on goods.

Regarding the possibility of Taiwan's participation in the IPEF, some believed that, if Taiwan joined the IPEF, some Southeast Asian countries which have strong economic ties to China and are concerned about China's opposition to Taiwan's membership might not participate in the IPEF. In the end, Taiwan's participation in the IPEF was not realized, but the "U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on Trade in the 21st Century," a consultative body to strengthen economic ties between the US and



U.S. President Joe Biden and Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida listen to other leaders joining the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) launch event virtually, at Izumi Garden Gallery in Tokyo, Japan, May 23, 2022. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst (Japan)

Taiwan, was launched. The Initiative was seen as an alternative to the IPEF and covers 11 areas, including

trade facilitation, digital trade, and the elimination of forced labor in supply chains.

China has voiced criticism of such moves toward alignments, saying that it goes against the trend of economic globalization. Meanwhile, after Lithuania allowed Taiwan to open a representative office in August 2021, China imposed trade restrictions on imports from Lithuania and the use of Lithuanian-made components. The EU brought the issue to the WTO process in January. China has also been exercising economic coercion against Taiwan, imposing restrictions on food imports and exports after House Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August.

Japan's efforts

Against the backdrop of the friend-shoring movement represented by the restructuring of supply chains in the Indo-Pacific region and international security trends in the region and beyond, the public and private sectors in Japan have been working together on economic security measures. Policy initiatives to secure critical goods and strengthen supply chains are being institutionalized through the Economic Security Promotion Law enacted in May 2022. The Act consists of four pillars: (1) a system to ensure stable supplies of critical materials, (2) a system to ensure stable provision of services using critical infrastructure, (3) a system that supports the development of critical technologies and (4) a secret patent system. Of these, policies related to (1) and (3) have already been implemented ahead of the other two systems.

In particular, with regard to semiconductors, which was designated as a critical good, it was decided in June to offer a subsidy of approximately 480 billion yen to have Taiwan's TSMC set up a plant in Japan, and it was announced in November that a subsidy of 70 billion yen had been approved for Rapidus, a new company established by eight Japanese companies with the aim of developing a mass-production center for next-generation semiconductors. In addition, following the Japan-US Economic 2+2 agreement in July, the Leading-edge Semiconductor Technology Center, a research and development center for the realization of mass production technology for next-generation semiconductors, was established in November. The center aims to establish an open R&D platform that will collaborate with relevant overseas organizations, including the National Semiconductor Technology Center (NSTC) to be established under the US CHIPS Act.

Japan is also pursuing international collaboration in the field of economic security with Indo-Pacific countries other than the US. For example, in October, a partnership on critical minerals was signed between Japan and Australia that will promote cooperation between the two countries to develop Australia's domestic critical minerals industry and to secure mineral resources needed in Japan. It was also announced that a dialogue on economic security among the governments of Japan, the US and

South Korea would be launched after their Trilateral Summit Meeting in November. Although there are some issues that need to be addressed with regard to the three-party economic security dialogue, such as the fact that the specifics of the dialogue have not yet been clarified, it can be seen that international economic security platforms in the Indo-Pacific region are being developed.

Perspective

Global economic circumstances have transitioned from the era that enjoyed a free trading system centered on the WTO and various free trade agreements enabling supply chains to develop remarkably in tandem with the end of the Cold War, to a new era of economic security against the backdrop of great power competition and heightened geopolitical risks due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Against this backdrop, countries in the Indo-Pacific are facing challenges to deal with the trade-offs between strengthening alignments on economic security and maintaining the free trade regime.

Furthermore, as countries become increasingly interdependent through supply chains that stretch around the world, any disruption in supply chains becomes a challenge that directly affects the economic activities and livelihoods of their citizens. In this regard, the friend-shoring promoted by the Biden administration also has its challenges. First, the IPEF participating countries have different positions on China. The possibility that differences in the perceptions and approaches of each country toward China could act as a diffusive force in the friend-shoring cannot be dismissed. In such a case, Japan will need to take measures to reduce such a diffusive force in cooperation with its allies and partners such as the US. It has also been pointed out that various policies for friend-shoring may conflict with existing international rules such as those of the WTO. Surely, there should be no undermining of the good faith implementation of international rules. On the other hand, new international rules and norms will be required to deal with issues that cannot be addressed by the existing international trade regime. In order to promote such efforts, Japan is expected to advance its economic security policy in the Indo-Pacific region through alignment with allies and partners as well as public-private cooperation. ■

Chapter 4 International cooperation facing a crisis

The framework for multilateral international cooperation that seemed to be emerging from crisis in 2021 is facing ever more serious dysfunction in the wake of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The UN Security Council has been exposed as dysfunctional and, while there are growing calls for reform, there are no prospects for that, either. While the stagnation and regression of nuclear arms control and disarmament had been widening the rift between nuclear-weapon states and their allies on one hand and non-nuclear-weapon states on the other, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and repeated nuclear threats have revealed a serious confrontation among nuclear-weapon states, which has not only made progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament more difficult but also sparked concern among the international community about the possibility of nuclear weapons being used. Although affected by heightened geopolitical tensions, some consensus building was achieved at summits and ministerial meetings in multilateral economic and climate change frameworks, but challenges remained in terms of concerted efforts to address serious adverse effects on the global economy and to achieve climate change targets.

