Research Group on 'China' FY2021-#3

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In 2021, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) celebrated its 100th anniversary and the People's Republic of China (PRC) its 72nd anniversary. The CCP has remained in power for over 70 years. While the core of the CCP's rule is undoubtedly the "leadership" (lingdao) of the Party, this leadership is supported by a variety of mechanisms. For example, it is important that Party committees have been created in each region, and endowed with a superior status to the government at each level. Personnel matters are also effectively decided by the Party based on the principle that "the Party controls the cadres" (dang guan ganbu). In terms of policymaking, the CCP routinely intervenes in the policy process through Party organisations created in state institutions and reflects the Party's intentions in its policies. This article will focus on these "Party groups" (dangzu) established in state organs and introduce their historical development and current status.

The Historical Development of Party Groups

The CCP's main activities in its early days were social movements such as the labour movement. In order to develop these movements, the CCP set up its own Party organisations within mass organisations such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Chinese National Peasants' Association and the All-China Students' Federation to discuss the Party's activities and policies in the movements. Such Party organisations were initially called "Dangtuan" and they became the forerunners of today's "Dangzu". Both "Dangtuan" and "Dangzu" can be translated into "Party groups." It was at the Seventh Party Congress in 1945 that "Dangtuan" became "Dangzu". The Seventh Party Congress held in Yan'an at the end of the Sino-Japanese War. This Party congress, at which Mao Zedong cemented his position as the supreme leader, was the first to stipulate "Dangzu" in the Party Constitution: "a Dangzu shall be formed when there are three or more Party members in positions of responsibility in the work of the government, industrial associations, agricultural associations, cooperatives and other leading organs of mass organizations".

After the CCP came to power in 1949, Party groups were actually established in various departments of the central government to reflect the CCP's wishes in these departments' policies. One of the triggers of the anti-Rightist struggle in 1957 was the criticism of "Dang tianxia" -- the CCP's stranglehold on power -- by the leaders of non-communist parties. In policy terms, these Party groups within the central government were instrumental in forming the CCP's power monopoly. This form of leadership of the Party became entrenched and, under the Communist regime, the collusion between the Party and the government increased. However, Mao Zedong destroyed these existing power structures during the Cultural Revolution. Both Party and government organisations ceased their activities, and military rule was promoted for a time. At the Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses held during this period, the very mention of Party groups was deleted from the Party Constitution.

Intervention by the Party groups in the political process had proven effective for the Party's leadership, and the Party groups were revived in the restoration of order following Mao's death. However, the separation of Party and state became a key feature of the political reforms under Zhao Ziyang's initiative in the late 1980s. With the aim of strengthening the Party's leadership, day-to-day affairs were left to the government, and Party groups were abolished in many government departments. The Party Constitution adopted at the Party Congress was also significantly amended to allow the establishment of Party groups within non-Party organisations. This provision remained unchanged till the 19th Party Congress held in 2017. After the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, Zhao Ziyang was ousted from power and his political reform plan was abandoned, especially the abolition of Party groups, which was judged to have weakened the Party's leadership rather than achieving its original objectives. Current research in China shares this view. Party groups were revived and to this day remain the main channel for CCP intervention in the policy process. In most cases, the head of a government department is also the secretary of the Party group for that department, to prevent the segregation of authority and ensuring that the Party's will is reflected in government departments via the Party groups.

Party Groups in the Xi Jinping Administration

The Xi Jinping administration has repeatedly stressed the Party's leadership and has sought to clearly define the Party's leading position by enacting various internal Party regulations. Following the rule of man under Mao Zedong and the institutionalisation and the attempted separation of Party and state under Deng Xiaoping, Xi Jinping has sought to prescribe Party leadership and integrating the Party and state through institutions with the aim of pursuing a different course of institutionalisation from that of Deng Xiaoping. For example, the Regulations on the Work of Local Party Committees and the Regulations on United Front Work were enacted, and in 2020 the Regulations on the work of the Central Committee were established. As part of this Xi Jinping-style institutionalisation, trial work regulations for Party Groups were enacted in 2015, and official Regulations on the Work of Party Groups were issued in 2019. Below is a brief introduction to some of the more important aspects of Party groups identified in these regulations.

First, the regulations list the organisations that should and may establish Party groups, and stipulate that government organs, people's organisations and centrally controlled enterprises should establish Party groups, which means that most authoritative bodies will have Party groups. Among the organisations in which Party groups will not be established are those with fewer than three Party members in positions of responsibility, organisations with "one institution with two names" that are effectively integrated with Party organisations, grassroots-level organisations, the Communist Youth League, subsidiaries of centrally controlled enterprises and local state-owned enterprises, local cultural organisations and social organisations. These entities obviously have limited influence or are already under the influence of the Party.

Regarding the chain of command of Party groups, lower-level Party groups are subject to the leadership of higher-level Party groups; for example, the Party groups of the State Council departments are subordinate to the Party group of the State Council. The appointment and dismissal of Party group members are decided by the Party committees that ratify the establishment of Party groups. The number of members, usually ranging from three to seven and at most nine, is evidently oligarchic in nature.

In addition, the issues to be discussed by Party groups range so broadly that they cover almost everything, including law-making, strategy, personnel, reform proposals, budgets, structures and staffing, audits and ideology. Party groups are therefore an important part of the CCP's governance in terms of policy and administration.

However, the activities of these Party groups are in fact nothing new. Like other work regulations enacted by Xi Jinping, the provisions of Party group work regulations themselves are not novel in the sense that they merely clarify and reaffirm existing mechanisms for the most part. Nevertheless, they are important in the sense that the activities of Party groups have been organised and made public.

Conclusion

Xi Jinping's regime is striving to systematically strengthen the Party's leadership by drawing up various internal Party regulations and institutionalising and legalising them in a way different from Deng Xiaoping's. The 2018 reform of Party and state structures is part of this effort, as is the strengthening of Party group work described above. Although this in fact constitutes in most cases only a clarification of existing operational mechanisms, the significance of making statutory what has heretofore been done by tacit agreement cannot be ignored. From the point of view of Party-government relations, the supremacy of the Party has been ensured from the very beginning of the Communist regime and has long been reinforced and entrenched. Party groups have become an important channel for manifesting the Party's intentions in practical policies.