Papers in the "JIIA Strategic Commentary Series" are prepared mainly by JIIA research fellows to provide comments and policy-oriented analyses of significant international affairs issues in a readily comprehensible and timely manner.

Introduction: German Political Background

Support for the "Traffic Light" coalition government of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens, and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) led by German Chancellor 　Olaf Scholz continues to deteriorate: its disapproval rating rose from 63% in May to 71% in June.¹ Against this backdrop, voter turnout for the EU parliamentary elections held June 6-9 was 64.8%, the highest since the unification of East and West Germany.² When voters were asked whether the policies that determined their votes were "at the European level" or "at the national level," 38% said "at the European level" and 55% said "at the national level," reflecting the high level of interest in domestic political issues and thus the unpopularity of the current administration.³

1. Election Results

The results of the EU parliamentary elections, which were a harsh interim assessment of the current government, are as follows.

	% of votes	Change from previous election	Number of seats	Change from previous election
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)	23.7%	+1.1%	23	+0
Christian Social Union (CSU)	6.3%	+0%	6	+0
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)	13.9%	-1.9%	14	-2
Free Democratic Party (FDP)	5.2%	-0.2%	5	+0
Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen)	11.9%	-8.6%	12	-9
The Left (Die Linke)	2.7%	-2.8%	3	-2
Alternative for Germany (AfD)	15.9%	+4.9%	15	+4
Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW)	6.2%	+6.2%	6	+6
Sum of other parties	14.2%	+1.3%	12	+3

The dominant party was the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU), with a total of 30% of the vote. CDU President Merz's pre-election target was "30+α," which means that the party has achieved its goal. The party with the second highest vote total was the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which increased its share of the vote by nearly five percentage points. The "eye of the storm" was Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW), which recorded more than 5% of the vote in its first election since its formation, meaning that it is now a realistic bet to win a seat in Germany's national elections, which have a "5% clause" that prevents parties with less than 5% of the vote from winning seats in the party-based voting. This means that any party with less than 5% of the vote will not be given a seat in the German parliament.⁴ On the other hand, the ruling parties across the board saw their shares of the vote decline. The decline of the Green Party was particularly striking, with its share of the vote falling by almost half. Given that many people voted because of their interest at the national level, it can be argued that the election was a "Nein" to the current government.

2. Analysis

1. Progress on the "Right?"

It is easy to assume that support for right-wing parties has grown because the CDU/CSU alliance is the leading party and the AfD is in second place, but the two factions need to be differentiated. First, support for the CDU/CSU has not grown dramatically, as can be seen from the figures. On the other hand, the growth rate of the AfD is notably the second-highest among all parties. Looking at the parties that received the most votes in each constituency (Stärkste Kraft), the AfD was particularly strong in the former East Germany, winning first place in many constituencies. The fact that East and West Germany have experienced economic disparities and cultural differences even after reunification has been pointed out quite often, and this has led some to regard the AfD as an "East German party" but, as can be seen from the map showing the parties receiving the second highest number of votes (Zweitestärkste Kraft), the AfD's influence is notably expanding even in the south, traditionally considered a stronghold of the CDU/CSU.⁵

Source: tagesschau Europawahl 2024 INTERAKTIV ERGEBNISSE REGIONAL

https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2024-06-09-EP-DE/index.shtml

Various scandals were uncovered about the AfD just before the elections. The secretary of Maximilian Krah, the leading candidate in the EU parliamentary elections, was arrested by police on suspicion of being a Chinese spy.⁶ In response, the AfD criticized the government for overreacting to China but, when Krah made a gaffe about the SS at the end of May, he was removed from his key position in the AfD and from the EU parliamentary election campaign.⁷ AfD was also expelled from the faction Identity and Democracy (ID).⁸ While it is unlikely that the AfD will have any influence in the European Parliament in the future as long as it does not belong to a faction, it is still remarkable that it was able to accumulate such a large number of votes. A close look at the demographics of its supporters shows that more men than women and more middle-aged people (35-44 years old) than young and old people support the AfD. We also know that, as an occupational category, workers are more likely to be supporters of the party.⁹ 51% of supporters said they voted for the party because of alignment with the party's principles, not because of dissatisfaction with other parties, an increase of 14 percentage points from the 2019 election.¹⁰

2. Stagnation and Breakthrough of "Leftist" Parties

The SPD seems unlikely to have lost loyal votes, given that it is only 1.9 points down from the previous election, but it did perhaps fail to win over swing voters. A look at the age groups of supporters shows that the SPD has a solid base of support among the elderly.¹¹ In contrast, the Green Party has never been highly supported by the elderly; in the 2019 election, it won the overwhelming support of young voters (16-24 years old), increasing its share by 9.8 percentage points compared to 2014, but in this election it lost support from these young voters across the board.