Crisis of the security regime centered on the United Nations

At the UN, Russia's use of veto exposed the reality of the Security Council's inability to fulfill its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Resolutions passed in the General Assembly, including at emergency special session meetings, provided opportunities for the vast majority of member states to express their will in response to acts of aggression by Russia, and a General Assembly resolution was adopted calling for an explanation in the event that a permanent member exercises its veto, but these are no substitute for Security Council dysfunction. Calls for Security Council reform are growing, but there are no prospects for reform to be achieved.



FILE - Russia's U.N. Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya casts the lone dissenting vote in the United Nations Security Council, Friday, Feb. 25, 2022. Two days into Russia's attack on Ukraine, a majority of U.N. Security Council members voted to demand that Moscow withdraw. But one thing stood in their way: a veto by Russia itself. Proposals to change the council's structure or rein in the use of vetoes have sputtered for years. But this time, a new approach appears to be gaining some traction. (AP Photo/Seth Wenig, File)

On February 24, at a Security Council meeting immediately following the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that Russia's military aggression was "wrong"

and "against the (UN) Charter". The following day, however, the exercise of veto by Russia, which was assuming the Presidency of the Security Council, of a draft resolution demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops was reported to the entire world, a scene that symbolized the helplessness of the Security Council, which has "primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security" under the UN Charter when confronted with aggression by a permanent member.

In response to the Security Council deadlock, member states turned to the UN General Assembly as a forum for expressing their will, which led to the adoption of several resolutions on Russia. On March 2, at an emergency special session, a resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops was adopted by a vast majority of 141 countries in favor (5 against, 35 abstentions). In April, following the discovery of bodies of Ukrainian citizens in Bucha and other locations, the General Assembly adopted a resolution suspending Russia's membership on the Human Rights Council, the second time this had happened (the first being Libya in 2011). The suspension was decided with 93 countries in favor, 24 against, and 58 abstentions, but it was clear that member states' positions were sharply divided on the issue of membership in the UN bodies. On the other hand, after the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution condemning Russia's annexation of four Ukrainian provinces at the end of September due to Russia's veto, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in October with 143 members in favor (5 against, 35 abstentions) labeling the annexation illegal and in violation of international law. The fact that the resolution received the largest number of votes in favor of any General Assembly resolution since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine clearly demonstrated the broad support among UN member states for the fundamental principle of international law, which prohibits the use of force to change the status quo. On the other hand, the fact that 35 countries, including China and those mainly from the Global South such as India, chose to abstain from voting on the resolution on this basic principle also highlighted the difficulty of bringing together countries that prioritize their own positions and interests into the "voice of the international community".

Russia's use of its veto, which symbolizes the dysfunction of the Security Council, has also increased calls for long-delayed reform of the Security Council. In April, the UN General Assembly adopted without a vote a resolution to convene a General Assembly meeting to request an explanation in the event that a permanent member of the Security Council exercises its veto power. The resolution was intended directly to increase accountability by the permanent members of the Security Council and indirectly to curb the use of the veto through such a process. However, it has yet to influence the decisions of the permanent members, as indicated by the veto by China and Russia in May of a Security Council resolution to strengthen sanctions against North Korea, which has accelerated its missile development in 2022. The Security Council impasse has hampered the response to North Korea, which has created actual hindrance

to addressing a serious security threat to Japan.

Against this backdrop, Japan was elected in June as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for a two-year term beginning in 2023, and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, in his speech at the General Assembly in September, advocated for reform of the UN including the Security Council, strengthening the UN's own functions including in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, promoting the rule of law in the international community, and undertaking efforts based on the principle of human security for a new era, so as to return to the ideals and principles of the UN Charter. At the UN General Assembly, US President Joe Biden also called for reform of the Security Council, referring to an increase in the number of permanent members to include African and Latin American countries in addition to Japan and other candidate countries for which the US had already expressed its support. However, since the revision of the UN Charter requires ratification by all permanent members of the Security Council, the structural problem remains that it cannot proceed without the approval of these countries, and there is no prospect for substantial progress in Security Council reform.

Nuclear arms control and disarmament

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has also had a significant direct and indirect impact on nuclear arms control and disarmament. Russia's repeated nuclear intimidation deviated greatly from the "nuclear deterrence as a defensive measure" that Russia (and other nuclear-weapon states (NWS)) have emphasized up to the present, and was made in the course of acts of aggression in violation of the UN Charter. This cannot be justified at all, no matter what reasons are given. In addition, there are not only threats but also a heightened threat perception that Russia might actually use nuclear weapons, especially if the tide of war were to turn against Russia.

Such Russian actions also made it clear that Russia is in fact totally disregarding the principle of "nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought," which five NWS, including Russia, reaffirmed in their joint statement in January 2022. It has violated its commitment to negative security assurances that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), as well as the pledge stipulated in the Budapest Memorandum of Understanding in its relations with Ukraine. Furthermore, the Russia's dissemination of disinformation that Ukraine is developing or possessing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the attack and occupation of nuclear facilities such as the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, were also serious challenges to the (nuclear) nonproliferation regime. Although the US and Russia continue to comply with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) concluded in 2010, Moscow claimed that because of sanctions against Russia by Western countries, it would be difficult to resume New START's on-site inspections which

have been suspended since 2020 firstly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, while the US and Russia agreed to hold the bilateral "Strategic Stability Dialogue" at the end of November which had been suspended since the outbreak of Russia-Ukraine War, Russia subsequently refused to hold it. Revitalizing nuclear arms control is thus also facing difficulties.

