Papers in the "JIIA Strategic Commentary Series" are prepared mainly by JIIA research fellows to provide commentary and policy-oriented analyses on significant international affairs issues in a readily comprehensible and timely manner.

European countries find themselves in an alarming situation from a conventional military perspective. Despite the burden of economic sanctions and substantial losses on the battlefield, Russia is gradually rebuilding its conventional capabilities, driven by an increasingly defence-oriented economy¹. It continues to conduct its "shadow war"² across the continent, staying below the threshold of conventional conflict, while maintaining its objective of weakening NATO by reverting the alliance to its status prior to the 1999 enlargement and decoupling the United States and Europe. Meanwhile, several European intelligence agencies have repeatedly warned of the possibility that Russia might test NATO's deterrence or even wage war against certain European countries, depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine³.

While facing the direct threats of a belligerent neighbour, European countries must also contend with mounting uncertainty surrounding their indispensable ally. Although US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has reaffirmed the United States' commitment to NATO⁴, the extended nuclear deterrence guarantee seems uncertain, while talk of cutting down US conventional forces in Europe persists⁵.

In this environment of growing threats and volatile alliance dynamics, European countries are left with no alternative but to pursue internal balancing - meaning a significant reinforcement of their own defence capabilities - to mitigate both the risk of overt conventional conflict, with the potential for nuclear escalation, and the possibility of diminished or discontinued US support.

The unprecedented debate on the European dimension of France's nuclear deterrence, as well as the public interest it has sparked among several European states, provides a valuable opportunity to foster vital discussions on the future of Europe's defence and deterrence⁶. However, France and the United Kingdom, Europe's sole nuclear-weapon-states, have neither the capabilities nor the political will to replicate the US model of extended nuclear deterrence at present. Moreover, the understanding of deterrence in Europe is too often limited to its nuclear dimension. The most urgent challenge now is for European states to figure out how they can bolster their conventional deterrence vis-à-vis Russia, which would provide the most credible response to the simultaneous challenges posed by the threats of an aggressive neighbour and the erratic behaviour of their key ally.

The need for a realistic assessment of priorities in terms of conventional capabilities, strategic enablers and defence industries

After decades of under-investment in European armed forces and a relative sense of security up until February 2022, current European efforts to rebuild conventional forces are bound to remain sub-optimal for some time. Given their current capabilities, Europeans are not so much building a brand-new bulwark against the Russian threats as they are hastily patching up the many cracks in their defences. As a recent article aptly put it, effectiveness must be prioritized over efficiency⁷.

The European Commission's first-ever defence white paper, published on March 19, 2025, provides a clear outline of what Europeans consider to be their most pressing shortfalls. In a section titled "Closing the Gaps", it identifies seven priority capability areas: air and missile defence; artillery systems; ammunition and missiles; drones and counter-drone systems; military mobility; AI, quantum, cyber and electronic warfare; and strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection⁸.

This list reflects a commendable effort to approach European defence in an integrated manner, seeking to cover the full spectrum of threats posed by Russia. However, it lacks a clear prioritization framework. An excessively broad focus, illustrated by the inclusion of emerging technologies, risks diverting resources from urgent operational gaps. For example, can the development of quantum technologies truly be considered as urgent a priority as replenishing ammunition stockpiles? Prioritization is not merely an industrial challenge but also a strategic one, as the selected time frame will determine what outcomes are realistically achievable. What is needed now is not to elaborate a posture of seamless deterrence, but rather a focused effort to close the most urgent conventional gaps.

In the short to medium term, European states should focus on military mass and precision strike capabilities. Military mass, inclusive of ammunition, artillery systems and drones, is indispensable in the event of a protracted, high-intensity war of attrition, while precision strike capabilities such as long-range missiles and drones are necessary to hold Russian assets at risk, serving both deterrence and escalation management objectives in a conventional conflict.

In the medium to long term, the key segment is that of strategic enablers. Right now, "European countries depend on the United States for the architecture for long-range detection, identification, geolocation of static targets and tracking of mobile as well as for real-time transmission of the targeting data" and "airborne electronic warfare needed to neutralize enemy sensors, support operations, and address enemy countermeasures."⁹

For instance, even France, a nuclear-weapon state that prides itself on maintaining a "full-spectrum military model" (modèle d'armée complet), had to rely on the United States in its operations in Mali for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, air-to-air refuelling and logistical transport¹⁰. Building up such enablers will be vital to ensuring effective conventional deterrence by the European continent against Russia in the coming years.

Within the broader division of labour across Europe, the EU has an essential role to play in the development of an adequate defence industrial base. This is reflected in the recently announced "ReArm Europe Plan / Readiness 2030", which aims to mobilise €800 billion by 2030. However, this catchy figure obscures a more nuanced and uncertain financing scheme. Of the €800 billion, the European Commission plans to provide €150 billion through a preferential loan instrument (Security Action for Europe, or SAFE). The remaining €650 billion is expected to come from national efforts, achieved by first activating the national escape clause of the EU's Stability and Growth Pact to allow increased defence spending, then encouraging Member States to raise defence expenditures by 1.5% of their GDP over the next four years¹¹. On April 30, the European Commission announced that 12 Member States had requested activation of the clause¹².

While these initiatives are welcome, they are still not enough. By relying primarily on national efforts - since defence remains a national competence of EU Member States - rather than on joint procurement, this approach fails to mitigate the risk of fragmentation, with Member States potentially pursuing diverging procurement strategies and failing to develop the capabilities most urgently required in a coordinated way.