In late May 2024, torrential rains continued to fall in southern Germany, causing flooding in several municipalities. This situation is reminiscent of the record rainfall and flooding in the summer of 2021, which killed more than 180 people, and is believed to have further increased public awareness of environmental issues and contributed to the Green Party's success in the 2021 Bundestag elections. Although the flooding has so far caused less damage than in 2021, with six deaths, many people are still forced to live in evacuation shelters, and daily news reports continue to come in.¹² The Greens thus lost votes in one fell swoop despite the situation being similar to 2021, but this seems to be due to disengagement stemming from a lack of interest in economic issues, represented by the "Heating Law (Heizungsgesetz)" and other measures initiated by the Greens, rather than a decline in interest in environmental issues.¹³ Starting in 2024, all new heating systems will be required to use renewable energy sources, and this will also apply when existing heating systems break down. Buildings built during the former East Germany era are expected above all to require various measures, including temporary evacuation, and the policy has been criticized for increasing the cost of housing in the face of continuing inflation.¹⁴

While the leftist parties that make up the ruling coalition have struggled, BSW has made great strides. The party's leader, Sahra Wagenknecht, a powerful figure who headed the Left Party faction until 2019, founded the BSW as a new party in January 2024 after a series of criticisms arose from within the party over a call for an immediate ceasefire in the Ukrainian war. BSW currently holds ten seats in the Bundestag and is expected to run in federal-state elections this year. Wagenknecht, who has strong sympathies for the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the predecessor of The Left, and even its predecessor, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED; the leading party in East Germany), has publicly committed to fully opposing arms transfers to Ukraine and to imposing a very strict immigration policy domestically. BSW clearly has a high share of the vote in East Germany and is expected to make great strides in the state elections (Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg) to be held in September and beyond.

3. Future Outlook

1. Possibility of Regime Change in Germany

As noted earlier, the election was an indication of the high level of rejection of the current administration. For this reason, attention has turned to whether a change of government can occur without waiting for the 2025 elections. The first point to consider in this regard is the high hurdle for a no-confidence resolution in Germany. In the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), which was founded after World War II, a system called constructive vote of no-confidence was instituted upon reflection of the small party upheaval that beset the Weimar period (1919-1933)¹⁵. Only once - in 1982 - has a vote of no confidence in the cabinet been passed under this system, which illustrates the difficulties involved. Friedrich Merz, the leader of the CDU Party and a potential candidate for the next chancellorship, has a low approval rating, and it is doubtful whether a constructive vote of no-confidence can be passed. In opinion polls, 51% want an early dissolution of the government, while 43% oppose it, indicating that the public is also not that excited about a change of government.¹⁶

In light of the number of seats and party ideologies, it seems that the only way for the CDU/CSU to become a governing alliance is through a grand coalition (with the SPD) or a coalition with the Greens and FDP (the Jamaica coalition), but it is doubtful that there is any merit in forming a coalition with these parties, whose support is currently declining. On the other hand, a coalition with the AfD was strongly criticized both inside and outside the party whenever Merz mentioned the possibility (even at the state government level), and he eventually declared that he would not form a coalition.¹⁷ Thus, the current government, despite its low approval rating, is likely to remain in power until 2025. Nevertheless, the composition of the Bundesrat may change in state elections after September, with the AfD and BSW expected to make great strides, as mentioned above. This twist in the balance of power is expected to further erode support for the ruling parties. Long-term observations indicate that the center-right CDU/CSU and center-left SPD are losing votes year by year, and that the political situation will remain difficult even after 2025.

2. President of the European Commission: Second Term of von der Leyen

The European People's Party (EPP) Group, of which the CDU/CSU is a member, has nominated the incumbent President Ursula von der Leyen (CDU) as its candidate for the presidency of the European Commission. The EPP also increased its number of seats in the European Parliament by 14, creating a "pro-EU" majority. Chancellor Scholz, who had for a long time avoided saying anything about endorsing von der Leyen, indicated his support after the election.¹⁸ French President Emmanuel Macron has expressed his support for von der Leyen as well, establishing a consensus among the leaders of the major EU countries. Nevertheless, she has not received support from other actors. Some reports indicate that President Charles Michel of the European Council seems opposed to her candidacy, while Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who belongs to the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) Group, which has made great strides, objects to some of the appointments to key posts.¹⁹

The tug-of-war with other factions over the presidency and other posts will be key to forming von der Leyen's second administration. Accordingly, the increase in the number of seats held by the ECR and even the ID, a faction that includes populist/far-right parties, means that the EPP, although it has won a majority, will continue having to cooperate with far-right parties to a certain extent. With the AfD having been expelled from the ID, Euroskeptics are no longer part of the faction. Meanwhile, the far-right and center-right parties remain divided over issues such as immigration and the protection of sexual minorities. With a second term for von der Leyen a realistic possibility, the focus has shifted now to the extent to which the EPP will (or will not) cooperate with the ECR and ID in the future. A close eye should be kept on how similar issues are handled both in the EU and in Germany.

(This is an English translation of a Japanese paper originally published on June 24, 2024)

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