Nuclear coercions by Russia and the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons have caused strong concern that the 77-year history of non-use of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be brought to an end. The Western nations and others harshly condemned Russia. Meanwhile, China, India, and other countries that have friendly relations with Russia implied their opposition to the use of nuclear weapons and war, but did not explicitly criticize Russia. At the first Meeting of the States Parties (1MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in June 2022, many states parties, who had advocated for establishing a global norm against nuclear weapons, avoided naming Russia. The Vienna Declaration adopted at the 1MSP has only the following reference: "We are alarmed and dismayed by threats to use nuclear weapons and increasingly strident nuclear rhetoric. ... We condemn unequivocally any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances."

Russia's invasion also had a major impact on developments at the Tenth NPT Review Conference (RevCon) which was convened in August 2022. Even before Russia's aggression, it was anticipated that adopting a final document by consensus as a goal of the conference would not be easy, due to the widening rift between NWS and NNWS over nuclear arms control and disarmament. Under such circumstances, the five NWS had maintained a certain degree of coordination in the NPT review process and jointly issued statements and working paper even under strategic competition. However, following Russia's invasion, the confrontation among the NWS became also evident at the NPT RevCon.

At the conference, the Western NWS and their allies harshly condemned Russia's nuclear intimidations as well as attacks on and occupation of nuclear facilities. They also made various proposals on China, which has implemented few substantial nuclear arms control or disarmament efforts, in mind. From Japan, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida attended the NPT RevCon for the first time as the incumbent prime minister. In his speech, Prime Minister Kishida stated, "As the first step of a realistic road map, which would take us from the 'reality' we face in the harsh security environment to the ideal of a world without nuclear weapons, we will work on the 'Hiroshima Action Plan' which is rooted in the following five actions, while simultaneously making efforts to reduce nuclear risks", and listed the following: (1) a shared recognition on the importance of continuing the record of non-use of nuclear weapons; (2) enhancing transparency, including disclosure of information on the status of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons ; (3) maintaining the decreasing trend of the global nuclear stockpile (by supporting the dialogue conducted

between the US and Russia for further reduction, and encouraging the US and China to engage in a bilateral dialogue on nuclear arms control and disarmament); (4) promoting nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and (5) promoting the accurate understanding on the realities of nuclear weapons use. The first meeting of the “International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons,” mentioned in his statement, was held in Hiroshima in December, where the members from Japan and abroad discussed the situation surrounding nuclear disarmament, challenges in promoting nuclear disarmament, and priority issues to be addressed.



Prime Minister of Japan Fumio Kishida addresses the United Nations General Assembly during the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference in New York City, New York, U.S., August 1, 2022. REUTERS/David 'Dee' Delgado (United States)

On the other hand, China was more aggressive than ever, inter alia: strongly opposing a proposal for a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons; and strongly criticizing the Western countries on issues such as Australia's plan to acquire nuclear submarines under AUKUS, US nuclear sharing with allies, and treated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant. And it was Russia that prevented the conference from adopting the final document. The draft final document by the chairperson was less than what the NNWS had originally called for, mainly on the issue of nuclear disarmament due to proposals for revision submitted by NWS and others. Still, it included several important points, among them, a commitment to efforts to ensure that nuclear weapons will never be used again, recognition of the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use, pursuit by the US and Russia of negotiations on a successor framework to New START, increased transparency by NWS, nuclear risk reduction measures, and the importance of gender and disarmament education. However, on the last day of the conference, Russia opposed the adoption of the final document, stating that it "could not agree on five paragraphs" while implying its opposition to the reference to the Budapest Memorandum of Understanding and to the description on the control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.

The global economy: impact of the coronavirus pandemic and the war in Ukraine

As of December 2022, restrictions on economic activities associated with the spread of COVID-19 are finally coming to an end after nearly three years, with the lifting of border control measures in most countries except China. On the other hand, a number of downside risks to the global economy have become apparent, and the global economy is showing signs of slowing down.


Inflation is rising worldwide, in both developed and developing countries, with the global CPI (consumer price index) at 8.2% in 2022 and the core CPI (excluding food and energy) at 6%. A combination of factors, including higher food and energy prices due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, higher demand after the COVID-19 pandemic, and higher costs, including raw materials and wages on the supply side, are all contributing to the situation. Central banks of major countries, except Japan, have adopted interest rate hike policies, and rapid rate hikes, especially by the US, have led to a stronger dollar and tighter financial markets. Growth in wage has been weak relative to inflation, increasing the burden on households in general and on vulnerable groups in particular.

The European Union is reducing its dependence on Russia for energy resources in response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine, and in retaliation Russia is cutting back on natural gas supplies to Europe. Natural gas supplies from Russia to Europe via gas pipelines are down by nearly 40% from the previous year. The EU has decided to curb consumption and take other measures but, if natural gas supplies from Russia are cut off, it will further accelerate inflation and have a serious impact on households and a whole industry. For this reason, the economic growth forecast for the Eurozone for 2023 is set at 1.2% (Figure 1).

By maintaining its “dynamic zero-corona policy” for the most part of 2022, China has again disrupted economic activity and supply chains by taking lockdown measures in Shanghai and other Chinese cities due to the expansion of Omicron infections. As a result, the outlook for economic growth in 2022 remains at 3.3% (Figure 1); the key to economic recovery in 2023 will be whether the country can accelerate vaccination, including of the elderly, after the zero-corona policy was reversed at the end of 2022. Uncertainty in the real estate market is also a risk, and the domestic and international impact of the Chinese economy's course is being closely watched.