Beyond the hardware: the need for political vision and coherence in defence development

To overcome the pitfall of fragmentation and respond effectively to Russia's threats and America's growing unreliability, the political dimension must be prioritized in shaping an appropriate strategy. While Europeans are actively discussing industrial development and procurement mechanisms, debates around the relevant political and strategic frameworks remain insufficient. Developing and acquiring weapons systems is critical but, without coordinated planning for their potential use and their role in a deterrence architecture, their effectiveness would be significantly diminished.

The first priority is to define appropriate cooperation between the EU's development of a defence industrial base and NATO's defence planning.

Indeed, talking about "European" conventional deterrence makes little sense as "Europe" is not a political or military actor, but a geographical entity composed of diverse nations and overlapping institutions. The EU is making important efforts to coordinate defence procurement and industrial development, but it cannot shoulder the burden of building deterrence alone as it lacks the necessary military structures. Moreover, it risks sidelining key non-EU NATO allies - such as Canada, Norway, the UK, and even Turkey - whose contributions are essential to credible deterrence.

NATO and the EU should therefore deepen their cooperation to ensure that the EU's industrial and procurement efforts align with the priorities set out in the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). For European states, nothing can replace NATO's planning structures at present. They must ensure effective coordination in this regard to give real substance to a so-called "European pillar" within NATO by effectively linking EU-driven procurement initiatives with NATO's military planning. Establishing a Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and the UK, similar to the existing agreement with Norway, could be envisaged as a means to strengthen this pillar.

From the formation of the Ramstein Group to the revitalization of the Weimar Triangle and the establishment of the European Political Community (EPC), Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has led to the multiplication of diplomatic formats, outside of and complementary to NATO, to address both the support to Ukraine and the broader security of the European continent amid Russian threats. A core group has emerged from these various formats, centred around the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Poland, as recently demonstrated by the joint visit of their leaders to Kyiv. These groups play a valuable role in ensuring coordination both within and beyond NATO, while also helping to align potentially divergent perceptions of and responses to the Russian threat.

The second priority, within these frameworks, is to develop a clear vision of how the Russian threats may evolve over the short and the medium term. In the short term, increased European support for Ukraine remains essential to counter Russia's conventional threats. It is crucial not only for ensuring Ukraine's survival, but also for containing and degrading Russia's military capabilities while reducing its incentive to challenge NATO. It is especially critical to sustain this support amid the current negotiations given the lack of credibility of any assurances from Moscow, as evidenced by twenty-six years of Putinism.

However, support to Ukraine must not be treated in isolation from the defence of the continent. Current discussions on peacekeeping or reassurance forces within Ukraine are important, but they should not be regarded as the final response to the Russian threats and must be integrated into a broader continental defence effort. The deterrence of Russia does not end at the Dnieper River.

The reinforcement of NATO's conventional posture and deployments in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region is also necessary. As Russia may seek to test the credibility of collective defence in these areas, escalation management at the conventional level must be improved and expanded to avoid falling into a binary dilemma between inaction out of fear of nuclear escalation, and nuclear escalation out of a lack of flexible conventional capabilities.

European states must therefore define clear scenarios of potential conflict with Russia to tailor their desired capabilities, taking into account the forces on both sides. They must also consider the political signalling associated with conventional deterrence. How does the acquisition of the identified priority capabilities reflect the credibility of their commitment to territorial defence?

As a corollary to this central question, European states must address the risks of misperception and miscalculation by Russia that could arise from their conventional buildup in order to avoid the pattern of a classic security dilemma and its risks of inadvertent escalation. Any effort to strengthen the conventional deterrence of EU and NATO Member States must therefore be accompanied by clear, unified political and military signalling, going beyond their current support to Ukraine¹³.

The third priority is for European states to strengthen and expand their public information strategies about the Russian threats directed at their own citizens.

Russia's approach to European countries and their support to Ukraine rests on two assumptions: an asymmetry of capabilities and an asymmetry of stakes. The former is based on identified conventional gaps such as that in the missile segment, which growing European defence expenditures aim to belie, while the latter is based on the idea that the future of Ukraine is less existential to European countries than it is to Russia. Russia's bet is that asymmetry of stakes begets asymmetry of resolve and that, in the longer term, European societies will be less inclined to approve the costs of the support to Ukraine. Russia's nuclear rhetoric also aims to exacerbate this situation, supported by large-scale disinformation and manipulation campaigns.

This assumption must be proven wrong, as resolve is crucial to a credible deterrence strategy. The financial investments required to bolster conventional capabilities must be accompanied by educational initiatives and public debates to explain to European citizens why defence spending must be increased. In Europe's current social and economic circumstances, a combination of democratic accountability and fiscal justice will be absolutely necessary to counter the Russian narrative that defence build-up in European countries will erode their ways of life and social models, ultimately strengthening the populist movements sympathetic to Russia.

It is long overdue for European countries to engage in the discussions and take the initiatives they are currently pursuing regarding conventional capabilities and defence industries. However, the focus on means must not overshadow the need to address the ends - specifically, the imperative to articulate a political and military vision that aligns and tailors these capabilities to the Russian threats. Only through this dual approach, linking industrial development with credible military planning across the relevant political frameworks, can European countries build both the brawns and the brains required for effective conventional deterrence.

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