Emerging and developing countries have a high proportion of their consumption going to energy and food, and they are being significantly affected by the rising prices of crude oil, natural gas, and agricultural products. Prices for fossil energy, including oil and coal, have been rising sharply since 2021. As for food, grain prices in particular have been rising, more than doubling since 2019. Concerns about food supply have led some countries to restrict exports in favor of domestic supply, as seen with India's rice export restrictions. In addition, debt crises in emerging and developing economies are coming to the fore as developed countries raise interest rates. Pressure from falling currencies, difficulties in obtaining new loans, and deteriorating public finances due to the COVID pandemic have forced an increasing number of countries to default on their debt, forcing Sri Lanka, Ghana, and Pakistan among others to seek IMF assistance.

Figure 1 Real growth outlook (%)



Source: World Economic Outlook, July 2022, IMF.

Multilateral frameworks in the economic realm: achievements and challenges

Multilateral frameworks in the economic realm such as the G20 and APEC have faced difficulties, with a series of ministerial meetings unable to adopt joint statements due to the conflict between Western countries plus Japan and Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. Despite this situation, an agreement on a summit declaration was reached at the G20 Summit in November, followed by the adoption of a summit declaration at the APEC Summit held in the same month. These declarations stated that



Nigeria's Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, director general of the World Trade Organization (WTO) speaks at a press conference after the closing of the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) at the headquarters of WTO in Geneva, Switzerland, Friday, June 17, 2022. (Martial Trezzini/Keystone via AP)

"many countries strongly condemn the war in Ukraine" and that the war had caused enormous human suffering and had a negative impact on the global economy, while the views of Russia and other countries opposed to sanctions were recognized in the wording "There were other views and different assessments". The fact that major countries in multilateral economic frameworks shared a sense of crisis about the rising geopolitical tensions, including the invasion of Ukraine, and their negative impact on the global economy and were able to reach a consensus at the summit level can be seen as a positive sign. News reports also highlighted the persistent efforts and wisdom of Indonesia and Thailand, which served as the respective

chairing countries of the Summits. However, the failure to reach agreement in these processes at the ministerial level preceding the summit meeting left a strong impression on the international community that policy coordination was not progressing due to confrontation among countries amid the ongoing global inflation and resource/energy crises.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) also succeeded in reaching consensus in June 2022 at its first ministerial conference (MC12) in four and a half years, following three postponements. The WTO has been facing rampant unilateralism in recent years against the backdrop of geopolitical competition as well as problems with the Appellate Body in the dispute settlement system, which has been dysfunctional since December 2019 due to failure to have a quorum. An urgent priority in making the revitalization of the multilateral free trade regime through WTO reform is in three main areas – rule-making, dispute settlement functions, and monitoring of agreement implementation. MC12 was the first ministerial meeting conducted during the term of Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who assumed the position of Director-General in 2021 and, under her leadership, a ministerial declaration was adopted after an extended session. In a webinar hosted by JIIA, Director-General Okonjo-Iweala explained that the consensus reached at the ministerial meeting was the result of "many dialogues with the countries concerned and persistent advocacy that the WTO is of interest and essential for each member country." Notable achievements include agreement on new rules for fisheries subsidies and agreement on simplified procedures for the use of patented vaccines ("vaccine waivers") in connection with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). These achievements in rulemaking are highly commendable because they are extremely important for reinvigorating the negotiation of new rules. It is also of great significance that the parties were able to reach agreement on the issue of simplified procedures for the use of patented vaccines in developing countries for limited periods, which has been an issue of contention between developed and developing countries. On the other hand, many important issues of WTO reform remain unresolved, including the dispute settlement system that serves as a cornerstone of the rules-based system.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine had a major impact on the energy policies of countries in 2022 and there were cases of increased dependence on fossil fuels, while extreme weather events and large-scale natural disasters occurred in many parts of the world, heightening the sense of crisis that the effects of global warming are increasing. Against this backdrop, financial support for "loss and damage" (loss and damage caused by the adverse effects of climate change) became a new agenda item at the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Egypt in November, in response to strong demand from developing countries. Although developed and developing countries disagreed over the specific measures to be taken, a decision was made to establish a fund to provide assistance to particularly vulnerable countries, and its operation was to be discussed in

the run-up to COP28. The agreement reached at COP27 is another example of the multi-party approach showing some results in a difficult international environment. However, there are still many issues to be addressed, including the strengthening of efforts to achieve the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement.

Perspective

At the United Nations, even before Russia's invasion of Ukraine began, it had already become difficult to reach a consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council due to the growing conflict between the United States and China. Even if the fighting in Ukraine comes to an end, there is no prospect for a significant near-term improvement in the division between the United States, Britain, and France on the one hand and China and Russia on the other, and the Security Council is expected to remain dysfunctional for some time.

Regarding nuclear arms control and disarmament, the failure to adopt a final document following the 2015 NPT RevCon may not immediately result in the collapse of the nuclear nonproliferation regime or nuclear order. With the exception of Russia, the conference participants did not oppose the adoption of the final document and repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT, although they remained dissatisfied to a certain extent. However, Russia's actions contrary to the nuclear order, the growing reliance on nuclear deterrence by nuclear powers and their allies, the qualitative and/or quantitative increase in nuclear capabilities, and the possibility of new attempts by some countries to change the status quo with nuclear intimidation in imitation of Russia will continue making it difficult for the foreseeable future to achieve progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament and to restore confidence in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

In economic and climate change-related matters, multilateral frameworks barely succeeded in consensus building amid rising geopolitical tensions, including the invasion of Ukraine, and their adverse impacts on the global economy. On the other hand, the world economy continues to be affected by geopolitical risks, and the existing international trade regime faces the challenge of adapting to a new era of globalization with concerns for economic security, including supply chain issues for semiconductors and other critical goods. Efforts to address climate change also need to be further strengthened. It is increasingly important to make progress in international cooperation and coordination toward a global economic recovery; to steadily update international economic rules to rebuild a multilateral trade regime based on free and fair economic rules by addressing remaining issues in the current WTO-centered international trade regime; and to strengthen multilateral efforts to address global challenges such as climate change. ■

Chapter 5 The Future of Japan's Diplomacy and Security and Recommendations

General remarks

On December 16, 2022, the Cabinet approved three documents: *National Security Strategy*, *National Defense Strategy*, and *Defense Buildup Program*. The *National Security Strategy* was revised for the first time in nine years (issued in 2013), while the *National Defense Strategy* (formerly the *National Defense Program Guidelines*) and the *Defense Buildup Program* (formerly the *Mid-Term Defense Program*) were revised for the first time in four years (last revised in 2018).

The newly formulated *National Security Strategy* first recognizes that the free, open and stable international order that has expanded worldwide since the end of the Cold War is facing serious challenges as the balance of power changes and geopolitical competition intensifies while, at the same time, various global challenges have arisen, resulting in a complex intertwining of aspects of confrontation and cooperation in international relations. The document also states that the international community is undergoing rapid changes as the center of gravity of global power shifts to the Indo-Pacific region and, citing the example of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it notes that unilateral changes to the status quo by force or attempts for that purpose are being made and that moves to challenge the international order are accelerating.

The document then discusses security developments involving China, North Korea and Russia, in that order. China's attempts to change the status quo in the Senkaku Islands and Spratly Islands and its increasing pressure on Taiwan are described as "a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community" and "an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge". North Korea had been positioned as a "threat" in the 2013 *National Security Strategy*, but its expanded nuclear missile operational capability has resulted in it being described more strongly as "an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan's national security than ever before". Russia's continued aggression against Ukraine is a "threat" to Europe and "strong security concern" in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, coupled with its strategic coordination with China.

In response to these security challenges, diplomatic capabilities are listed as the first item of the main elements of comprehensive national power, and Japan's priority strategic approach is "diplomacy to prevent crises, proactively create a peaceful and stable international environment, and strengthen a free and open international order," focusing on strengthening the Japan-US alliance and cooperation with Australia and other like-minded countries. This *National Security Strategy* then notably advocates

the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities as the last guarantee of national security, and asserts the need to possess counterstrike capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability among others. The development and prototype production of upgraded Type 12 Surface-to-Ship Missiles and the introduction of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles are explicitly mentioned in the *Defense Buildup Program*.

These counterstrike capabilities are the capabilities that the government has chosen not to acquire up to now as a matter of policy decision, although the government's view has been that these capabilities are "legally within the purview of self-defense and thus permissible," thus symbolizing the description "the strategic guidance and policies under this *Strategy* will dramatically transform Japan's national security policy after the end of WWII from the aspect of its execution". The *National Security Strategy* also clearly states that these counterstrike capabilities do not change Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy, and that preemptive strikes remain impermissible.

The *National Security Strategy* also states that in FY 2027, Japan will take the necessary measures to make the level of its budget, for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives, reach 2% of the current GDP. In the *Defense Buildup Program*, the amount of money required for defense buildup over the five-year period FY2023-FY2027 is estimated to be around 43 trillion yen.

One of the main features of this *National Security Strategy* is that it addresses economic security, which was not included in 2013. This move reflects the fact that the international balance of power has changed and the scope of security has expanded from traditional areas to include the economy and technology. The *National Security Strategy* expresses concern that "some states, not sharing universal values, are exploiting unique approaches to rapidly develop their economies and science technologies, and then, in some areas, are gaining superiorities over those states that have defended academic freedom and market-economy principles," pointing out that these are "attempts to revise the existing international order".

Based on the international situation described in Chapters 1 through 4 and the issuance of the *National Security Strategy* and the two other documents, the following recommendations are made for respective areas and regions.

Security and defense

The new *National Security Strategy* lays out the course that Japan should take as it pursues a "three-front strategy" against the powers to change status quo, namely, China, Russia and North Korea. In other words, to prevent the status quo from being changed by force in Asia, Japan needs to drastically strengthen its defense capabilities and deepen cooperation with the US and other like-minded nations to restore the

balance of power in the region, which is becoming favorable to the powers attempting to change the status quo. The US, which deploys its military globally, cannot concentrate its resources in Asia alone, while China has been expanding and bolstering its conventional forces in Asia over the past two decades. Moreover, China seems to have set course to increase its strategic nuclear capabilities. If the strategic balance between the US and China reaches parity in the next 15 years or so, a “stability/instability paradox” may arise in which nuclear war becomes less likely but at the same time it becomes easier to change the status quo with conventional forces. It would not be an exaggeration to say that avoiding this is the main aim of the latest revision of the strategy.

The key to realizing the new strategy is an increase in defense spending. Japan's defense spending, which has been effectively kept at around 1% of GDP since the 1970s, is to be raised to 2% of GDP. The figure of 43 trillion yen, the total defense spending for the five years through FY2027, is 1.6 times the size of the current medium-term defense force development plan. This will enable Japan to upgrade its stand-off defense capability as a counterattack capability, its integrated air defense missile defense, its unmanned asset defense, and its sustainability and resiliency in preparation for the “new battles” of missile attacks, hybrid warfare, asymmetric attacks, and nuclear threats, as indicated in the *National Defense Strategy*. With regard to financial resources, however, the conclusion has not yet been reached, including on the proposal for tax increase. It is necessary to arrive at the conclusion on stable financial resources as soon as possible with the understanding and support of the general public.

Counterattack capabilities are intended to thwart a second or subsequent strike from an adversary, as it is difficult to respond only by strengthening missile defense capabilities given that China and North Korea are qualitatively and quantitatively improving their missile capabilities. In other words, counterattack capabilities are positioned as part of denial deterrence to neutralize the other party's attack, invalidating concerns that these may lead to a first strike or exceed the scope of exclusive defense. The Japanese government has been vague about the kind of targets it will use its counterattack capability against, but it is believed that it will primarily target moving vessels and partially attack fixed targets such as air and naval bases to prevent the adversary from gaining air and sea superiority.

However, the development and acquisition of these standoff capabilities will take several years, and it is necessary to carefully assess whether the development of hypersonic missiles, which the US military is also struggling with, as well as the range extension of domestically produced anti-ship missiles, will go as planned. To mitigate this development risk, the Tomahawk cruise missiles, which already have a proven track record, will be introduced, but it will take several years of system and software modifications to install them on surface ships and submarines, and the missiles need to be supported by US space assets

for guidance.

While working to acquire a stand-off capability, Japan should make maximum use of its existing equipment. In particular, there is an urgent need to resolve reduced aircraft operating rates due to parts shortages, to stockpile ammunition and fuel, including precision-guided bombs and interceptor missiles, and to fortify defense facilities by burying command posts. In addition, protection of defense production bases is important, but whether subsidies and expansion of sales channels will be sufficiently effective in the face of the increasing withdrawal of defense-related companies is another serious issue. It is also necessary to expand the use of civilian transportation capabilities and airport and port facilities on a regular basis from the perspectives of force dispersion, mobile deployment, and citizen protection. Of course, it is essential, too, to secure SDF personnel, the core of the defense force, and create an environment in which they can demonstrate their individual capabilities. However, the new *National Defense Strategy* calls for optimization rather than capacity expansion, and the question of whether the limited number of personnel can handle the expanded missions remains a major challenge.

Based on the *National Defense Strategy*, a permanent Joint Command will be created to reinforce the SDF's integrated operational structure. This will eliminate situations in which the Chief of the Joint Staff is required to assist the Minister of Defense while also directing unit operations. The Air SDF will be renamed the Aerospace SDF to step up space utilization. The SDF as a whole will be empowered to take on cyber defense, and active cyber defense will be introduced to penetrate suspicious access sources in order to prevent attacks. This is because it is widely recognized that cyberspace is already in a state of warfare, and that passive cyber defense, which can only respond in the event of a contingency, is not sufficient to deal with the situation. These circumstances require a revision of the law to enable active defense while ensuring the secrecy of communications as stipulated in Article 21 of the Constitution.

As described above, Japan's defense capability needs to be fundamentally strengthened and, at the same time, Japan and the US should deepen their cooperation and establish an integrated deterrence posture. The division of roles in the Japan-US alliance has been referred to as the "shield and spearhead," with the SDF primarily responsible for defensive operations and the US military for offensive operations involving striking power. Even if the SDF comes to possess the ability to counterattack, this division of roles will not essentially change. For this reason, there is no need to immediately revise the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, but it is necessary to reconcile the two countries' understanding of defense cooperation through RMC (roles, missions, and capabilities) consultations and to formulate joint operational plans as soon as possible. With the creation of a joint command post in the Self-Defense Forces, the two countries should also consider how to strengthen cooperation in terms of command

and control between Japan and the United States. In addition, the new *National Security Strategy* calls for deepening extended deterrence talks between Japan and the US in order to improve the reliability of extended deterrence, and it is necessary to fully examine what kind of deepening of cooperation is possible between Japan and the US, which do not share nuclear strike missions like NATO.

Nuclear arms control and disarmament

The revision of the international order by force or aggression, as well as the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons for such purposes, must never be tolerated. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has made it clear that we cannot rule out the possibility that such risks could materialize in Northeast Asia where Japan is located. Under these circumstances, as the *National Security Strategy* indicates, it is important for Japan to strengthen its deterrence capabilities, including extended (nuclear) deterrence provided by the United States. At the same time, precisely because actors engaged in strategic competition, including Japan, are pursuing the quantitative and/or qualitative enhancement of deterrence and reaffirming the importance of nuclear deterrence, there is also an urgent need to reinvigorate nuclear arms control and disarmament, which have constituted the nuclear order along with nuclear deterrence, for preventing an arms race as a sequel to a security dilemma and intentional/inadvertent escalation to use nuclear weapons, and maintaining a certain stability in strategic competition and deterrence relations therein.

This will also contribute to maintain and defend the rules-based international order that Japan values. Japan is expected to exercise leadership and promote ever more proactive nuclear arms control and disarmament diplomacy, such as: establishing confidence-building measures and crisis management mechanisms that will reduce the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, which is an urgent agenda; engaging China which is conducting active nuclear modernization in nuclear arms control and disarmament in short- and mid-term, including improvement of its transparency; buttressing the NPT and other multilateral frameworks for nuclear arms control and non-proliferation; and establishing norms toward a world without nuclear weapons in the mid- and long-term. It is important that Japan, as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings during wartime, make its unique efforts, including to lead international discussions toward the next NPT Review Conference through the "International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons," and to promote efforts to deepen the international community's accurate understanding on the realities of nuclear weapons use, including on the occasion of G7 summit meeting.

Economic security

The *National Security Strategy* describes "(e)conomic security is to ensure Japan's national interests, such as peace, security, and economic prosperity, by carrying out economic measures," and states that "Japan will ensure the self-reliance of its economic structure, as well as advantages over other countries and ultimately

the indispensability of its technologies”. Specific measures to achieve this include: strengthening supply chains by securing stable supplies of critical goods including rare earth; expanding the scope of the prior screening system for government procurement in the field of critical infrastructure; bolstering information security, including security clearances; developing advanced technology and protecting this technology; and taking steps against economic coercion. These measures are to be implemented in alignment with the ally and like-minded countries, as well as in cooperation with the private sector. Indeed, cooperation among countries that share common interests and norms as well as public-private cooperation are essential for effective economic security policies. This is because, as people, goods, money and information move across borders, no one government has a monopoly on all technologies, and cutting-edge technologies also emerge in the private sector.

The challenge for the future will be to implement the policies outlined in the *National Security Strategy* in concrete terms. For example, the *National Security Strategy* calls for further stepping up support and developing systems for information gathering, development, and fostering of advanced critical technologies. In this regard, it is also necessary to strengthen support measures and systems for STEM education. International collaboration in STEM education, which is already being promoted between the US and Japan and in the Quad, could be expanded. Specific measures to deal with economic coercion also deserve consideration. Given that the *National Security Strategy* states that “Japan will enhance its own measures to counter against unfair trade practices and economic coercion, including through working to solidify international norms in cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries,” it would be beneficial to share an early warning mechanism for supply chain disruptions with ally and partners, to design mechanisms for the flexible exchange of critical supplies and resources with ally and partners, and to form international rules and norms to ensure the effectiveness of these measures. Public-private cooperation is also important in these efforts. Strategic implementation of economic security measures based on the *National Security Strategy* is expected to ensure Japan’s national interests, such as peace, security and economic prosperity.

Relations with countries and regions and multilateral cooperation

United States

The *National Security Strategy* regards the Japan-US alliance as playing an indispensable role not only for the security of Japan but also for the realization of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and throughout the international community, and refers to the importance of deepening Japan-US cooperation in this region and strengthening the alliance in all areas, including diplomacy, defense and economics. In addition to boosting its own defense capabilities and deepening Japan-US defense cooperation, Japan is expected to reaffirm the value of the Japan-US alliance in defending and promoting an international

order in the Indo-Pacific region based on common values and the rule of law, and further enhance its effort to realize the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” through coordination with the United States bilaterally and through frameworks such as the Quad. The importance of the US-Japan alliance enjoys wide recognition among experts and the public in both countries. However, as partisan confrontation and “inward-looking” political tendencies grow in the US, efforts should be made to further augment understanding and support for Japan as a reliable partner based on common values and the importance of the Japan-US alliance, transcending partisan differences within the US; it is also important to continue and step up efforts to further broaden and deepen the foundations of the Japan-US relationship through steady activities such as personal exchanges.

China

Concerns regarding China's assertive efforts across a range of fronts, including diplomacy, military, and economic spheres continue to escalate, and the *National Security Strategy* recognizes that China's military activities and other trends are “a matter of serious concern to Japan and the international community” and “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge”. Based on its analysis of security risks, Japan needs to enhance its security responses based on the Japan-US security system and by seeking greater cohesion with other nations that share values such as democracy. At the same time, the *National Security Strategy* also recognizes that “Japan and China both have important responsibilities for the peace and prosperity of the region and the international community,” and mentions the importance of close communication with China and the possibility of cooperation in areas such as economic and personnel exchange in ways that will benefit both Japan and China.

Japan should assert what it needs to assert to China and openly communicate its concerns, while at the same time striving to find areas of common interest and cooperation and increasing dialogue aimed at resolving common issues such as climate change. It will be all the more important to communicate with China through various channels and opportunities to accurately grasp China's intentions and policy trends. It will also be necessary to ensure Japan's interests in the economic sphere by, for example, encouraging the creation of an orderly business environment while ensuring economic security, as well as to promote regular personnel exchanges between Japan and China.

Korean Peninsula

The *National Security Strategy* calls for strengthening strategic cooperation between Japan and the ROK, as well as among Japan, the US and the ROK, including on security aspects, with responses to North Korea in mind, as the ROK is an extremely important geopolitical and security neighbor of Japan. As North Korea's nuclear and missile development accelerates, cooperation with the US and South Korea

in the areas of diplomacy and security is becoming increasingly important, and further deepening cooperation among the three countries in all aspects of security, from aligning policies toward North Korea to conducting joint military exercises, is essential. With regard to South Korea, it is important to make early progress in pursuing closer cooperation in defense, including the resumption of GSOMIA and the conclusion of ACSA, and it is also desirable to resolve bilateral concerns as soon as possible through close communication between the two countries.

With regard to North Korea, the *National Security Strategy* makes no mention of cooperation between North Korea and China or Russia, but it is hard to deny that the international situation has essentially shifted to a confrontation between the two camps as geopolitical competition intensifies. This reality makes it even more complicated and difficult to deal with North Korea, which has accelerated its nuclear and missile development and “has become an even more serious and imminent threat” to Japan’s security. In addition to enhancing cooperation with the US and South Korea, it would be beneficial for Japan to encourage better understanding of the growing threat posed by North Korea and Japan’s policy responses thereto as well as to increase the effectiveness of sanctions on North Korea through cooperation with the G7 nations, Australia, the EU, and other countries with which Japan has much in common in terms of policy and through outreach to Asian countries and the rest of the international community.

Russia

The *National Security Strategy* states that Japan’s basic policies regarding relations with Russia are to respond in a manner that protects Japan’s national interests in light of the severe security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, to prevent Russia from taking actions that undermine the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community in cooperation with allies and like-minded countries, and to resolve the Northern Territories issue and conclude a peace treaty with Russia. Japan’s fundamental stances on resolving the Northern Territories issue and concluding a peace treaty remain unchanged. Japan, as a member of the G7, has joined sanctions against Russia and demanded Russia’s immediate withdrawal from Ukraine. Russia has declared these moves by Japan “unilateral and unfriendly,” suspended negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty, halted visa-free exchanges, announced its withdrawal from joint economic activities on the four northern islands, and even banned politicians from the ruling party and other Japanese government officials from entering the country.

Japan-Russia relations have cooled to an unprecedented degree, and there is little hope of a recovery for some time. Nevertheless, it is necessary to continue to negotiate with the Russian side on issues directly related to Japan’s national interests, such as fisheries around the four northern islands and gas development in Sakhalin, and it is important to maintain relations for this purpose. It will be important

for Japan to seek dialogue with Russia in areas that are in Japan's national interest to the extent that it is compatible with its principled policy toward Russia, and to deepen frank exchanges of views on security issues, including those related to Ukraine.

Europe

As discussed in the *National Security Strategy*, Japan needs to further strengthen cooperation, including on security, with European countries, the EU and NATO, with whom it shares common values, as the global balance of power changes. European countries are also taking a growing interest in the Indo-Pacific region, and increasing their activities such as dispatch of ships and aircraft and participation in joint military exercises, although there are some differences in the level of interest and involvement. In order to maintain the commitment of European countries and organizations and to strengthen cooperation with Japan, it will need to continue to encourage these countries and organizations to better understand the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region and the seriousness of its security environment. Cooperation within the framework of the G7, of which Japan will assume the presidency in 2023, would also be beneficial in strengthening relations with European countries. It is important, too, that Japan continue its active support for Ukraine with regard to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which poses the greatest security threat to European countries and has a serious impact on their economies, and expectations for Japan's role as the G7 presidency are also high in this regard.

Indo-Pacific

Regarding the Indo-Pacific, the *National Security Strategy* refers to universalization of the FOIP vision, a free and fair economic zone, connectivity, maritime security, and the rule of law as measures to realize the FOIP, and calls for the strategic use of ODA. The new plan to promote FOIP, to be announced in the spring of 2023, is expected to make the vision more concrete in order to universalize the FOIP vision. It is important to further strengthen the long-lasting cooperation in which Japan has been engaged, such as the provision of quality infrastructure and human capacity development, to support the economic and social development of ASEAN countries and Pacific island countries affected by the COVID pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and climate change. Cooperation in the provision of equipment and supplies and infrastructure development to improve the security and deterrence capabilities of the like-minded countries of the region is also an important initiative for strengthening security in the Indo-Pacific region, and its active promotion is expected.

Defense cooperation with Australia has been particularly increased in recent years, and it is important to pursue it further by building up concrete bilateral cooperation between the two countries. It is also important for the trilateral defense cooperation among Japan, the US and Australia to expand its scope

and become more concrete. Greater defense cooperation with the Philippines is also needed. Japan's early conclusion of reciprocal access agreements (RAA) and promotion of multilateral defense cooperation, including joint exercises among Japan, the US, Australia and the Philippines, would also contribute to regional peace and stability. It is important to continue promoting defense cooperation and interoperability with India, including the first joint air force training exercise scheduled in January 2023. Since Japan and India will chair the 2023 G7 and G20 meetings, respectively, close diplomatic cooperation as the host countries is expected.

Middle East and Africa

In the Middle East and Africa, there are signs of easing of tensions within the region, among Arab countries, Turkey, Israel and Iran, as the US presence declines, and China's growing presence in the region is also noteworthy. As the regional order remains in flux, the Global South, including the Middle East and Africa, which is strongly affected by the war in Ukraine and economic sanctions against Russia, is expected to have a greater voice, partly due to the rapid population growth in India and Africa. Japan has been committed to aiding Afghanistan, promoting peace in the Middle East, supporting Palestine, and resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, and it should continue to work on these issues and strengthen relations with the countries of the Global South through bilateral and multilateral frameworks.

Multilateral cooperation

The *National Security Strategy* states that "Japan will lead efforts to strengthen the functions of the United Nations, including reform of the UN Security Council". Although there are organizational and structural challenges in reforming the UN, such as the special status of permanent members of the Security Council in addition to the difficulty in reaching a consensus or obtaining support by an overwhelming majority for any reform proposal, many member states share the sense of crisis that the UN is in serious dysfunction. It is hoped that Japan will take advantage of its two-year term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council starting in 2023 to move discussions on UN reform forward. At the same time, it is also important to build on Japan's long-standing efforts to make the Security Council more transparent in its operations, and to strengthen its contribution to efforts to address global issues by leveraging its strengths, such as its initiatives in the areas of human security and health areas.

As the free and fair trade regime faces difficulties, it is also important to contribute to maintaining and developing international and regional economic orders and strengthening international norms through initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region such as the frameworks of the CPTPP, RCEP and IPEF, as well as to maintain and strengthen the multilateral trade regime centered on the WTO. ■

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<https://www.jiia.or.jp/project/2020/A.php>
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<https://www.jiia.or.jp/project/2020/A3.php>
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